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題名 Credit Rationing for Bad Companies in Bad Years: Evidence from Bank Loan Transaction Data
作者 Shen, Chung-Hua
沈中華
貢獻者 金融系
關鍵詞 equilibrium credit rationing;backward-bent loan supply;bank loan transaction data;disequilibrium model
日期 2002
上傳時間 23-Mar-2015 18:20:22 (UTC+8)
摘要 This paper examines whether or not there is equilibrium credit rationing using Taiwan banks loans` transaction data. Our transaction data are unique since they help us to identify the exact lenders and borrowers, thus reducing the aggregation bias. This paper raises three hypotheses to test equilibrium credit rationing. First, we argue that the loan supply should bend backward to be consistent with equilibrium credit rationing. Second, credit rationing is expected to be more severe in bad years than in good years, suggesting stronger asymmetric information during turbulent days. Third, the asymmetric information is more severe for bad companies than for good companies. Our results support almost all hypotheses except when a bad company is similarly credit rationed as a good company in bad years.
關聯 International Journal of Finance & Economics, 7(3), 261-278
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.188
dc.contributor 金融系
dc.creator (作者) Shen, Chung-Hua
dc.creator (作者) 沈中華zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2002
dc.date.accessioned 23-Mar-2015 18:20:22 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 23-Mar-2015 18:20:22 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 23-Mar-2015 18:20:22 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/73964-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper examines whether or not there is equilibrium credit rationing using Taiwan banks loans` transaction data. Our transaction data are unique since they help us to identify the exact lenders and borrowers, thus reducing the aggregation bias. This paper raises three hypotheses to test equilibrium credit rationing. First, we argue that the loan supply should bend backward to be consistent with equilibrium credit rationing. Second, credit rationing is expected to be more severe in bad years than in good years, suggesting stronger asymmetric information during turbulent days. Third, the asymmetric information is more severe for bad companies than for good companies. Our results support almost all hypotheses except when a bad company is similarly credit rationed as a good company in bad years.
dc.format.extent 322 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) International Journal of Finance & Economics, 7(3), 261-278
dc.subject (關鍵詞) equilibrium credit rationing;backward-bent loan supply;bank loan transaction data;disequilibrium model
dc.title (題名) Credit Rationing for Bad Companies in Bad Years: Evidence from Bank Loan Transaction Data
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1002/ijfe.188en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.188 en_US