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題名 公司財務決策論文兩篇:跨國購併目標公司之選擇以及聯貸市場參貸銀行的選擇
Two Essays on Corporate Financial Decisions: Choices of Target Firms in Cross-Border M&As and Choices of Participant Banks in Syndicated Loan Market
作者 謝依婷
Hsieh, Yi Ting
貢獻者 張元晨<br>岳夢蘭
Chang, Yuan Chen<br>Yueh, Meng Lan
謝依婷
Hsieh, Yi Ting
關鍵詞 公司財務決策
市場集中度
跨國購併
垂直整合
比較利益
聯貸市場
參貸者商譽
建立商譽的互補現象
Corporate Financial Decisions
Market Concentration
Cross-border Merger
Vertical Integration
Comparative Advantage
Syndicated Loan Market
Participant Bank Reputation
Complementarity in reputation Building
日期 2015
上傳時間 13-Jul-2015 11:07:01 (UTC+8)
摘要 本論文主要由兩篇文章所組成，探討有關跨國購併活動中目標公司的選擇，以及聯貸市場中參貸銀行的選擇。第一部份旨在分析市場集中程度與跨國購併在垂直相關產業的議題。Beladi, Chakrabarti and Marjit (2013)建立一般均衡寡佔模型，連結當地國的市場競爭力和跨國購併在垂直相關產業的論點。他們模型認為當地國家的垂直整合程度會改變國外主併者策略優勢。我們使用1990年至2012年涵蓋86個國家，之全球購併活動案件，我們衡量當地國家的市場競爭與垂直整合程度，呈現當地國家前期的市場競爭力將會誘發國外市場主併者進入，以垂直購併的方式購併當地國家之目標公司。本研究結果提供了實證性的結果來支持過去理論之發現，認為產業的集中程度會影響跨國購併。
本論文的第二部份，在研究知識技能互補和銀行商譽在參貸銀行的選擇，觀察主貸銀行該如何選擇參貸銀行之決策分析。延伸Diamond (1991)的商譽建立假說，透過主貸銀行本身的特性因子與工作經驗，來探討主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行的誘因動機。研究結果發現，當主貸銀行具有較高的自身商譽佳、經營及投資具效率性、內部監理機制較佳、且市場經驗較為豐富時，會誘使主貸銀行減少對高商譽參貸銀行的需求。呈現知識技能互補的現象於主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行的決策。本研究結果可提供我們對聯貸銀行團商譽互補現象及分析。
Two essays are comprised in this dissertation to study on choices of target firms in cross-border M&As and choices of participant banks in the syndicated loan market. In the first essay, cross-border mergers and market concentration in a vertically related industry, we examine the relationship between market concentration and cross-border M&A. Beladi, Chakrabarti and Marjit (2013) present an oligopoly in general equilibrium model to identify the linkages between local market competition and cross-border mergers in a vertically related industry. Their model predicts that a vertical integration at home changes the strategic advantage for foreign acquirers. Using firm-level data from 86 countries between 1990 and 2012, we calculate proxies for local market competition and show that lower (higher) pre-merger local competition at home country will increase (decrease) mergers between a foreign firm and a vertically integrated home firm. These findings provide empirical supports for the significant impact of industry concentration on the decisions of cross-border M&A.
In the second essay, the effects of knowledge complementarities and bank reputation on participant banks choices, we focus on the decision of lead arrangers on participant bank choices in the syndicated loan market. We extend reputation building theory (Diamond, 1991) and model the lead arranger’s partner choice problem through the effect of self-related and task-related factors. Our paper show that when lead arrangers have higher reputation, operating efficiency, and market experience, lead arrangers tend to choose less reputable partners. These results help to explain how lead arrangers, through their partner selection decisions, manage the reputation pool among banks in the syndicated loan market.
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描述 博士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
97357504
103
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097357504
