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題名 Effects of job security laws in a shirking model with heterogeneous workers
作者 林忠正
Lin, Chung-cheng
貢獻者 財政系
關鍵詞 Studies; Employment security; Equilibrium; Economic models
日期 2002
上傳時間 4-Nov-2014 18:11:25 (UTC+8)
摘要 This paper explores the policy implications of job security laws. It extends Carter and De Lancey`s (1997) efficiency wage model from the assumption of two types of workers to allow for infinite types of workers. One key difference between the models is that the proportion of nonshirking workers in equilibrium is an exogenous constant in their model, whereas it is an endogenous variable in this study, They find that a job security law increases the welfare of both shirkers and nonshirkers without reducing output. In this setting, it is shown that the law may increase the welfare of both shirkers and nonshirkers at the cost of lower output, or it may result in higher output, but the welfare effect of workers is uncertain.
關聯 Southern Economic Journal, 69(2), 479-486
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 財政系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 林忠正zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lin, Chung-chengen_US
dc.date (日期) 2002en_US
dc.date.accessioned 4-Nov-2014 18:11:25 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 4-Nov-2014 18:11:25 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Nov-2014 18:11:25 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71124-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper explores the policy implications of job security laws. It extends Carter and De Lancey`s (1997) efficiency wage model from the assumption of two types of workers to allow for infinite types of workers. One key difference between the models is that the proportion of nonshirking workers in equilibrium is an exogenous constant in their model, whereas it is an endogenous variable in this study, They find that a job security law increases the welfare of both shirkers and nonshirkers without reducing output. In this setting, it is shown that the law may increase the welfare of both shirkers and nonshirkers at the cost of lower output, or it may result in higher output, but the welfare effect of workers is uncertain.en_US
dc.format.extent 2547081 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Southern Economic Journal, 69(2), 479-486en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Studies; Employment security; Equilibrium; Economic modelsen_US
dc.title (題名) Effects of job security laws in a shirking model with heterogeneous workersen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen