| dc.creator (作者) | 廖四郎;蔡揚宗 ;張敏蕾 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Liao, Szu-Lang ; Tsay, Jimmy Y.T. ; Chang, Ming-Lei | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2002 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 14-Nov-2008 12:38:51 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 14-Nov-2008 12:38:51 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 14-Nov-2008 12:38:51 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=8416 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This study aims to investigate the corruption and collusion problems occurring\r\nin the reforms of state-owned enterprises in China, and to analyze how this problem\r\naffects the performance of state firms. Using the idea of principal-supervisor-agent\r\nrelationships, we analyze the decay of officials control over state-owned enterprises\r\nresulting from the change that employees, managers and the public are now allowed\r\nto hold shares of state-owned enterprises, and they can claim the residual rights of\r\nthe enterprises. From our analysis, the corruption and collusion between officials\r\nand managers may not become less serious. The performances of state-owned\r\nenterprises will not be improved even after the introduction of the shareholder system.\r\nWe use a game-theoretical model involving public, government officials and\r\nenterprise managers, focusing on political considerations to study the effect of\r\nownership structure of state-owned enterprises. | - |
| dc.format | application/ | en_US |
| dc.language | en | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 中山管理評論, 10, 3-39 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | agency relationship; state-owned enterprise; shareholding; compensation surplus | - |
| dc.title (題名) | The Impact of Share Holding and Ability of Managers on The Firm Value of State-Owned Enterprises in China - An Application of Financial Agency Theory | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
