| dc.contributor | 國貿系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 胡聯國 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lin,Yu-Hsiu;Hu,Len-Kuo | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2009.08 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 24-十一月-2014 17:08:15 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 24-十一月-2014 17:08:15 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 24-十一月-2014 17:08:15 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71638 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper adopts the principal–supervisor–agent hierarchy model pioneered by Tirole [Tirole, J., 1986. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2, 181–214] to analyze the optimal architecture of supervision. We consider a principal who encounters a double moral hazard problem. In particular, we examine the endogenously determined supervisory effort and the possibility of untruthful revelation of supervisor`s message. The degree of accuracy for this endogenously chosen information architecture hinges upon the supervisory technology, the supervisor`s reservation utility and the agent`s production technology. Besides, though the principal`s welfare would be lowered when the possibility of untruthful revelation is taken into account, we find that his desired supervisory effort level may be enhanced instead. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 337354 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,71(2),473-485 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Moral hazard; Principal–supervisor–agent model; Optimal supervision | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
