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題名 政治連結對於新創企業公開發行的影響： 以台灣創業投資產業為例
Political connections under the IPO process of new ventures: Evidence from Taiwanese venture capital industry
作者 黃敬堡
Huang, Jing Bao
貢獻者 李文傑<br>王信實
Lee, Wen Chieh<br>Wang, Shinn Shyr
黃敬堡
Huang, Jing Bao
關鍵詞 創業投資
政治連結
初次公開發行 (IPO)
研發效率
台灣
Venture Capital
Political connections
Initial public offerings (IPO)
Innovative Efficiency
Taiwan
日期 2014
上傳時間 1-Jul-2015 14:59:48 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究探討政治連結如何成為創業投資產業中資訊傳遞的橋樑，其中政治連結的指標分別由新創企業和創投董監事的教育背景，是否和國家發展基金委員會成員的教育背景有關係來定義。實證結果顯示政治連結透過不同的緊密程度對新創企業公開發行的里程碑造成影響。透過梳理過去發生在台灣的創投投資案記錄，本研究發現創投名聲和企業的研發效率對企業的初次公開發行有正面的影響。另外，政治連結在新創企業公開發行的里程碑上，扮演著相當有趣的角色。企業自身的政治連結確實有助於企業達到初次公開發行的里程碑；然而，創投的政治連結卻對企業的初次公開發行有負面的影響。
This paper investigates how the political connections work on information dissemination in venture capital markets. The political connections are formed among new ventures, venture capitals measured by whether their directors or supervisors have the same educational backgrounds as those of the Taiwanese National Development Fund (NDF) board members. The political connection is hypothesized to affect the entrepreneurial Initial Public Offering (IPO) milestone in different connection settings. By using Taiwanese domestic venture capital investment records, this paper shows how reputation, firm innovative efficiency and political connections have impacts on the startup’s IPO. While the reputation and firm innovative efficiency are positively correlated with the probability of firm’s IPO, the political connections play a significant but tricky role in the entrepreneurial IPO milestone. Specifically, firms’ political connections affect their IPO milestone positively; however, venture capitals’ political connections are adversely related with the probably of the IPO milestone.
參考文獻 1. Akerlof, G. A., 1970. The market for" lemons": Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500.
2. Allen, F., 1984. Reputation and product quality. The RAND Journal of Economics, 15(3), 311-327.
3. Admati, A. R., and Perry, M., 1991. Joint projects without commitment. The Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 259-276.
4. Admati, A. R., and Pfleiderer, P., 1994. Robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists. Journal of Finance, 49(2), 371-402.
5. Ardichvili, A., Cardozo, R., and Ray, S., 2003. A theory of entrepreneurial opportunity identification and development. Journal of Business venturing, 18(1), 105-123.
6. Bradford, D. F., 1981. The incidence and allocation effects of a tax on corporate distributions. Journal of Public Economics, 15(1), 1-22.
7. Bagwell, L. S., and Shoven, J. B., 1989. Cash distributions to shareholders. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 129-140.
8. Beck, T., and Levine, R., 2002. Industry growth and capital allocation: does having a market-or bank-based system matter?. Journal of Financial Economics, 64(2), 147-180.
9. Bernile, G., Cumming, D., and Lyandres, E., 2007. The size of venture capital and private equity fund portfolios. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(4), 564-590.
10. Bygrave, W. D., 1987. Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: A networking perspective. Journal of Business Venturing, 2(2), 139-154.
11. Bygrave, W. D., 1988. The structure of the investment networks of venture capital firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 3(2), 137-157.
12. Boot, A. W., and Thakor, A. V., 1993. Security design. Journal of Finance, 48(4), 1349-1378.
13. Berkman, H., Cole, R. A., and Fu, L. J., 2010. Political connections and minority-shareholder protection: Evidence from securities-market regulation in China. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(2), 1391-1417
14. Carleton, W. T. and Cooper, I. A., 1976. Estimation and Uses of the Term Structure of Interest Rates. Journal of Finance, 31(4), 1067-1083.
15. Chan, Y. S., Siegel, D., and Thakor, A. V., 1990. Learning, corporate control and performance requirements in venture capital contracts. International Economic Review, 31(2), 365-381.
