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題名 Investor protection, prospect theory, and earnings management: An international comparison of the banking industry
作者 Shen, Chung-Hua;Chih, Hsiang-Lin
沈中華
貢獻者 金融系
關鍵詞 Bank earnings; Earnings management; Investor protection; Prospect theory; Corporate governance
日期 2005
上傳時間 23-Mar-2015 18:12:41 (UTC+8)
摘要 This paper raises three issues related to the earnings management (EM) of banks across 48 countries. First, does earnings management of banks exist in all 48 countries? Second, what is the incentive of banks to manage earnings? Third, why does EM vary across countries? To answer these three questions, two thresholds (viz., a threshold of zero earnings and a threshold of zero earnings change) are employed.The answer to the first question above is that banks in more than two-thirds of the 48 countries sampled are found to have managed their earnings. With respect to the second question, prospect theory is used to provide an answer. The relationship between return and risk is positive for high earnings groups, but is negative for low earnings banks. Finally, as to the last question, stronger protection of investors and greater transparency in accounting disclosure can reduce banks’ incentives to manage earnings. Also, higher real GDP per capita decreases the degree of earnings management. It is seen that stronger enforcement of laws can counter intuitively result in stronger earnings management. However, this effect appears in low-income countries only, and not in high-income countries.
關聯 Journal of Banking & Finance - J BANK FINAN , vol. 29, no. 10, pp. 2675-2697
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.10.004
dc.contributor 金融系
dc.creator (作者) Shen, Chung-Hua;Chih, Hsiang-Lin
dc.creator (作者) 沈中華zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2005
dc.date.accessioned 23-Mar-2015 18:12:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 23-Mar-2015 18:12:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 23-Mar-2015 18:12:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/73957-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper raises three issues related to the earnings management (EM) of banks across 48 countries. First, does earnings management of banks exist in all 48 countries? Second, what is the incentive of banks to manage earnings? Third, why does EM vary across countries? To answer these three questions, two thresholds (viz., a threshold of zero earnings and a threshold of zero earnings change) are employed.The answer to the first question above is that banks in more than two-thirds of the 48 countries sampled are found to have managed their earnings. With respect to the second question, prospect theory is used to provide an answer. The relationship between return and risk is positive for high earnings groups, but is negative for low earnings banks. Finally, as to the last question, stronger protection of investors and greater transparency in accounting disclosure can reduce banks’ incentives to manage earnings. Also, higher real GDP per capita decreases the degree of earnings management. It is seen that stronger enforcement of laws can counter intuitively result in stronger earnings management. However, this effect appears in low-income countries only, and not in high-income countries.
dc.format.extent 280736 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Banking & Finance - J BANK FINAN , vol. 29, no. 10, pp. 2675-2697
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Bank earnings; Earnings management; Investor protection; Prospect theory; Corporate governance
dc.title (題名) Investor protection, prospect theory, and earnings management: An international comparison of the banking industry
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.10.004en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.10.004en_US