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題名 從投資人保護觀點與展望理論探討各國銀行業盈餘管理之現象與動機
其他題名 Can Prospect Theory and Investor Protection Explain Banks` Incentives to Manage Earnings? New Evidence Across 48 Countries
作者 沈中華;池祥麟
關鍵詞 銀行;盈餘管理;投資人保護;展望理論;行為財務學;企業治理;Bank;Earnings management;Investor protection;Prospect theory;Behavioral finance;Corporate governance
日期 2003-09
上傳時間 14-Nov-2008 12:36:36 (UTC+8)
摘要 銀行業受到政府法規高度管制,其盈餘管理行為可能與其他產業不同。各國銀行業是否有盈餘管理現象?「展望理論」是否是盈餘管理的動機?當各國銀行盈餘管理程度高低不同時,是否可被投資人保護程度的差異所解釋?本研究發現各國銀行業「避免發生虧損」比「避免盈餘下降」的盈餘管理現象更顯著,反映銀行業避免盈餘為負的高度誘因。我們亦發現展望理論確實能解釋銀行業盈餘管理之現象。有趣的發現是各國對投資人保護程度愈高時,對於所得水準不高的國家而言,反而可能增加其銀行「避免盈餘下降」的程度,銀行財務資訊的品質反而可能會下降。 Due to its highly regulated characteristics, the extent and motives of the earnings management on the banking industry may be distinct. The paper first examines the extent to manage earnings to exceed each of two thresholds: zero earnings and zero earnings changes. Then we test whether the prospect theory can explain these behavioral thresholds for earnings management. Third, if the extents to manage earnings differ across countries, can it be explained by the varied degree of the investor protection across these countries? To test these hypotheses, we examine the properties of reported earnings of the banking industry for 47,206 firm-years between 1993 and 1999 across 48 countries. Our results demonstrate the significant evidence of the earnings management across countries, which appears to be strongly driven by the prospect theory. And we find that the earnings management decreases in outside investor rights, accounting disclosure, and the quality of inside trading. But it is striking that higher law enforcement contrarily results in more earnings management and thus possibly lower quality of financial reports of the banking industry.
關聯 經濟論文, 31(3), 407-458
資料類型 article
dc.creator (作者) 沈中華;池祥麟zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2003-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned 14-Nov-2008 12:36:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 14-Nov-2008 12:36:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 14-Nov-2008 12:36:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/7499-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 銀行業受到政府法規高度管制,其盈餘管理行為可能與其他產業不同。各國銀行業是否有盈餘管理現象?「展望理論」是否是盈餘管理的動機?當各國銀行盈餘管理程度高低不同時,是否可被投資人保護程度的差異所解釋?本研究發現各國銀行業「避免發生虧損」比「避免盈餘下降」的盈餘管理現象更顯著,反映銀行業避免盈餘為負的高度誘因。我們亦發現展望理論確實能解釋銀行業盈餘管理之現象。有趣的發現是各國對投資人保護程度愈高時,對於所得水準不高的國家而言,反而可能增加其銀行「避免盈餘下降」的程度,銀行財務資訊的品質反而可能會下降。 Due to its highly regulated characteristics, the extent and motives of the earnings management on the banking industry may be distinct. The paper first examines the extent to manage earnings to exceed each of two thresholds: zero earnings and zero earnings changes. Then we test whether the prospect theory can explain these behavioral thresholds for earnings management. Third, if the extents to manage earnings differ across countries, can it be explained by the varied degree of the investor protection across these countries? To test these hypotheses, we examine the properties of reported earnings of the banking industry for 47,206 firm-years between 1993 and 1999 across 48 countries. Our results demonstrate the significant evidence of the earnings management across countries, which appears to be strongly driven by the prospect theory. And we find that the earnings management decreases in outside investor rights, accounting disclosure, and the quality of inside trading. But it is striking that higher law enforcement contrarily results in more earnings management and thus possibly lower quality of financial reports of the banking industry.-
dc.format application/en_US
dc.format.extent 118 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/octet-stream-
dc.language zh-TWen_US
dc.language en-USen_US
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) 經濟論文, 31(3), 407-458en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 銀行;盈餘管理;投資人保護;展望理論;行為財務學;企業治理;Bank;Earnings management;Investor protection;Prospect theory;Behavioral finance;Corporate governance-
dc.title (題名) 從投資人保護觀點與展望理論探討各國銀行業盈餘管理之現象與動機zh_TW
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) Can Prospect Theory and Investor Protection Explain Banks` Incentives to Manage Earnings? New Evidence Across 48 Countries-
dc.type (資料類型) articleen