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題名 聯合行為下寬恕政策的有效性分析
The Effectiveness Analysis of Leniency Policy under Cartel
作者 陳姿伶
Chen, Tzu Ling
貢獻者 王智賢
Wang, Jue Shyan
陳姿伶
Chen, Tzu Ling
關鍵詞 寬恕政策
卡特爾
反托拉斯
子賽局完全均衡
資訊不對稱
序列均衡
Leniency Policy
Cartel
Antitrust
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Information Asymmetry
Sequential Equilibrium
日期 2015
上傳時間 13-Jul-2015 11:17:34 (UTC+8)
摘要 寬恕政策為政府打擊卡特爾不可或缺的重要工具，為了維持市場競爭公平性，各國相繼將其引入法條之中，該政策透過廠商主動揭露涉案行為，使得政府可有效掌握證據將其處置。本文建立兩種賽局模型並分別利用子賽局完全均衡及序列均衡的概念，嘗試討論一般情況下寬恕政策的效率及納入資訊不對稱情形下的政策有效性，並由兩模型推論出：實行寬恕政策且廠商主動申報聯合行為為社會最有效率的均衡、透過政府制定適當的罰鍰區間引導下，主動申報聯合行為的行為可視為一區隔廠商型態的訊號。
The leniency policy plays an indispensable role in thwarting cartel formation. To maintain the fairness of market competition, most countries successively bring this policy into their antitrust legislation. After the enforcement of the policy, the involved firms may have incentive to self-report and provide evidences to the Antitrust Authority. Therefore, the authorities can get enough evidences to convict those firms of being cartel members.\nIn this paper, we develop two kinds of game theoretical model and use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss the efficiency of leniency policy in general conditions, and the effectiveness of the policy under the condition of information asymmetry. We show that it is efficient to the society and the authorities when the cartel members self-report under the enforcement of leniency policy. Moreover, by setting up an appropriate fine payment, self-reporting can be a signal for the authorities to segment the type of the involved firms.
參考文獻 中文文獻\n\n王銘勇，「聯合行為寬恕減免責任條款之研究」，公平交易季刊，第14卷第1期 (2006)。\n顏廷棟，「聯合行為之執法檢討與展望」，公平交易季刊，第20卷第4期 (2012)。\n\n英文文獻\n\nApesteguia, J., Dufwenberg, M., & Selten, R., “Blowing the Whistle,” 31 Economic Theory, (2007).\nBigoni, M., Fridolfsson, S. O., Lecoq, C., & Spagnolo, G., “Fines, Leniency and Rewards in antitrust, ” 43 RAND Journal of Economics, (2012).\nBrenner, S., “An Empirical Study of the European Corporate Leniency Program,” 27 International Journal of Industrial Organization, (2009).\nChoi, J. P., & Gerlach, H., “Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation,” 30(6) International Journal of Industrial Organization, (2012).\nHarrington, J.E., “Corporate Leniency Programs When Firms Have Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre-emption,” 61(1) Journal of Industrial Economics, (2013).\nHinloopen, J., “An Economic Analysis of Leniency Programs in Antitrust Law,” 151(4) De Economist, (2003).\nHinloopen, J., & Soetevent, A. R., “Laboratory Evidence on the Effectiveness of Corporate Leniency Programs,” 39 RAND Journal of Economics, (2008).\nMiller, N.H., “Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement,” 99 American Economic Review, (2009).\nMotta, M., & Polo, M., “Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution,” 21 International Journal of Industrial Organization , (2003).\nSauvagnat, J.,“ Prosecution and Leniency Programs：A fool’s game, ” Toulouse School of Economics working paper Series , (2010).\nSilbye, F., “A note on antitrust damages and leniency programs,” 33(3) European Journal of Law and Economics, (2012).
