| dc.contributor.advisor | 王智賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Wang, Jue Shyan | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 侯文婷 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Hou, Wen Ting | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 侯文婷 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hou, Wen Ting | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2014 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 3-Feb-2015 10:30:10 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 3-Feb-2015 10:30:10 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 3-Feb-2015 10:30:10 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0102255006 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/73319 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 102255006 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 103 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 聯合行為的存在，可能會傷害市場的競爭公平，因此，各國紛紛制定反壟斷政策，以打擊聯合行為。寬恕政策便是其中一種方法，而其效果為何，是本文所要探討的重點。本文延伸 Silbye (2012) 之設定，建立反托拉斯法主管機關開始調查前及開始調查後兩個階段的賽局基本模型。先將台灣、日本、歐盟、美國四個經濟體的寬恕政策法規內容應用至基本模型裡，並得出各階段之下廠商所會採取的策略均衡。接著，本文以兩方面來探討寬恕政策效果，一為能否促進廠商提早申報的誘因；一為寬恕政策對罰款及損害賠償額的影響。本研究發現，美國的寬恕政策，最能促進廠商提早申報誘因；在反托拉斯當局開始調查前，台灣的寬恕政策預期罰款以及損害賠償額最高；在反托拉斯當局開始調查後，則是日本的寬恕政策預期罰款以及損害賠償額最高。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The cartels may injure the fairness of market competition and most of the authorities around the world have implemented Antitrust Law to eliminate them. The leniency policy is a regulation which can eliminate the cartels. The purpose of this article is to investigate the effect of this policy.We extend the model of Silbye (2012) and establish a two-stage game theoretical model. The first stage is before the beginning of antitrust authority’s detection, and the second stage is after the beginning of antitrust authority’s detection. First, we apply the leniency policy in Taiwan, Japan, the U.S.A. and the E.U. into the basic model. And then get the strategy equilibrium of firms in each stage. Next, we discuss the effect of leniency policy from two aspects. One is that whether this policy can make the firm increase the incentive to report early to the authority. The other one is to view how this policy will influence the firm’s expected penalty and damages.We find the leniency policy in the U.S.A. has the most effective impact on promoting the incentive of the firm to report early. Before the antitrust authority begins the detection, the firm’s expected penalty and damages will be the highest under the leniency policy in Taiwan. After the antitrust authority begins the detection, the firm’s expected penalty and damages will be the highest under the leniency policy in Japan. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 前言 1第二章 文獻探討 4第三章 模型設定 7第一節 基本模型 7第二節 各國寬恕政策規定 10第三節 台灣之賽局模型 13第四節 日本之賽局模型 17第五節 美國之賽局模型 20第六節 歐盟之賽局模型 23第四章 各國寬恕政策效果比較 26第一節 各國各階段均衡之臨界值 26第二節 各國各階段兩家廠商罰款值與賠償值的預期大小 29第五章 結論與建議 34參考文獻 36 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 592770 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102255006 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 寬恕政策 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 反托拉斯 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 子賽局完全均衡 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 卡特爾 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 聯合行為 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 預期罰款 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 損害賠償額 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Leniency Policy | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Antitrust | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Subgame Perfect Equilibrium | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Cartel | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Concerted Action | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Expected Penalty | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Damages | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 聯合行為寬恕政策之跨國比較 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | The Cross-Country Comparison of Leniency Policy | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 一、中文文獻王銘勇 (2006)，「聯合行為寬恕減免責任條款之研究」，《公平交易季刊》，14(1)，75-113。楊銘宏 (2008)，《卡特爾規範之研究—以寬恕政策為中心》，中原大學財經法律學系碩士論文。顏廷棟 (2008)，「寬恕政策實施子法之研究」，《公平交易季刊》，16(4)，67-115。顏廷棟 (2012)，「聯合行為之執法檢討與展望」，《公平交易季刊》， 20(4)，1-52。二、英文文獻Blum, U., N. Steinat and M. Veltins (2008), “On the rationale of leniency programs: a game-theoretical analysis,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 25(3), 209-229.Hamaguchi, Y., T. Kawagoe and A. Shibata (2009), “Group size effects on cartel formation and the enforcement power of leniency programs,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(2), 145-165.Harrington, J. E. (2006), “Corporate leniency programs and the role of the antitrust authority in detecting collusion,” Department of Economics，Johns Hopkins University.Park, S. (2014), “ The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion,” Economics Letters, 122(2), 326-330.Silbye, F. (2012), “A note on antitrust damages and leniency programs,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 33(3), 691–699.Wang, J.-S. and Y.-S. Chen (2012), “The impact of different antitrust laws on the actions of cartels,” Theoretical Economics Letters, 2(5), 455-458. | zh_TW |
