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題名 銀行往來影響公司治理對公司績效研究
The effect between Banks relationship and Corporate Governance to the Company
作者 徐仲凌
貢獻者 林靖<br>毛維凌
徐仲凌
關鍵詞 銀行往來關係
公司治理
公司績效
日期 2015
上傳時間 27-Jul-2015 11:33:38 (UTC+8)
摘要 在90年代以後因為政策的解禁金融業開始蓬勃發展，而在銀行與企業長期往來關係下，兩者緊密的互動形成所謂的「銀行往來關係」。目前國內銀行往來的關係研究中，多以探討融資敏感度以及資訊不對稱，較無針對公司治理方面探討。本文以台灣上市公司為實證樣本，探討銀行往來關係對於公司的治理以及經營績效是否有影響，並討論金融風暴發生後，銀行往來的關係對企業的影響。利用GLM模型以2005到2010年期間有與銀行借款的公司做分析，並以光電產業為例分析金融風暴後企業與銀行間的調適過程。其中針對三項議題的具體結論如下：第一、台灣的銀行與企業來往中，對公司的往來關係經營為正，而銀行進入董事會對公司治理及績效並無影響。第二、往來存續期間愈長，公司與銀行往來的關係就愈緊密，對公司的整體績效及治理皆有正向影響，除了貸款比率之外。第三、在金融風暴發生之後，顯示愈強的往來關係對公司績效呈現負向影響。
參考文獻 王健安與李佩玲 (2008),銀行提列呆帳準備費用之研究：來自跨國數據之比較分析.
第十二屆科技整合管理研討會.
李馨蘋 與 何喜將 (2007),銀行業之公司治理機制如何影響銀行風險承擔行為?.Journal
of Accounting and Corporate Governance, 4(2), 1-22.
柯承恩 (2000) ,我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議（上），會計研究月刊.
陳家彬 (2010),銀行進入企業董事會及往來關係與企業現金流量及資訊不對稱之關係.
陳家彬, 江惠櫻, 與 賴怡洵 (2003),商業銀行對企業授信決策考量因素與授信品質之關
係. 管理評論, 22(2), 1-23.
陳瑞斌 與 許崇源 (2007) ,公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究，交大管理學報27(2):
55–109.
黃慶堂, 汪志勇,與 董沿 (2011),中小企業與銀行往來關係對其授信條件之影響.中小企
業發展季刊, 頁135-160.
葉銀華, 李存修,與 柯承恩 (2002),公司治理與評等系統，商智文化出版.
廖益興,與 陳昭蓉 (2014),銀行進入公司董事會, 代理問題與資訊不對稱之關聯性研究.
人文及社會科學集刊, 26(4), 583-619.
賴怡洵, 陳家彬, 與 何加政 (2008),台灣地區銀行進入企業董監事會之決定因素:代理成
本與放款者利益衝突假說.管理學報第 25 卷第 1 期, p001-p030.
英文部分:
Abe, Naohito, Noel Gaston, and Katsuyuki Kubo (2005).Executive pay in Japan: the role of bank-appointed monitors and the main bank relationship. Japan and the World Economy 17(3): 371–394.
Berger, A. N. , and Udell (2002). Small business credit availability and relationship lending: The importance of bank organisational structure. The Economic Journal,112(477).
Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995). Proprietary information, financial intermediation, and research incentives. Journal of Financial Intermediation,4(4), 328-357.
Bharath, S. T. , Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2009). Lending relationships and loan contract terms. Review of Financial Studies.
Blackwell, D. W. , and Winters (1997). Banking relationships and the effect of monitoring on loan pricing. Journal of Financial Research, 20(2): 275.
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). Optimal debt structure and the number of creditors. Journal of Political Economy, 1-25.
Booth, James , and Daniel (1999). On Executives of financial institutions as outside directors. Journal of Corporate Finance 5(3): 227–250.
Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven (2011). Corporate governance, accounting and finance: A review. Accounting and finance, 51(1), 96-172.
Byrd, D. T. , and Mizruchi (2005). Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms. Journal of corporate finance, 11(1), 129-173.
Chahine, Salim and Assem Safieddine (2008). Corporate governance and the external monitoring of banks in Lebanon. Journal of corporate finance 8(3): 258–270.
Chi and Chenchin Wang (2010). Accounting conservatism in a setting of information asymmetry between majority and minority shareholders. The International Journal of Accounting 45(4):465–489.
