| dc.contributor | 財政系 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | 鄭竹君;朱巡;Lai, Yu-Bong | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2014-09 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 27-Apr-2015 15:19:46 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 27-Apr-2015 15:19:46 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 27-Apr-2015 15:19:46 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/74839 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The welfare effect of the existence of tax havens on high-tax countries has not been conclusive in the theoretical literature. Some papers show that the existence of tax havens is harmful to high-tax countries, while other studies argue that the opposite could occur. We aim to address a question: Do these welfare-reducing or welfare-enhancing properties still hold in the presence of lobbying? We find that the welfare-enhancing property does not hold, provided that the policy-maker attaches a sufficiently large weight to the political contribution received. Moreover, we point out that the cooperation among high-tax countries in restricting the international tax planning activity can lead to a lower level of social welfare in all high-tax countries. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 259567 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | International Tax and Public Finance, 1-20 | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Capital mobility;Interest groups;Lobbying;Tax havens;Tax competition;F21;H41;H73 | - |
| dc.title (題名) | A Political Economy of Tax Havens | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | book/chapter | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1007/s10797-014-9338-8 | - |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-014-9338-8 | - |
