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題名 影響新創公司長期表現之因素 - 以教育網絡為例
What factors affect new ventures` long-term performance? A case of educational network
作者 項柏維
貢獻者 王信實<br>李文傑
Wang, Shinn Shyr<br>Lee, Wen Chieh
項柏維
關鍵詞 教育連結
新創
創業投資
國發基金
Educational Link
New Venture
Venture Capital
National Development Fund
日期 2015
上傳時間 27-Jul-2015 11:33:26 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究提出了影響新創公司長期表現的架構，並以教育網絡連結作為衡量
社群網絡連結的依據，探討其解決資訊不對稱問題的效果。本論文透過建構台灣的新創公司、創業投資基金和國家發展基金三個群體的經理人資料，計算出各教育網絡間的連結關係；依此可衡量各教育網絡關係對新創公司長期表現的影響。
實證結果顯示，新創公司和創業投資基金間的雙向教育網絡連結對新創公
司的長期表現有正向影響；然而當教育網絡連結和政府部門(本研究定義為國發基金)有關係時，其效果則延伸出許多議題，其一為政府部門與被投資公司產生教育連結時，其對被投資公司的長期績效表現效果為負向，顯示出產生政治連結時政府部門的投資行為會受到影響。另一方面，當創業投資基金和政府部門產生教育連結時，其對被投資公司的長期績效表現為正，解釋了政府單位在選擇創業投資基金時是以長期績效表現作為選擇依據。
In this research, educational links are hypothesized as the key factors for solving
the information asymmetry problem. By using the uniquely constructed dataset with
key information of invested companies, venture capital firms and National
Development Fund (NDF) in Taiwan, we quantify the effect of network linkages on
invested companies’ long-term performance. Our empirical results show that a linkage
between invested companies and VCs positively affects invested companies’ long-term
performance. However, the political linkage formed with NDF has non-trivial two-fold
effects. While an educational link formed between invested companies and NDF impact
long-term performance adversely, the educational link between venture capital firms
and NDF in turn has positive effects on the long-term performance. We thus confirm
the existence of inappropriate investment decisions frequently taken because of the
political link between invested companies and National Development Fund.
參考文獻 Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for" lemons": Quality uncertainty and the market
mechanism. The quarterly journal of economics, 488-500.
Bai, C. E., Hsieh, C. T., & Song, Z. M. Crony Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics.
Barber, B. M., & Lyon, J. D. (1996). Detecting abnormal operating performance: The
empirical power and specification of test statistics. Journal of financial Economics,
41(3), 359-399.
Barry, C. B., Muscarella, C. J., Peavy, J. W., & Vetsuypens, M. R. (1990). The role of
venture capital in the creation of public companies: Evidence from the goingpublic
process. Journal of Financial economics, 27(2), 447-471.
Boot, Arnoud W A and Thakor, Anjan V (1993). Security Design. Journal of Finance,
48(4): 1349-78.
Brav, A., & Gompers, P. A. (1997). Myth or reality? The long‐run underperformance of
initial public offerings: evidence from venture and nonventure capital‐backed
companies. The Journal of Finance, 52(5), 1791-1821.
Bunkanwanicha, P., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2009). Big business owners in politics.
Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2133-2168.
Carleton, W.T., and I.A. Cooper. (1976). Estimation and Uses of the Term Structure of
Interest Rates. Journal of Finance, 31: 1067-1083.
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. (2008). Political connections and preferential
access to finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial
Economics, 88(3), 554-580.
Cohen L., Frazzini A., Malloy C. (2008). The small world of investing: Board
connections and mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy 116(5)951-979.
Cooper, M. J., Gulen, H., & Ovtchinnikov, A. V. (2010). Corporate political
contributions and stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 65(2), 687-724.
Eckbo, B. E. (Ed.). (2008). Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance SET (Vol. 1).
Elsevier.
Faccio, M. (2006). Politically-connected firms. American Economic Review,
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1992). The cross‐section of expected stock returns. the
Journal of Finance, 47(2), 427-465.
Fisman, R. (2001). Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic
Review, 1095-1102.
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J. (2009). Do politically connected boards affect firm
value? Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2331-2360.
Gompers, P. A. (1995). Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture
capital. The journal of finance, 50(5), 1461-1489.
Gompers, P. A. (1996). Grandstanding in the venture capital industry. Journal of
Financial economics, 42(1), 133-156.