16. Chan, L. K., Lakonishok, J., and Sougiannis, T., 2001. The stock market valuation of research and development expenditures. Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2431-2456.

17. Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., and Malloy, C., 2008. The small world of investing: Board connections and mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy, 116(5), 951-979.
18. Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., and Malloy, C., 2010. Sell‐side school ties. Journal of Finance, 65(4), 1409-1437.
19. Chemmanur, T. J., Krishnan, K., and Nandy, D. K., 2011. How does venture capital financing improve efficiency in private firms? A look beneath the surface. Review of Financial Studies, 24(12), 4037-4090.
20. Chen, S., Sun, Z., Tang, S., and Wu, D., 2011. Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(2), 259-271.
21. Chaney, P. K., Faccio, M., and Parsley, D., 2011. The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(1), 58-76.
22. Hsu, D. H., 2004. What do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital affiliation?. Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1805-1844.
23. Fisman, R., 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. The American economic review, 91(4), 1095-1102.
24. Faccio, M., 2006. Politically Connected Firms. The American economic review, 96(1), 369-386
25. Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., and McConnell, J., 2006. Political connections and corporate bailouts. The Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2597-2635.
26. Fan, J. P., Wong, T. J., and Zhang, T., 2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China`s newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(2), 330-357.
27. Fernhaber, S. A., and McDougall‐Covin, P. P., 2009. Venture capitalists as catalysts to new venture internationalization: the impact of their knowledge and reputation resources. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(1), 277-295.
28. Golden, B. R., 1992. Research notes. The past is the past—or is it? The use of retrospective accounts as indicators of past strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 35(4), 848-860.
29. Gompers, P. A., 1995. Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital. Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1461-1489.
30. Gompers, P. A., 1996. Grandstanding in the venture capital industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 42(1), 133-156.
31. Gompers Paul, and Josh Lerner, 2005. The venture capital cycle. MIT press.


32. Huber, G. P., and Power, D. J., 1985. Retrospective reports of strategic‐level managers: Guidelines for increasing their accuracy. Strategic Management Journal, 6(2), 171-180.
33. Hansen, E., 1992. Venture capital contracts with conversion options. Discussion paper 24. Reserve Bank of New Zealand Wellington.
34. Hart, O. and Moore, J., 1994. A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 841-879.
35. Hart, O. and Moore, J., 1999. Foundations of incomplete contracts. The Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 115-138.
36. Hunter, J. E., and Schmidt, F. L., 2004. Methods of meta-analysis: Correcting error and bias in research findings. Sage.
37. Hall, B. H., Jaffe, A., and Trajtenberg, M., 2005. Market value and patent citations. RAND Journal of Economics, 36(1), 16-38.
38. Hellmann, T., 2006. IPOs, acquisitions, and the use of convertible securities in venture capital. Journal of Financial Economics, 81(3), 649-679.
39. Hochberg, Y. V., Ljungqvist, A., and Lu, Y., 2007. Whom you know matters: Venture capital networks and investment performance. Journal of Finance, 62(1), 251-301.
40. Hirshleifer, D., Hsu, P. H., and Li, D., 2013. Innovative efficiency and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(3), 632-654.
41. Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W. H., 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
42. Johnson, S., and Mitton, T., 2003. Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Financial Economics, 67(2), 351-382.
43. Krueger, A. O., 1974. The political economy of the rent-seeking society. The American economic review, 64(3), 291-303.
44. Kreps, D. M., and Wilson, R., 1982. Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 253-279.
45. Kaplan, S. N., Martel, F., and Stromberg, P., 2003. How do legal differences and learning affect financial contracts? Working paper. National Bureau of Economic Research.
46. Kanniainen, V., and Keuschnigg, C., 2003. The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture capital finance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(5), 521-534.
47. Krishnan, C. N. V., Ivanov, V. I., Masulis, R. W., and Singh, A. K., 2011. Venture capital reputation, post-IPO performance and corporate governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(05), 1295-1333.
48. Leland, H. E. and Pyle, D. H., 1977. Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance, 32(2),371-387.
49. Litzenberger, R. H., and Ramaswamy, K., 1979. The effect of personal taxes and dividends on capital asset prices: Theory and empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(2), 163-195.
