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題名 Media bias, slant regulation, and the public-interest media
作者 Guo, W.-C.;Lai, Fu-Chuan
賴孚權
貢獻者 財政系
關鍵詞 Hotelling; Media bias; Public-interest media; Regulation
日期 2014-04
上傳時間 11-Jun-2015 13:13:56 (UTC+8)
摘要 This study addresses the role of government in reducing media bias that arises from the demand side. Introducing a public-interest media outlet reduces the equilibrium slants that would otherwise exist under laissez-faire. Subsidy for the truthful report and price regulation are designed to effectively remedy media bias. The socially optimal subsidy policy can reduce both slant and media prices. © 2014 Springer-Verlag Wien.
關聯 Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 114(3), 291-308
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-014-0396-2
dc.contributor 財政系
dc.creator (作者) Guo, W.-C.;Lai, Fu-Chuan
dc.creator (作者) 賴孚權zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2014-04
dc.date.accessioned 11-Jun-2015 13:13:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-Jun-2015 13:13:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Jun-2015 13:13:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/75674-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study addresses the role of government in reducing media bias that arises from the demand side. Introducing a public-interest media outlet reduces the equilibrium slants that would otherwise exist under laissez-faire. Subsidy for the truthful report and price regulation are designed to effectively remedy media bias. The socially optimal subsidy policy can reduce both slant and media prices. © 2014 Springer-Verlag Wien.
dc.format.extent 323997 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 114(3), 291-308
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Hotelling; Media bias; Public-interest media; Regulation
dc.title (題名) Media bias, slant regulation, and the public-interest media
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1007/s00712-014-0396-2
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-014-0396-2