Cole, Goldberg, and White (2004). The micro structure of small business lending by large and small banks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39(2): 227-251.
Dass and Massa (2011). The impact of a strong bank-firm relationship on the borrowing firm. Review of Financial Studies, 24(4), 1204-1260.
Datta, Mai, and Ajay Patel (2000). Some evidence on the uniqueness of initial public debt offerings. The Journal of Finance 55(2): 715–743.
Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000). Relationship lending within a bank-based system: evidence from European small business data. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9,90-109.
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies. The Review of Economic Studies, 62(4), 541-555.
Dey and Aiyesha (2008). Corporate governance and agency conflicts. Journal of Accounting Research ,46(5): 1143–1181.
Diamond (1991). Monitoring and reputation: the choice between bank loans and directly placed debt. Journal of Political Economy, 99, 689-751.
Elsas (2005). Empirical determinants of relationship lending. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 14(1): 32-57.
Ferri and Messori (2000). Bank-firm relationships and allocative efficiency in Northeastern and Central Italy and in the South. Journal of Banking and Finance, 24(6):1067-1095.
Francis, Hasan, Koetter, and Wu (2012). Corporate boards and bank loan contracting. Journal of Financial Research, 35(4), 521-552.
Gilson, Ronald J. and Mark J. Roe (1993). Understanding the Japanese keiretsu: overlaps between corporate governance and industrial organization. Yale Law Journal, 102(4): 871–906.
Gambiniand Zazzaro (2013). Long-lasting bank relationships and growth of firms. Small Business Economics, 40(4), 977-1007.
Houston and James (2001). Do relationships have limits? banking relationships, financial constraints, and investment. The Journal of Business, 74(3): 347-374.
Huang and Darren J. Kisgen. Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives overconfident relative to female executives?."Journal of Financial Economics ,108.3 (2013): 822-839.
James, C. (1995). When do banks take equity in debt restructurings? Review of Financial Studies, 1209–1234.
Kaplan, Steven N. and Bernadette A. Minton (1994). Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards:determinants and implications for managers. Journal of Financial Economics,: 225–258.
Kelton, Andrea S, and Ya-wen Yang (2008). The impact of corporate governance on the internet financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy ,27(1): 62–87.
Kroszner and Strahan (2001). Bankers on boards:monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability. Journal of Financial Economics, 62(3), 415-452.
Lai Chen and C. Ho (2008). Determinants of bankers on boards in Taiwan: agency costs and lenders’ conflicts of interest hypotheses. Journal of Management, 25(1), 1-30(In Chinese).
Mitton, Todd (2002). A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics ,64(2): 215–241.
Ongena and Smith (2001). What determines the number of bank relationships? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(1): 26-56.
Tumer Alkan, and Von Westernhagen (2010). Creditor concentration: an empirical investigation. SSRN Library.
Rajan, R. G. (1992). Insiders and outsiders: the choice between informed and arm`s-length Debt. The Journal of Finance, 47(4): 1367-1400.
Sharpe, S. A. (1990). Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: a stylized model of customer relationships. Journal of Finance, 45(4): 1069-1087.
Slomka Golebiowska, A. (2014). Bankers on boards as corporate governance mechanism: evidence from Poland. Journal of Management and Governance,18(4), 1019-1040.
Triantis, George C. and Ronald Daniels (1995). The role of debt in interactive corporate governance. University of California Law Review, 83(4): 1073–1113.
Tseng, Y. C., Chang, C. P., Chang and Liao, H. Y. (2012). The impact of bankers on the board on corporate dividend policy: evidence from an emerging market. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 192-212.
Wenlian (2007). Bankers as lenders and shareholders: evidence from Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal.
Williamson, S. D. (1986). Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing. Journal of Monetary Economics, 18(2), 159-179.