50. Lerner, J., 1994. The importance of patent scope: an empirical analysis. The RAND Journal of Economics, 25(2), 319-333.
51. La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A., 2002. Government ownership of banks. Journal of Finance, 57(1), 265-301.
52. Li, H., Meng, L., Wang, Q., and Zhou, L. A., 2008. Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms. Journal of development economics, 87(2), 283-299.
53. Megginson, W. L., and Weiss, K. A., 1991. Venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings. Journal of Finance, 46(3), 879-903.
54. Neher, D. V., 1999. Staged financing: an agency perspective. The Review of Economic Studies, 66(2), 255-274.
55. Nahata, R., 2008. Venture capital reputation and investment performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 90(2), 127-151.
56. Oliver, L., 2013. Social Network and the Venture Capital Investment Target: The Case of Educational Network. National Chengchi University Economic Master Thesis.
57. Petersen, M. A., 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches. Review of financial studies, 22(1), 435-480.
58. Ryan, H., 2013. Social Network and R&D Productivity of the Venture Invested Entrepreneurial Team: the Case of Educational Network. National Chengchi University Economic Master Thesis.
59. Stott, D. H., 1958. Some psychosomatic aspects of casualty in reproduction. Journal of psychosomatic research, 3(1), 42-55.
60. Shapiro, C., 1983. Premiums for high quality products as returns to reputations. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(4), 659-679.
61. Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W., 1994. Politicians and firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 995-1025.
62. Shane, S., 2000. Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. Organization science, 11(4), 448-469.
63. Shane, S., and Cable, D., 2002. Network ties, reputation, and the financing of new ventures. Management Science, 48(3), 364-381.
64. Schmidt, K. M., 2003. Convertible securities and venture capital finance. Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1139-1166.
65. Stam, W., Arzlanian, S., and Elfring, T., 2014. Social capital of entrepreneurs and small firm performance: A meta-analysis of contextual and methodological moderators. Journal of Business Venturing, 29(1), 152-173.
66. Trester, J. J., 1998. Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information. Journal of Banking and Finance, 22(6), 675-699.
67. Venkataraman, S. 1997. The distinctive domain of entrepreneurship research. Advances in entrepreneurship, firm emergence and growth, 3(1), 119-138.
68. Woods Jr, T. E., 2009. Meltdown: A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy Tanked, and the Government Bailout Will Make Things Worse. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc.
69. Yoon, E., Guffey, H. J., and Kijewski, V., 1993. The effects of information and company reputation on intentions to buy a business service. Journal of Business Research, 27(3), 215-228.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
102258029
103
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102258029
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 李文傑<br>王信實zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Lee, Wen Chieh<br>Wang, Shinn Shyren_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃敬堡zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Huang, Jing Baoen_US
dc.creator (作者) 黃敬堡zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Huang, Jing Baoen_US
dc.date (日期) 2014en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2015 14:59:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Jul-2015 14:59:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2015 14:59:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0102258029en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76247-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 102258029zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 103zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究探討政治連結如何成為創業投資產業中資訊傳遞的橋樑，其中政治連結的指標分別由新創企業和創投董監事的教育背景，是否和國家發展基金委員會成員的教育背景有關係來定義。實證結果顯示政治連結透過不同的緊密程度對新創企業公開發行的里程碑造成影響。透過梳理過去發生在台灣的創投投資案記錄，本研究發現創投名聲和企業的研發效率對企業的初次公開發行有正面的影響。另外，政治連結在新創企業公開發行的里程碑上，扮演著相當有趣的角色。企業自身的政治連結確實有助於企業達到初次公開發行的里程碑；然而，創投的政治連結卻對企業的初次公開發行有負面的影響。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper investigates how the political connections work on information dissemination in venture capital markets. The political connections are formed among new ventures, venture capitals measured by whether their directors or supervisors have the same educational backgrounds as those of the Taiwanese National Development Fund (NDF) board members. The political connection is hypothesized to affect the entrepreneurial Initial Public Offering (IPO) milestone in different connection settings. By using Taiwanese domestic venture capital investment records, this paper shows how reputation, firm innovative efficiency and political connections have impacts on the startup’s IPO. While the reputation and firm innovative efficiency are positively correlated with the probability of firm’s IPO, the political connections play a significant but tricky role in the entrepreneurial IPO milestone. Specifically, firms’ political connections affect their IPO milestone positively; however, venture capitals’ political connections are adversely related with the probably of the IPO milestone.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1. Introduction