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
102255017
103
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102255017
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 王智賢zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Wang, Jue Shyanen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳姿伶zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chen, Tzu Lingen_US
dc.creator (作者) 陳姿伶zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Tzu Lingen_US
dc.date (日期) 2015en_US
dc.date.accessioned 13-Jul-2015 11:17:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 13-Jul-2015 11:17:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 13-Jul-2015 11:17:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0102255017en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=85307-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 102255017zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 103zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 寬恕政策為政府打擊卡特爾不可或缺的重要工具，為了維持市場競爭公平性，各國相繼將其引入法條之中，該政策透過廠商主動揭露涉案行為，使得政府可有效掌握證據將其處置。本文建立兩種賽局模型並分別利用子賽局完全均衡及序列均衡的概念，嘗試討論一般情況下寬恕政策的效率及納入資訊不對稱情形下的政策有效性，並由兩模型推論出：實行寬恕政策且廠商主動申報聯合行為為社會最有效率的均衡、透過政府制定適當的罰鍰區間引導下，主動申報聯合行為的行為可視為一區隔廠商型態的訊號。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The leniency policy plays an indispensable role in thwarting cartel formation. To maintain the fairness of market competition, most countries successively bring this policy into their antitrust legislation. After the enforcement of the policy, the involved firms may have incentive to self-report and provide evidences to the Antitrust Authority. Therefore, the authorities can get enough evidences to convict those firms of being cartel members.\nIn this paper, we develop two kinds of game theoretical model and use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss the efficiency of leniency policy in general conditions, and the effectiveness of the policy under the condition of information asymmetry. We show that it is efficient to the society and the authorities when the cartel members self-report under the enforcement of leniency policy. Moreover, by setting up an appropriate fine payment, self-reporting can be a signal for the authorities to segment the type of the involved firms.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 前言 1\n第二章 文獻探討 5\n第三章 模型設定 9\n第一節 模型 1 9\n第二節 模型2 19\n第四章 結論與建議 31\n附錄1 33\n附錄 2 36\n參考文獻 38zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1662875 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102255017en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 寬恕政策zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 卡特爾zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 反托拉斯zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 子賽局完全均衡zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊不對稱zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 序列均衡zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Leniency Policyen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Cartelen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Antitrusten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Subgame Perfect Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Information Asymmetryen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Sequential Equilibriumen_US
dc.title (題名) 聯合行為下寬恕政策的有效性分析zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Effectiveness Analysis of Leniency Policy under Cartelen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文文獻\n\n王銘勇，「聯合行為寬恕減免責任條款之研究」，公平交易季刊，第14卷第1期 (2006)。\n顏廷棟，「聯合行為之執法檢討與展望」，公平交易季刊，第20卷第4期 (2012)。\n\n英文文獻\n\nApesteguia, J., Dufwenberg, M., & Selten, R., “Blowing the Whistle,” 31 Economic Theory, (2007).\nBigoni, M., Fridolfsson, S. O., Lecoq, C., & Spagnolo, G., “Fines, Leniency and Rewards in antitrust, ” 43 RAND Journal of Economics, (2012).\nBrenner, S., “An Empirical Study of the European Corporate Leniency Program,” 27 International Journal of Industrial Organization, (2009).\nChoi, J. P., & Gerlach, H., “Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation,” 30(6) International Journal of Industrial Organization, (2012).\nHarrington, J.E., “Corporate Leniency Programs When Firms Have Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre-emption,” 61(1) Journal of Industrial Economics, (2013).\nHinloopen, J., “An Economic Analysis of Leniency Programs in Antitrust Law,” 151(4) De Economist, (2003).\nHinloopen, J., & Soetevent, A. R., “Laboratory Evidence on the Effectiveness of Corporate Leniency Programs,” 39 RAND Journal of Economics, (2008).\nMiller, N.H., “Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement,” 99 American Economic Review, (2009).\nMotta, M., & Polo, M., “Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution,” 21 International Journal of Industrial Organization , (2003).\nSauvagnat, J.,“ Prosecution and Leniency Programs：A fool’s game, ” Toulouse School of Economics working paper Series , (2010).\nSilbye, F., “A note on antitrust damages and leniency programs,” 33(3) European Journal of Law and Economics, (2012).zh_TW