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題名 公司治理與動態資本結構關係之研究
Two Essays of the Effects of Corporate Governance on Capital Structure Dynamics
作者 張雅凱
Chang, Ya Kai
貢獻者 黃台心<br>周冠男
Huang, Tai Hsin<br>Chou, Robin K.
張雅凱
Chang, Ya Kai
關鍵詞 公司治理
動態資本結構
資本結構調整速度
產品市場競爭
Corporate Governance
Dynamic capital structure
Speed of capital structure adjustment
Product market competition
日期 2014
上傳時間 1-Jul-2015 14:44:24 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究旨在探討公司治理與動態資本結構之間的關係，以及產品市場競爭對此關係的影響。
     
     第一篇文章探討公司治理品質如何影響動態資本結構。本篇文章同時考慮負債的「接管防禦」與「懲罰」效果，對最適資本結構調整速度的影響。我們的實證結果發現，雖然低負債(underlevered)和高負債(overlevered)公司，皆呈現公司治理品質愈差，調整速度愈慢的結果，但原因並不相同。以低負債且弱治理的公司來說，因負債所扮演的懲罰角色帶來的成本，高於使用負債作為接管防禦工具所帶來的利益，因此公司傾向減少負債的使用，並以較緩慢的速度朝向目標資本結構調整。但就高負債弱治理的公司而言，因面臨較嚴重的接管威脅，為了驅逐潛在的掠奪者，公司選擇增加負債的使用，而不願調降其負債水準至目標值，因此也降低了資本結構的調整速度。
     
     第二篇文章主要探討產品市場競爭在公司治理品質與動態資本結構關係中所扮演的角色。文獻中已有許多研究探討市場競爭對經理人的怠惰行為的影響。然而，到目前為止，仍然沒有文獻研究產品市場競爭程度的高低如何影響公司治理與資本結構調整速度之間的關係。我們的文章因此補足目前研究文獻不足之處。實證結果顯示，公司在競爭的狀態下，更願意以追求股東財富極大化為其目標，此舉也因此提升公司資本結構朝向最適目標值調整的速度。除此之外，我們的實證結果亦發現在一個高度市場競爭的環境下，弱治理與強治理公司之間調整速度的差距會縮小。
This study contains two essays on the relationship between corporate governance on capital structure dynamics, and how production market competition affects this relation.
     
     Essay 1: Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of Capital Structure: New Evidences
     
     The effects of corporate governance on optimal capital structure choices have been well documented, though without offering empirical evidence about the impact of corporate governance quality on the adjustment speed toward an optimal capital structure. This study simultaneously considers two effects of debt originating from agency theory—the takeover defense and the disciplinary effects of debt—on the speed of adjustment to the optimal capital structure. Corporate governance has a distinct effect on the speed of capital structure adjustment: weak governance firms that are underlevered tend to adjust slowly to the optimal capital structure, because the costs of the disciplinary role of debt outweigh the benefits of using debt as a takeover defense tool. Although, overlevered weak governance firms also adjust slowly, they do so because they are reluctant to decrease their leverage toward the target level to deter potential raiders, especially if they face a serious takeover threat. Therefore, this study finds that both overlevered and underlevered firms with weak governance adjust slowly toward their target debt levels, though with different motivations.
     
     Essay 2: Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Dynamic Capital Structure
     
     The importance of product market competition for analyzing managerial slack or the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decision has been widely discussed. However, prior studies pay little attention to center on the impact of market competition on the relationship between corporate governance quality and capital structure dynamics. This paper thus fills this gap in the literature. Our study finds that competition makes firms with weak governance have stronger incentive to maximize shareholders’ wealth and thus increase their adjustment speed toward their target leverage. Moreover, the difference in the adjustment speeds between weak and strong governance firms become smaller when firms operate in highly competitive industries.
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     Byoun, S. (2008). How and when do firms adjust their capital structures toward targets? Journal of Finance, 6, 3069-3096.
     Chava, S., Livdan, D., & Purnanandam A. (2009). Do shareholder rights affect the cost of bank loans? Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2973-2004.
     Cook, D. O., Kieshnick, R., & McCullough, B. D. (2008). Regression analysis of proportions in finance with self selection. Journal of Empirical Finance, 15, 860-867.
     Dang, V. A. (2011). Leverage, debt maturity and firm investment: An empirical analysis. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 38, 225-258.
     Dangl, T. & Zechner, J. (2007). Debt maturity and the dynamics of leverage. Working paper, Vienna University of Technology.
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     De Miguel, A. & Pindado, J. (2001). Determinants of the capital structure: New evidence from Spanish data. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7, 77-99.
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描述 博士
國立政治大學
金融研究所
98352507
103
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098352507
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 黃台心<br>周冠男zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Huang, Tai Hsin<br>Chou, Robin K.en_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 張雅凱zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chang, Ya Kaien_US
dc.creator (作者) 張雅凱zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chang, Ya Kaien_US
dc.date (日期) 2014en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2015 14:44:24 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Jul-2015 14:44:24 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2015 14:44:24 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0098352507en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76167-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 金融研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 98352507zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 103zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究旨在探討公司治理與動態資本結構之間的關係，以及產品市場競爭對此關係的影響。
     