1.1 The Venture Capital Industry 1
1.2 Double-Sided Information Asymmetry Problem 1
1.3 Mechanisms to Resolve Information Asymmetry 2
1.4 Information Dissemination Channels 3
2. Motivation and Institution Background 7
3. Hypothesis and Methodology 9
4. Data, Sample Selection, and Construction of Variables
4.1 Data Construction 11
4.2 Sample Selection Criteria 13
4.3 Variable constructions 13
4.4 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 18
5. Regression Analysis and Results
5.1 Effect of Venture Capital Reputation 20
5.2 Effect of Firm Innovative Efficiency 21
5.3 Effect of Political Connections 21
6. Conclusion 24
7. Appendix 25
8. References 28		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 563094 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102258029en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 創業投資zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政治連結zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 初次公開發行 (IPO)zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 研發效率zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 台灣zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Venture Capitalen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Political connectionsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Initial public offerings (IPO)en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Innovative Efficiencyen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Taiwanen_US
dc.title (題名) 政治連結對於新創企業公開發行的影響： 以台灣創業投資產業為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Political connections under the IPO process of new ventures: Evidence from Taiwanese venture capital industryen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1. Akerlof, G. A., 1970. The market for" lemons": Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500.
2. Allen, F., 1984. Reputation and product quality. The RAND Journal of Economics, 15(3), 311-327.
3. Admati, A. R., and Perry, M., 1991. Joint projects without commitment. The Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 259-276.
4. Admati, A. R., and Pfleiderer, P., 1994. Robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists. Journal of Finance, 49(2), 371-402.
5. Ardichvili, A., Cardozo, R., and Ray, S., 2003. A theory of entrepreneurial opportunity identification and development. Journal of Business venturing, 18(1), 105-123.
6. Bradford, D. F., 1981. The incidence and allocation effects of a tax on corporate distributions. Journal of Public Economics, 15(1), 1-22.
7. Bagwell, L. S., and Shoven, J. B., 1989. Cash distributions to shareholders. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 129-140.
8. Beck, T., and Levine, R., 2002. Industry growth and capital allocation: does having a market-or bank-based system matter?. Journal of Financial Economics, 64(2), 147-180.
9. Bernile, G., Cumming, D., and Lyandres, E., 2007. The size of venture capital and private equity fund portfolios. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(4), 564-590.
10. Bygrave, W. D., 1987. Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: A networking perspective. Journal of Business Venturing, 2(2), 139-154.
11. Bygrave, W. D., 1988. The structure of the investment networks of venture capital firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 3(2), 137-157.
12. Boot, A. W., and Thakor, A. V., 1993. Security design. Journal of Finance, 48(4), 1349-1378.
13. Berkman, H., Cole, R. A., and Fu, L. J., 2010. Political connections and minority-shareholder protection: Evidence from securities-market regulation in China. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(2), 1391-1417
14. Carleton, W. T. and Cooper, I. A., 1976. Estimation and Uses of the Term Structure of Interest Rates. Journal of Finance, 31(4), 1067-1083.
15. Chan, Y. S., Siegel, D., and Thakor, A. V., 1990. Learning, corporate control and performance requirements in venture capital contracts. International Economic Review, 31(2), 365-381.
16. Chan, L. K., Lakonishok, J., and Sougiannis, T., 2001. The stock market valuation of research and development expenditures. Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2431-2456.

17. Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., and Malloy, C., 2008. The small world of investing: Board connections and mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy, 116(5), 951-979.
18. Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., and Malloy, C., 2010. Sell‐side school ties. Journal of Finance, 65(4), 1409-1437.
19. Chemmanur, T. J., Krishnan, K., and Nandy, D. K., 2011. How does venture capital financing improve efficiency in private firms? A look beneath the surface. Review of Financial Studies, 24(12), 4037-4090.
20. Chen, S., Sun, Z., Tang, S., and Wu, D., 2011. Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(2), 259-271.
21. Chaney, P. K., Faccio, M., and Parsley, D., 2011. The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(1), 58-76.