Gompers, P. A., & Lerner, J. (1999). What drives venture capital fundraising? (No.
w6906). National bureau of economic research.
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory
of vertical and lateral integration. The Journal of Political Economy, 691-719.
Ho (2014), Social Network and R&D Productivity of the Venture Invested
Entrepreneurial Team：the Case of Educational Network
Jensen M.C. and Meckling W.H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4)：
305-360.
Kaplan, S. N., Sensoy, B. A., & Strömberg, P. (2009). Should investors bet on the jockey
or the horse? Evidence from the evolution of firms from early business plans to
public companies. The Journal of Finance, 64(1), 75-115.
Krishnan, C. N. V., Ivanov, V. I., Masulis, R. W., & Singh, A. K. (2011). Venture capital
reputation, post-IPO performance, and corporate governance. Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis, 46(05), 1295-1333.
Lee, P. M., & Wahal, S. (2004). Grandstanding, certification and the underpricing of
venture capital backed IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(2), 375-407.
Leuz, C., & Oberholzer-Gee, F. (2006). Political relationships, global financing, and
corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Financial
Economics, 81(2), 411-439.
Lin, T. H., & Smith, R. L. (1998). Insider reputation and selling decisions: the
unwinding of venture capital investments during equity IPOs. Journal of Corporate
Finance, 4(3), 241-263.
Lin (2014) Social Network and the Venture Capital Investment Target：The Case of
Educational Network
Mahmood, I. P., Zhu, H. and Zajac, E. J., 2011, “Where can capabilities come from?
Network ties and capability acquisition in business groups,” Strategic
Management Journal, 32, 820–48.Megginson and Weiss.
McDonald, M. B. (2014). Politically Connected Analysts.
McDonald, R. L. (2013). Contingent capital with a dual price trigger. Journal of
Financial Stability, 9(2), 230-241.
Megginson, W. L., & Weiss, K. A. (1991). Venture capitalist certification in initial
public offerings. The Journal of Finance, 46(3), 879-903.
Nahata, R. (2008). Venture capital reputation and investment performance. Journal of
Financial Economics, 90(2), 127-151.
Petersen, M. A. (2009). Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets:
Comparing approaches. Review of financial studies, 22(1), 435-480.
Ritter, J. R. (1991). The long‐run performance of initial public offerings. The journal of
finance, 46(1), 3-27.
Saxenian A. (1994). Regional Advantage：Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley
and Route 128. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Saxenian, A. (2002). Brain Circulation and Chinese Chipmakers: The Silicon ValleyHsinchu-Shanghai
Triangle. Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley.
Singh, A. K., Dark, F. H., & Carter, R. B. (1998). Underwriter Reputation, Initial
Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks. The Journal of Finance,
53(1).
Y. Chan, D. Siegel, A.V. Thakor (1990). Learning, corporate control and performance
requirements in venture capital contracts. International Economic Review, 31, pp.
365–381.
Zarutskie, R. (2010). The role of top management team human capital in venture capital
markets: Evidence from first-time funds. Journal of Business Venturing, 25(1),
155-172.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
102258001
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102258001
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 王信實<br>李文傑zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Wang, Shinn Shyr<br>Lee, Wen Chiehen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 項柏維zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 項柏維zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2015en_US
dc.date.accessioned 27-Jul-2015 11:33:26 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 27-Jul-2015 11:33:26 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 27-Jul-2015 11:33:26 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0102258001en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76929-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 102258001zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究提出了影響新創公司長期表現的架構，並以教育網絡連結作為衡量
社群網絡連結的依據，探討其解決資訊不對稱問題的效果。本論文透過建構台灣的新創公司、創業投資基金和國家發展基金三個群體的經理人資料，計算出各教育網絡間的連結關係；依此可衡量各教育網絡關係對新創公司長期表現的影響。
實證結果顯示，新創公司和創業投資基金間的雙向教育網絡連結對新創公
司的長期表現有正向影響；然而當教育網絡連結和政府部門(本研究定義為國發基金)有關係時，其效果則延伸出許多議題，其一為政府部門與被投資公司產生教育連結時，其對被投資公司的長期績效表現效果為負向，顯示出產生政治連結時政府部門的投資行為會受到影響。另一方面，當創業投資基金和政府部門產生教育連結時，其對被投資公司的長期績效表現為正，解釋了政府單位在選擇創業投資基金時是以長期績效表現作為選擇依據。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In this research, educational links are hypothesized as the key factors for solving
the information asymmetry problem. By using the uniquely constructed dataset with
key information of invested companies, venture capital firms and National
Development Fund (NDF) in Taiwan, we quantify the effect of network linkages on
invested companies’ long-term performance. Our empirical results show that a linkage
between invested companies and VCs positively affects invested companies’ long-term
performance. However, the political linkage formed with NDF has non-trivial two-fold
effects. While an educational link formed between invested companies and NDF impact
long-term performance adversely, the educational link between venture capital firms
and NDF in turn has positive effects on the long-term performance. We thus confirm
the existence of inappropriate investment decisions frequently taken because of the
political link between invested companies and National Development Fund.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents INDEX
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 8
1.1 THE ORIGIN OF A NEW BUSINESS........................................................... 8
1.2 THE SOCIAL NETWORK LINKAGES TO SOLVE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY PROBLEM
..................................................................................................................................10