     第一篇文章探討公司治理品質如何影響動態資本結構。本篇文章同時考慮負債的「接管防禦」與「懲罰」效果，對最適資本結構調整速度的影響。我們的實證結果發現，雖然低負債(underlevered)和高負債(overlevered)公司，皆呈現公司治理品質愈差，調整速度愈慢的結果，但原因並不相同。以低負債且弱治理的公司來說，因負債所扮演的懲罰角色帶來的成本，高於使用負債作為接管防禦工具所帶來的利益，因此公司傾向減少負債的使用，並以較緩慢的速度朝向目標資本結構調整。但就高負債弱治理的公司而言，因面臨較嚴重的接管威脅，為了驅逐潛在的掠奪者，公司選擇增加負債的使用，而不願調降其負債水準至目標值，因此也降低了資本結構的調整速度。
     
     第二篇文章主要探討產品市場競爭在公司治理品質與動態資本結構關係中所扮演的角色。文獻中已有許多研究探討市場競爭對經理人的怠惰行為的影響。然而，到目前為止，仍然沒有文獻研究產品市場競爭程度的高低如何影響公司治理與資本結構調整速度之間的關係。我們的文章因此補足目前研究文獻不足之處。實證結果顯示，公司在競爭的狀態下，更願意以追求股東財富極大化為其目標，此舉也因此提升公司資本結構朝向最適目標值調整的速度。除此之外，我們的實證結果亦發現在一個高度市場競爭的環境下，弱治理與強治理公司之間調整速度的差距會縮小。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study contains two essays on the relationship between corporate governance on capital structure dynamics, and how production market competition affects this relation.
     
     Essay 1: Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of Capital Structure: New Evidences
     
     The effects of corporate governance on optimal capital structure choices have been well documented, though without offering empirical evidence about the impact of corporate governance quality on the adjustment speed toward an optimal capital structure. This study simultaneously considers two effects of debt originating from agency theory—the takeover defense and the disciplinary effects of debt—on the speed of adjustment to the optimal capital structure. Corporate governance has a distinct effect on the speed of capital structure adjustment: weak governance firms that are underlevered tend to adjust slowly to the optimal capital structure, because the costs of the disciplinary role of debt outweigh the benefits of using debt as a takeover defense tool. Although, overlevered weak governance firms also adjust slowly, they do so because they are reluctant to decrease their leverage toward the target level to deter potential raiders, especially if they face a serious takeover threat. Therefore, this study finds that both overlevered and underlevered firms with weak governance adjust slowly toward their target debt levels, though with different motivations.
     
     Essay 2: Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Dynamic Capital Structure
     
     The importance of product market competition for analyzing managerial slack or the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decision has been widely discussed. However, prior studies pay little attention to center on the impact of market competition on the relationship between corporate governance quality and capital structure dynamics. This paper thus fills this gap in the literature. Our study finds that competition makes firms with weak governance have stronger incentive to maximize shareholders’ wealth and thus increase their adjustment speed toward their target leverage. Moreover, the difference in the adjustment speeds between weak and strong governance firms become smaller when firms operate in highly competitive industries.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents Chapter 1 Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of Capital Structure: New Evidence 1
     1.1 Introduction 1
     1.2 Literature Review. 7
     1.2.1 Debts as takeover defense tools 8
     1.2.2 Debts as disciplinary tools 9
     1.3 Hypotheses and Model Specification 10
     1.3.1 Hypotheses 10
     1.3.2 Econometric models 11
     1.3.2.1 Two-stage model 12
     1.3.2.2 Reduced-form model 13
     1.4 Variable Definition and Data 14
     1.4.1 Variable definition 14
     1.4.1.1 Leverage ratio 14
     1.4.1.2 Corporate governance 15
     1.4.1.3 Firm characteristics 17
     1.4.1.4 Qualities of corporate governance 18
     1.4.2. Data 19
     1.5. Empirical Results 20
     1.5.1. Two-stage dynamic partial adjustment model 20
     1.5.2. Reduced-form partial adjustment model 21
     1.5.3. Boundary issues 21
     1.5.4. Deviation from target leverage and speed of adjustments 22
     1.6. Conclusions 26
     References 28
     Appendix. Variable definitions 43
     Chapter 2 Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Dynamic Capital Structure 44
     2.1. Introduction 44
     2.2. Literature review and hypothesis development 47
     2.3. Model Specification 50
     2.4. Variable Definition and Data 52
     2.4.1. Definition of leverage 52
     2.4.2. Corporate governance target determinant 53
     2.4.3. Firm characteristics target determinants 55
     2.4.4. Measures of market competition 57
     2.4.5. Defining weak and strong governance qualities between firms in low and high competition industries 58
     2.4.6. Data 59
     2.5. Empirical analysis 60
     2.5.1. Corporate governance, market competition, and speed of adjustment 60
     2.5.2. Alternative measure of leverage ratio 62
     2.5.3. Alternative measure of corporate governance index 64
     2.5.4. Alternative industry classification schemes of HHI 64
     2.5.5. The presence of boundary issues 65
     2.5.6. Asymmetric target adjustment behavior 66
     2.6. Conclusion 67
     References 69
     
