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題名 Resource allocation and the performance of Taiwan`s democratic progressive party in mixed-member majoritarian elections
作者 Lin, Jih-Wen
林繼文
貢獻者 政治系
關鍵詞 DPP; KMT; MMM; Resource allocation; Taiwan elections
日期 2014-06
上傳時間 11-Jun-2015 12:05:42 (UTC+8)
摘要 Politics always involves the exchange of resources for votes, but the mechanism differs according to the electoral institution. The principal-agent model identifies two necessary conditions for this exchange to be feasible: (1) the opportunity cost of preferential grants is small, and (2) agents receiving these resources play a vital role in helping the principal to win. These conditions were satisfied in the presidential election of 2004, when swing voters were critical in helping the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to retain the presidency and limited costs were attached to the resources demanded by legislators elected under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. After 2004, the president no longer exchanged grants for votes at the national level because swing voters could hardly change the result of presidential elections while the opportunity cost of grants was raised by the plurality-tier of the mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system. Nevertheless, resource allocation still dominates local politics. After MMM was introduced, DPP legislators elected in DPP-led regions distributed the resources that were helpful to consolidating potential supporters; those campaigning in KMT-administered areas, however, attempted to lure swing voters by providing them with extra services-just like what their local heads did.
關聯 Issues and Studies, 50(2), 1-38
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 政治系
dc.creator (作者) Lin, Jih-Wen
dc.creator (作者) 林繼文zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2014-06
dc.date.accessioned 11-Jun-2015 12:05:42 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-Jun-2015 12:05:42 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Jun-2015 12:05:42 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/75667-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Politics always involves the exchange of resources for votes, but the mechanism differs according to the electoral institution. The principal-agent model identifies two necessary conditions for this exchange to be feasible: (1) the opportunity cost of preferential grants is small, and (2) agents receiving these resources play a vital role in helping the principal to win. These conditions were satisfied in the presidential election of 2004, when swing voters were critical in helping the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to retain the presidency and limited costs were attached to the resources demanded by legislators elected under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. After 2004, the president no longer exchanged grants for votes at the national level because swing voters could hardly change the result of presidential elections while the opportunity cost of grants was raised by the plurality-tier of the mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system. Nevertheless, resource allocation still dominates local politics. After MMM was introduced, DPP legislators elected in DPP-led regions distributed the resources that were helpful to consolidating potential supporters; those campaigning in KMT-administered areas, however, attempted to lure swing voters by providing them with extra services-just like what their local heads did.
dc.format.extent 803486 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Issues and Studies, 50(2), 1-38
dc.subject (關鍵詞) DPP; KMT; MMM; Resource allocation; Taiwan elections
dc.title (題名) Resource allocation and the performance of Taiwan`s democratic progressive party in mixed-member majoritarian elections
dc.type (資料類型) articleen