1.3 THE DISTINCTIVE POWER TO SOLVE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY PROBLEM ..........12
1.4 THE LEVEL OF LINKAGES AND DISTINCTIVE POWER.............................................14
1.5 THE POLITICAL RELATED ISSUE IN TAIWAN ..........................................................16
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................17
2.1 INFORMATION ASYMMETRIC AND AGENCY PROBLEM ...........................................17
2.2 DIFFERENT TYPES OF LINKAGES ..........................................................................17
2.2.1 Educational link ..........................................................................................17
2.2.2 Background link..........................................................................................18
2.2.3 Political link................................................................................................18
2.3 DISTINCTIVE POWER............................................................................................18
2.3.1 Human capital .............................................................................................18
2.3.2 Reputation...................................................................................................19
2.3.3 Political power ............................................................................................19
CHAPTER 3 DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS.................20
3.1 SOCIAL NETWORK DATABASE ..............................................................................21
3.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES ......................................................................................21
3.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ...................................................................................22
3.4 OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES ..............................................................................24
3.4.1 Invested company .......................................................................................24
3.4.2 Venture Capital............................................................................................25
3.4.3 Investment records......................................................................................25
3.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS.....................................................................................25
CHAPTER 4 HYPOTHESIS AND REGRESSION MODEL SETTING............27
4.1 HYPOTHESIS........................................................................................................28
4.1.1 Invested companies & Venture capitals......................................................28
4.1.2 Invested companies & National Development Fund ..................................29
4.1.3 Venture capitals & National Development Fund ........................................30
4.2 REGRESSION MODEL SETTING..............................................................................31
5
CHAPTER 5 METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS .............................................32
5.1 METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................32
5.2 RESULTS..............................................................................................................32
5.2.1 Results – invested companies & VCs.........................................................33
5.2.2 Results – invested companies & NDF ........................................................33
5.2.3 Results – VCs & NDF.................................................................................33
5.2.4 Results – different independent variables...................................................34
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION.............................................................................43
REFERENCES...................................................................................................44
APPENDIX.........................................................................................................47		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1433229 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102258001en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 教育連結zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 新創zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 創業投資zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 國發基金zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Educational Linken_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) New Ventureen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Venture Capitalen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) National Development Funden_US
dc.title (題名) 影響新創公司長期表現之因素 - 以教育網絡為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) What factors affect new ventures` long-term performance? A case of educational networken_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for" lemons": Quality uncertainty and the market
mechanism. The quarterly journal of economics, 488-500.
Bai, C. E., Hsieh, C. T., & Song, Z. M. Crony Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics.
Barber, B. M., & Lyon, J. D. (1996). Detecting abnormal operating performance: The
empirical power and specification of test statistics. Journal of financial Economics,
41(3), 359-399.
Barry, C. B., Muscarella, C. J., Peavy, J. W., & Vetsuypens, M. R. (1990). The role of
venture capital in the creation of public companies: Evidence from the goingpublic
process. Journal of Financial economics, 27(2), 447-471.
Boot, Arnoud W A and Thakor, Anjan V (1993). Security Design. Journal of Finance,
48(4): 1349-78.
Brav, A., & Gompers, P. A. (1997). Myth or reality? The long‐run underperformance of
initial public offerings: evidence from venture and nonventure capital‐backed
companies. The Journal of Finance, 52(5), 1791-1821.