     Table 1.1 Summary statistics 32
     Table 1.2 Difference in mean between strong and weak governance firms 33
     Table 1.3 Regression results for adjustment speed estimates from a two-stage dynamic partial adjustment capital structure model 34
     Table 1.4 Regression results for adjustment speed estimates from the reduced-form dynamic partial adjustment capital structure model 36
     Table 1.5 Regression results omitting zero-debt boundary points using the reduced- form dynamic partial adjustment model 38
     Table 1.6 Regression results for underlevered and overlevered categories 40
     Table 1.7 Leverages and deviations for years surrounding M&A announcement dates 42
     Table 2.1 Summary statistics 72
     Table 2.2 Correlation matrix of the variables 73
     Table 2.3 The impact of product market competition on adjustment speed estimates across the governance qualities 75
     Table 2.4 Regression results for adjustment speed estimates using book-valued leverage ratio 76
     Table 2.5 Regression results for using E-index as a proxy for corporate governance quality 77
     Table 2.6 Regression results for adjustment speed estimates using alternative measures of HHI 78
     Table 2.7 Regression results for omitting zero-debt boundary points 79
     Table 2.8 Regression results for asymmetric adjustment speed estimates 80		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098352507en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 動態資本結構zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資本結構調整速度zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 產品市場競爭zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Dynamic capital structureen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Speed of capital structure adjustmenten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Product market competitionen_US
dc.title (題名) 公司治理與動態資本結構關係之研究zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Two Essays of the Effects of Corporate Governance on Capital Structure Dynamicsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Alchian, A. A. (1950). Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory. Journal of Political Economy, 58, 211-221.
     Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009). What matters in corporate governance? Review of Financial Studies, 22, 783-827.
     Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Wang, C. C. Y. (2013). Learning and the disappearing association between governance and returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 108, 323-348.
     Berger, P. G., Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. L. (1997). Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. Journal of Finance, 52, 1411-1438.
     Bowman, R. G. (1980). The importance of a market value measurement of debt in assessing leverage. Journal of Accounting Research, 18, 242-254.
     Byoun, S. (2008). How and when do firms adjust their capital structures toward targets? Journal of Finance, 6, 3069-3096.
     Chava, S., Livdan, D., & Purnanandam A. (2009). Do shareholder rights affect the cost of bank loans? Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2973-2004.
     Cook, D. O., Kieshnick, R., & McCullough, B. D. (2008). Regression analysis of proportions in finance with self selection. Journal of Empirical Finance, 15, 860-867.
     Dang, V. A. (2011). Leverage, debt maturity and firm investment: An empirical analysis. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 38, 225-258.
     Dangl, T. & Zechner, J. (2007). Debt maturity and the dynamics of leverage. Working paper, Vienna University of Technology.
     De Jong, A., Verbeek, M., & Verwijmeren, P. (2011). Firms’ debt-equity decisions when the static tradeoff theory and the pecking order theory disagree. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35, 1303-1314.
     De Miguel, A. & Pindado, J. (2001). Determinants of the capital structure: New evidence from Spanish data. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7, 77-99.
     Dittmar, A. & Mahrt-Smith, J. (2007). Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics, 83, 599-634.
     Drobetz, W. & Wanzenried, G. (2006). What determines the speed of adjustment to the target capital structure? Applied Financial Economics, 16, 941-961.
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