22. Hsu, D. H., 2004. What do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital affiliation?. Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1805-1844.
23. Fisman, R., 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. The American economic review, 91(4), 1095-1102.
24. Faccio, M., 2006. Politically Connected Firms. The American economic review, 96(1), 369-386
25. Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., and McConnell, J., 2006. Political connections and corporate bailouts. The Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2597-2635.
26. Fan, J. P., Wong, T. J., and Zhang, T., 2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China`s newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(2), 330-357.
27. Fernhaber, S. A., and McDougall‐Covin, P. P., 2009. Venture capitalists as catalysts to new venture internationalization: the impact of their knowledge and reputation resources. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(1), 277-295.
28. Golden, B. R., 1992. Research notes. The past is the past—or is it? The use of retrospective accounts as indicators of past strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 35(4), 848-860.
29. Gompers, P. A., 1995. Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital. Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1461-1489.
30. Gompers, P. A., 1996. Grandstanding in the venture capital industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 42(1), 133-156.
31. Gompers Paul, and Josh Lerner, 2005. The venture capital cycle. MIT press.


32. Huber, G. P., and Power, D. J., 1985. Retrospective reports of strategic‐level managers: Guidelines for increasing their accuracy. Strategic Management Journal, 6(2), 171-180.
33. Hansen, E., 1992. Venture capital contracts with conversion options. Discussion paper 24. Reserve Bank of New Zealand Wellington.
34. Hart, O. and Moore, J., 1994. A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 841-879.
35. Hart, O. and Moore, J., 1999. Foundations of incomplete contracts. The Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 115-138.
36. Hunter, J. E., and Schmidt, F. L., 2004. Methods of meta-analysis: Correcting error and bias in research findings. Sage.
37. Hall, B. H., Jaffe, A., and Trajtenberg, M., 2005. Market value and patent citations. RAND Journal of Economics, 36(1), 16-38.
38. Hellmann, T., 2006. IPOs, acquisitions, and the use of convertible securities in venture capital. Journal of Financial Economics, 81(3), 649-679.
39. Hochberg, Y. V., Ljungqvist, A., and Lu, Y., 2007. Whom you know matters: Venture capital networks and investment performance. Journal of Finance, 62(1), 251-301.
40. Hirshleifer, D., Hsu, P. H., and Li, D., 2013. Innovative efficiency and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(3), 632-654.
41. Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W. H., 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
42. Johnson, S., and Mitton, T., 2003. Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Financial Economics, 67(2), 351-382.
43. Krueger, A. O., 1974. The political economy of the rent-seeking society. The American economic review, 64(3), 291-303.
44. Kreps, D. M., and Wilson, R., 1982. Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 253-279.
45. Kaplan, S. N., Martel, F., and Stromberg, P., 2003. How do legal differences and learning affect financial contracts? Working paper. National Bureau of Economic Research.
46. Kanniainen, V., and Keuschnigg, C., 2003. The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture capital finance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(5), 521-534.
47. Krishnan, C. N. V., Ivanov, V. I., Masulis, R. W., and Singh, A. K., 2011. Venture capital reputation, post-IPO performance and corporate governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(05), 1295-1333.
48. Leland, H. E. and Pyle, D. H., 1977. Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance, 32(2),371-387.
49. Litzenberger, R. H., and Ramaswamy, K., 1979. The effect of personal taxes and dividends on capital asset prices: Theory and empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(2), 163-195.
50. Lerner, J., 1994. The importance of patent scope: an empirical analysis. The RAND Journal of Economics, 25(2), 319-333.
51. La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A., 2002. Government ownership of banks. Journal of Finance, 57(1), 265-301.
52. Li, H., Meng, L., Wang, Q., and Zhou, L. A., 2008. Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms. Journal of development economics, 87(2), 283-299.
53. Megginson, W. L., and Weiss, K. A., 1991. Venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings. Journal of Finance, 46(3), 879-903.
54. Neher, D. V., 1999. Staged financing: an agency perspective. The Review of Economic Studies, 66(2), 255-274.
55. Nahata, R., 2008. Venture capital reputation and investment performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 90(2), 127-151.
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