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題名 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
作者 胡聯國
Lin,Yu-Hsiu;Hu,Len-Kuo
貢獻者 國貿系
關鍵詞 Moral hazard; Principal–supervisor–agent model; Optimal supervision
日期 2009.08
上傳時間 24-Nov-2014 17:08:15 (UTC+8)
摘要 This paper adopts the principal–supervisor–agent hierarchy model pioneered by Tirole [Tirole, J., 1986. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2, 181–214] to analyze the optimal architecture of supervision. We consider a principal who encounters a double moral hazard problem. In particular, we examine the endogenously determined supervisory effort and the possibility of untruthful revelation of supervisor`s message. The degree of accuracy for this endogenously chosen information architecture hinges upon the supervisory technology, the supervisor`s reservation utility and the agent`s production technology. Besides, though the principal`s welfare would be lowered when the possibility of untruthful revelation is taken into account, we find that his desired supervisory effort level may be enhanced instead.
關聯 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,71(2),473-485
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 國貿系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 胡聯國zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lin,Yu-Hsiu;Hu,Len-Kuoen_US
dc.date (日期) 2009.08en_US
dc.date.accessioned 24-Nov-2014 17:08:15 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 24-Nov-2014 17:08:15 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 24-Nov-2014 17:08:15 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71638-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper adopts the principal–supervisor–agent hierarchy model pioneered by Tirole [Tirole, J., 1986. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2, 181–214] to analyze the optimal architecture of supervision. We consider a principal who encounters a double moral hazard problem. In particular, we examine the endogenously determined supervisory effort and the possibility of untruthful revelation of supervisor`s message. The degree of accuracy for this endogenously chosen information architecture hinges upon the supervisory technology, the supervisor`s reservation utility and the agent`s production technology. Besides, though the principal`s welfare would be lowered when the possibility of untruthful revelation is taken into account, we find that his desired supervisory effort level may be enhanced instead.en_US
dc.format.extent 337354 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,71(2),473-485en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Moral hazard; Principal–supervisor–agent model; Optimal supervisionen_US
dc.title (題名) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organizationen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen