| dc.contributor | 會計系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chen, C.-J.;Hsu, Chung Yuan;Chen, Y.-L. | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 許崇源 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2014-07 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 11-Jun-2015 13:36:34 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 11-Jun-2015 13:36:34 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 11-Jun-2015 13:36:34 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/75680 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This study investigates the impact of the central agency problem on the top management compensation mix and incentive orientation in family-controlled firms. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that family-controlled firms offer a lower proportion of variable compensation to total compensation to their top management than non-family firms. Additionally, family-controlled firms with central agency problems provide their top management with higher proportions of cash compensation in their compensation packages than do family-controlled firms without central agency problems in non-electronic industries. This research provides new insights into how family-controlled firms utilize compensation mix and the temporal orientation of incentives to deal with agency problems. © 2014 Elsevier Inc. | |
| dc.format.extent | 383734 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | International Review of Economics and Finance, 32, 29-46 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Central agency problem; Family control; Incentive orientation; Top management compensation mix; Traditional agency problem | |
| dc.title (題名) | The impact of family control on the top management compensation mix and incentive orientation | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.iref.2014.01.005 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2014.01.005 | |