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 張元晨<br>岳夢蘭zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Chang, Yuan Chen<br>Yueh, Meng Lanen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 謝依婷zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Hsieh, Yi Tingen_US
dc.creator (作者) 謝依婷zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Hsieh, Yi Tingen_US
dc.date (日期) 2015en_US
dc.date.accessioned 13-Jul-2015 11:07:01 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 13-Jul-2015 11:07:01 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 13-Jul-2015 11:07:01 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0097357504en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76422-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 97357504zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 103zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本論文主要由兩篇文章所組成，探討有關跨國購併活動中目標公司的選擇，以及聯貸市場中參貸銀行的選擇。第一部份旨在分析市場集中程度與跨國購併在垂直相關產業的議題。Beladi, Chakrabarti and Marjit (2013)建立一般均衡寡佔模型，連結當地國的市場競爭力和跨國購併在垂直相關產業的論點。他們模型認為當地國家的垂直整合程度會改變國外主併者策略優勢。我們使用1990年至2012年涵蓋86個國家，之全球購併活動案件，我們衡量當地國家的市場競爭與垂直整合程度，呈現當地國家前期的市場競爭力將會誘發國外市場主併者進入，以垂直購併的方式購併當地國家之目標公司。本研究結果提供了實證性的結果來支持過去理論之發現，認為產業的集中程度會影響跨國購併。
本論文的第二部份，在研究知識技能互補和銀行商譽在參貸銀行的選擇，觀察主貸銀行該如何選擇參貸銀行之決策分析。延伸Diamond (1991)的商譽建立假說，透過主貸銀行本身的特性因子與工作經驗，來探討主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行的誘因動機。研究結果發現，當主貸銀行具有較高的自身商譽佳、經營及投資具效率性、內部監理機制較佳、且市場經驗較為豐富時，會誘使主貸銀行減少對高商譽參貸銀行的需求。呈現知識技能互補的現象於主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行的決策。本研究結果可提供我們對聯貸銀行團商譽互補現象及分析。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Two essays are comprised in this dissertation to study on choices of target firms in cross-border M&As and choices of participant banks in the syndicated loan market. In the first essay, cross-border mergers and market concentration in a vertically related industry, we examine the relationship between market concentration and cross-border M&A. Beladi, Chakrabarti and Marjit (2013) present an oligopoly in general equilibrium model to identify the linkages between local market competition and cross-border mergers in a vertically related industry. Their model predicts that a vertical integration at home changes the strategic advantage for foreign acquirers. Using firm-level data from 86 countries between 1990 and 2012, we calculate proxies for local market competition and show that lower (higher) pre-merger local competition at home country will increase (decrease) mergers between a foreign firm and a vertically integrated home firm. These findings provide empirical supports for the significant impact of industry concentration on the decisions of cross-border M&A.
In the second essay, the effects of knowledge complementarities and bank reputation on participant banks choices, we focus on the decision of lead arrangers on participant bank choices in the syndicated loan market. We extend reputation building theory (Diamond, 1991) and model the lead arranger’s partner choice problem through the effect of self-related and task-related factors. Our paper show that when lead arrangers have higher reputation, operating efficiency, and market experience, lead arrangers tend to choose less reputable partners. These results help to explain how lead arrangers, through their partner selection decisions, manage the reputation pool among banks in the syndicated loan market.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents Introduction 1