Yao and Ouyang (2007). Dark-side evidence on bank–firm relationship in Japan. Japan and the World Economy, 19(2), 198-213.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
102258002
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102258002
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 林靖<br>毛維凌zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 徐仲凌zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 徐仲凌zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2015en_US
dc.date.accessioned 27-Jul-2015 11:33:38 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 27-Jul-2015 11:33:38 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 27-Jul-2015 11:33:38 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0102258002en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76930-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 102258002zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在90年代以後因為政策的解禁金融業開始蓬勃發展，而在銀行與企業長期往來關係下，兩者緊密的互動形成所謂的「銀行往來關係」。目前國內銀行往來的關係研究中，多以探討融資敏感度以及資訊不對稱，較無針對公司治理方面探討。本文以台灣上市公司為實證樣本，探討銀行往來關係對於公司的治理以及經營績效是否有影響，並討論金融風暴發生後，銀行往來的關係對企業的影響。利用GLM模型以2005到2010年期間有與銀行借款的公司做分析，並以光電產業為例分析金融風暴後企業與銀行間的調適過程。其中針對三項議題的具體結論如下：第一、台灣的銀行與企業來往中，對公司的往來關係經營為正，而銀行進入董事會對公司治理及績效並無影響。第二、往來存續期間愈長，公司與銀行往來的關係就愈緊密，對公司的整體績效及治理皆有正向影響，除了貸款比率之外。第三、在金融風暴發生之後，顯示愈強的往來關係對公司績效呈現負向影響。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 摘要 II
目錄 III
表目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
1、 緒論 1
1.1 研究動機 1
1.2 研究目的 3
1.3 研究流程與架構 4
2、 文獻回顧 5
2.1 公司治理定義 5
2.2 公司治理綜合指標文獻 9
2.3 銀行往來關係對企業的影響 11
2.4 衡量銀行往來的方式 13
3、 研究方法 19
3.1 研究模型 19
3.2 研究假說 24
3.3 研究樣本與資料來源 27
3.4 研究模性變數之定義與衡量 28
4、 實證結果與分析 34
4.1 迴歸分析 34
4.2 以光電產業為例 41
5、 結論與建議 47
5.1 研究結論 47
5.2 研究限制 49
參考文獻 50		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1362274 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102258002en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 銀行往來關係zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司績效zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 銀行往來影響公司治理對公司績效研究zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The effect between Banks relationship and Corporate Governance to the Companyen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王健安與李佩玲 (2008),銀行提列呆帳準備費用之研究：來自跨國數據之比較分析.
第十二屆科技整合管理研討會.
李馨蘋 與 何喜將 (2007),銀行業之公司治理機制如何影響銀行風險承擔行為?.Journal
of Accounting and Corporate Governance, 4(2), 1-22.
柯承恩 (2000) ,我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議（上），會計研究月刊.
陳家彬 (2010),銀行進入企業董事會及往來關係與企業現金流量及資訊不對稱之關係.
陳家彬, 江惠櫻, 與 賴怡洵 (2003),商業銀行對企業授信決策考量因素與授信品質之關
係. 管理評論, 22(2), 1-23.
陳瑞斌 與 許崇源 (2007) ,公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究，交大管理學報27(2):
55–109.
黃慶堂, 汪志勇,與 董沿 (2011),中小企業與銀行往來關係對其授信條件之影響.中小企
業發展季刊, 頁135-160.
葉銀華, 李存修,與 柯承恩 (2002),公司治理與評等系統，商智文化出版.
廖益興,與 陳昭蓉 (2014),銀行進入公司董事會, 代理問題與資訊不對稱之關聯性研究.
人文及社會科學集刊, 26(4), 583-619.
賴怡洵, 陳家彬, 與 何加政 (2008),台灣地區銀行進入企業董監事會之決定因素:代理成
本與放款者利益衝突假說.管理學報第 25 卷第 1 期, p001-p030.
英文部分:
Abe, Naohito, Noel Gaston, and Katsuyuki Kubo (2005).Executive pay in Japan: the role of bank-appointed monitors and the main bank relationship. Japan and the World Economy 17(3): 371–394.
Berger, A. N. , and Udell (2002). Small business credit availability and relationship lending: The importance of bank organisational structure. The Economic Journal,112(477).
Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995). Proprietary information, financial intermediation, and research incentives. Journal of Financial Intermediation,4(4), 328-357.
Bharath, S. T. , Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2009). Lending relationships and loan contract terms. Review of Financial Studies.
Blackwell, D. W. , and Winters (1997). Banking relationships and the effect of monitoring on loan pricing. Journal of Financial Research, 20(2): 275.
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). Optimal debt structure and the number of creditors. Journal of Political Economy, 1-25.
Booth, James , and Daniel (1999). On Executives of financial institutions as outside directors. Journal of Corporate Finance 5(3): 227–250.
Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven (2011). Corporate governance, accounting and finance: A review. Accounting and finance, 51(1), 96-172.
