| dc.contributor | 財政系 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | Guo, W.-C.;Lai, Fu-Chuan | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | 賴孚權 | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2014-01 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2-Jun-2015 17:25:45 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 2-Jun-2015 17:25:45 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 2-Jun-2015 17:25:45 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=84335 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | d`Aspremont (Econometrica 47:1145-1150, 1979) showed that a Hotelling (Econ J 39:41-57, 1929) duopoly model with quadratic transport costs yields maximal differentiation. However, the introducing of an online firm ensures that the duopolist will never be located at the end points of the market. In other words, an online firm can raise a market effect that induces two firms to be finitely differentiated. The implication of the socially optimal solution is derived. The results herein can be extended to allow multiple firms. Finally, a free-entry equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium are also discussed. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 264730 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Annals of Regional Science, 52(1), 309-324 | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | competition (economics); market; numerical model; oligopoly | - |
| dc.title (題名) | Spatial competition with quadratic transport costs and one online firm | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1007/s00168-013-0586-9 | - |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00168-013-0576-y | - |