【第一篇論文】
Cross-Border Mergers and Market Concentration in a Vertically Related Industry 2
1. Introduction 2
2. Literature review: Cross-Border Mergers and Market Concentration 3
3. Hypotheses development: Determinants of cross-border M&As 5
4. Sample and descriptive statistics on Cross-border M&As and market concentration 6
5. Empirical Results 10
6. Robustness 15
7. Conclusion 20

【第二篇論文】
銀行的商譽與參貸銀行的選擇：商譽互補效果 32
1. 前言 32
2. 研究架構：參貸銀行的選擇與商譽互補誘因 35
2.1. 背景：全球聯合貸款市場 35
2.2. 商譽互補：參貸銀行的商譽("Big3Global" ) 37
2.3. 選擇參貸的潛在誘因：銀行自身特性與工作經驗 37
2.3.1 自身特性相關因子(Self-related)的衡量 39
2.3.2 銀行工作經驗(Task-related) 40
3. 高商譽參貸的選擇模型：樣本描述及敘述統計 41
3.1. 樣本篩選與資料來源 41
3.2. 敘述統計 42
4. 參貸銀行選擇上的互補誘因 48
4.1. 自身相關特性(Self-related)與參貸選擇 49
4.2. 工作經驗(Task-related)與參貸選擇 52
5. 進一步的研究 54
5.1. 工作經驗與參貸銀行商譽選擇，以條件性邏輯斯迴歸(Conditional logit regression)再驗證 54
5.2. 銀行商譽程度的高低與主貸銀行選擇的影響 55
5.3. 學習誘因與參貸銀行商譽的選擇 56
6. 結論及後續研究建議 60

表目錄
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics of M&A sample. 7
Table 1.2 Number of M&A in the Oligopoly Industry. 9
Table 1.3 Determinants of Cross-Border M&As in Oligopoly Industry. 12
Table 1.4 Determinant of Cross-Border Home Vertical M&As in Oligopoly Industry 14
Table 1.5 Robustness check: SIC-Based Classification of the Determinant of Cross-Border M&As in Oligopoly Industry. 16
Table 1.6 Robustness check: SIC-Based Classification of the Determinant of Cross-Border Home Vertical M&As in Oligopoly Industry. 17
Table 1.7 Robustness check: Additional tests on the Determinant of Cross-Border M&As in Oligopoly Industry. 18
Table 1.8 Robustness check: Additional tests of the Determinant of Cross-Border Home Vertical M&As in Oligopoly Industry. 19
表2.1 全球聯貸銀行的排名表 36
表2.2 資料來源與預期方向 38
表2.3 敘述統計：參貸銀行的選擇 43
表2.5 選擇高商譽參貸vs. 選擇非高商譽參貸：主貸銀行特性之比較 47
表2.6 概率模型結果：主貸銀行商譽、營運及投資多角化與參貸銀行的選擇 50
表2.7 概率模型結果：主貸銀行內部監控機制與參貸銀行的選擇 51
表2.8 概率模型結果：主貸銀行工作經驗與參貸銀行的選擇 53
表2.9 穩健性檢定-條件式邏輯斯迴歸模型：主貸銀行的工作經驗與參貸銀行的選擇 57
表2.10 穩健性檢定-多元邏輯斯檢定：商譽特性與資訊不對稱 58
表2.11 穩健性檢定：學習誘因與參貸銀行的商譽 59

圖目錄
Figure 1.1 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of M&A sample. 8
圖2.1 全球聯貸時間趨勢圖與高商譽的持有份額 35

附件目錄
Appendix 1.A Variable definitions and data sources for Chapter II 24
Appendix 1.B Model and Propositions 25
附件2.A面對不同的參貸選擇下主貸銀行的宣告效果 70
附件2.B 變數定義與資料來源 for Chapter III 71

文獻目錄
Chapter II References 21
Chapter III 參考文獻 61		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1934189 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097357504en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司財務決策zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 市場集中度zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 跨國購併zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 垂直整合zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 比較利益zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 聯貸市場zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 參貸者商譽zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 建立商譽的互補現象zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate Financial Decisionsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Market Concentrationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Cross-border Mergeren_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Vertical Integrationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Comparative Advantageen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Syndicated Loan Marketen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Participant Bank Reputationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Complementarity in reputation Buildingen_US
dc.title (題名) 公司財務決策論文兩篇:跨國購併目標公司之選擇以及聯貸市場參貸銀行的選擇zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Two Essays on Corporate Financial Decisions: Choices of Target Firms in Cross-Border M&As and Choices of Participant Banks in Syndicated Loan Marketen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Chapter II References
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