Byrd, D. T. , and Mizruchi (2005). Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms. Journal of corporate finance, 11(1), 129-173.
Chahine, Salim and Assem Safieddine (2008). Corporate governance and the external monitoring of banks in Lebanon. Journal of corporate finance 8(3): 258–270.
Chi and Chenchin Wang (2010). Accounting conservatism in a setting of information asymmetry between majority and minority shareholders. The International Journal of Accounting 45(4):465–489.
Cole, Goldberg, and White (2004). The micro structure of small business lending by large and small banks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39(2): 227-251.
Dass and Massa (2011). The impact of a strong bank-firm relationship on the borrowing firm. Review of Financial Studies, 24(4), 1204-1260.
Datta, Mai, and Ajay Patel (2000). Some evidence on the uniqueness of initial public debt offerings. The Journal of Finance 55(2): 715–743.
Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000). Relationship lending within a bank-based system: evidence from European small business data. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9,90-109.
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies. The Review of Economic Studies, 62(4), 541-555.
Dey and Aiyesha (2008). Corporate governance and agency conflicts. Journal of Accounting Research ,46(5): 1143–1181.
Diamond (1991). Monitoring and reputation: the choice between bank loans and directly placed debt. Journal of Political Economy, 99, 689-751.
Elsas (2005). Empirical determinants of relationship lending. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 14(1): 32-57.
Ferri and Messori (2000). Bank-firm relationships and allocative efficiency in Northeastern and Central Italy and in the South. Journal of Banking and Finance, 24(6):1067-1095.
Francis, Hasan, Koetter, and Wu (2012). Corporate boards and bank loan contracting. Journal of Financial Research, 35(4), 521-552.
Gilson, Ronald J. and Mark J. Roe (1993). Understanding the Japanese keiretsu: overlaps between corporate governance and industrial organization. Yale Law Journal, 102(4): 871–906.
Gambiniand Zazzaro (2013). Long-lasting bank relationships and growth of firms. Small Business Economics, 40(4), 977-1007.
Houston and James (2001). Do relationships have limits? banking relationships, financial constraints, and investment. The Journal of Business, 74(3): 347-374.
Huang and Darren J. Kisgen. Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives overconfident relative to female executives?."Journal of Financial Economics ,108.3 (2013): 822-839.
James, C. (1995). When do banks take equity in debt restructurings? Review of Financial Studies, 1209–1234.
Kaplan, Steven N. and Bernadette A. Minton (1994). Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards:determinants and implications for managers. Journal of Financial Economics,: 225–258.
Kelton, Andrea S, and Ya-wen Yang (2008). The impact of corporate governance on the internet financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy ,27(1): 62–87.
Kroszner and Strahan (2001). Bankers on boards:monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability. Journal of Financial Economics, 62(3), 415-452.
Lai Chen and C. Ho (2008). Determinants of bankers on boards in Taiwan: agency costs and lenders’ conflicts of interest hypotheses. Journal of Management, 25(1), 1-30(In Chinese).
Mitton, Todd (2002). A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics ,64(2): 215–241.
Ongena and Smith (2001). What determines the number of bank relationships? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(1): 26-56.
Tumer Alkan, and Von Westernhagen (2010). Creditor concentration: an empirical investigation. SSRN Library.
Rajan, R. G. (1992). Insiders and outsiders: the choice between informed and arm`s-length Debt. The Journal of Finance, 47(4): 1367-1400.
Sharpe, S. A. (1990). Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: a stylized model of customer relationships. Journal of Finance, 45(4): 1069-1087.
Slomka Golebiowska, A. (2014). Bankers on boards as corporate governance mechanism: evidence from Poland. Journal of Management and Governance,18(4), 1019-1040.
Triantis, George C. and Ronald Daniels (1995). The role of debt in interactive corporate governance. University of California Law Review, 83(4): 1073–1113.
Tseng, Y. C., Chang, C. P., Chang and Liao, H. Y. (2012). The impact of bankers on the board on corporate dividend policy: evidence from an emerging market. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 192-212.
Wenlian (2007). Bankers as lenders and shareholders: evidence from Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal.
Williamson, S. D. (1986). Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing. Journal of Monetary Economics, 18(2), 159-179.
Yao and Ouyang (2007). Dark-side evidence on bank–firm relationship in Japan. Japan and the World Economy, 19(2), 198-213.		zh_TW