Bunkanwanicha, P., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2009). Big business owners in politics.
Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2133-2168.
Carleton, W.T., and I.A. Cooper. (1976). Estimation and Uses of the Term Structure of
Interest Rates. Journal of Finance, 31: 1067-1083.
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. (2008). Political connections and preferential
access to finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial
Economics, 88(3), 554-580.
Cohen L., Frazzini A., Malloy C. (2008). The small world of investing: Board
connections and mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy 116(5)951-979.
Cooper, M. J., Gulen, H., & Ovtchinnikov, A. V. (2010). Corporate political
contributions and stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 65(2), 687-724.
Eckbo, B. E. (Ed.). (2008). Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance SET (Vol. 1).
Elsevier.
Faccio, M. (2006). Politically-connected firms. American Economic Review,
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1992). The cross‐section of expected stock returns. the
Journal of Finance, 47(2), 427-465.
Fisman, R. (2001). Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic
Review, 1095-1102.
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J. (2009). Do politically connected boards affect firm
value? Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2331-2360.
Gompers, P. A. (1995). Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture
capital. The journal of finance, 50(5), 1461-1489.
Gompers, P. A. (1996). Grandstanding in the venture capital industry. Journal of
Financial economics, 42(1), 133-156.
Gompers, P. A., & Lerner, J. (1999). What drives venture capital fundraising? (No.
w6906). National bureau of economic research.
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory
of vertical and lateral integration. The Journal of Political Economy, 691-719.
Ho (2014), Social Network and R&D Productivity of the Venture Invested
Entrepreneurial Team：the Case of Educational Network
Jensen M.C. and Meckling W.H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4)：
305-360.
Kaplan, S. N., Sensoy, B. A., & Strömberg, P. (2009). Should investors bet on the jockey
or the horse? Evidence from the evolution of firms from early business plans to
public companies. The Journal of Finance, 64(1), 75-115.
Krishnan, C. N. V., Ivanov, V. I., Masulis, R. W., & Singh, A. K. (2011). Venture capital
reputation, post-IPO performance, and corporate governance. Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis, 46(05), 1295-1333.
Lee, P. M., & Wahal, S. (2004). Grandstanding, certification and the underpricing of
venture capital backed IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(2), 375-407.
Leuz, C., & Oberholzer-Gee, F. (2006). Political relationships, global financing, and
corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Financial
Economics, 81(2), 411-439.
Lin, T. H., & Smith, R. L. (1998). Insider reputation and selling decisions: the
unwinding of venture capital investments during equity IPOs. Journal of Corporate
Finance, 4(3), 241-263.
Lin (2014) Social Network and the Venture Capital Investment Target：The Case of
Educational Network
Mahmood, I. P., Zhu, H. and Zajac, E. J., 2011, “Where can capabilities come from?
Network ties and capability acquisition in business groups,” Strategic
Management Journal, 32, 820–48.Megginson and Weiss.
McDonald, M. B. (2014). Politically Connected Analysts.
McDonald, R. L. (2013). Contingent capital with a dual price trigger. Journal of
Financial Stability, 9(2), 230-241.
Megginson, W. L., & Weiss, K. A. (1991). Venture capitalist certification in initial
public offerings. The Journal of Finance, 46(3), 879-903.
Nahata, R. (2008). Venture capital reputation and investment performance. Journal of
Financial Economics, 90(2), 127-151.
Petersen, M. A. (2009). Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets:
Comparing approaches. Review of financial studies, 22(1), 435-480.
Ritter, J. R. (1991). The long‐run performance of initial public offerings. The journal of
finance, 46(1), 3-27.
Saxenian A. (1994). Regional Advantage：Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley
and Route 128. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Saxenian, A. (2002). Brain Circulation and Chinese Chipmakers: The Silicon ValleyHsinchu-Shanghai
Triangle. Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley.
Singh, A. K., Dark, F. H., & Carter, R. B. (1998). Underwriter Reputation, Initial
Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks. The Journal of Finance,
53(1).
Y. Chan, D. Siegel, A.V. Thakor (1990). Learning, corporate control and performance
requirements in venture capital contracts. International Economic Review, 31, pp.
365–381.
Zarutskie, R. (2010). The role of top management team human capital in venture capital
markets: Evidence from first-time funds. Journal of Business Venturing, 25(1),
155-172.		zh_TW