| dc.contributor | 國貿系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lin, Yu-Hsiu;Hu, Len-Kuo | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 胡聯國 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2009-08 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 24-Aug-2015 14:59:54 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 24-Aug-2015 14:59:54 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 24-Aug-2015 14:59:54 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/77957 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper adopts the principal–supervisor–agent hierarchy model pioneered by Tirole [Tirole, J., 1986. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2, 181–214] to analyze the optimal architecture of supervision. We consider a principal who encounters a double moral hazard problem. In particular, we examine the endogenously determined supervisory effort and the possibility of untruthful revelation of supervisor`s message. The degree of accuracy for this endogenously chosen information architecture hinges upon the supervisory technology, the supervisor`s reservation utility and the agent`s production technology. Besides, though the principal`s welfare would be lowered when the possibility of untruthful revelation is taken into account, we find that his desired supervisory effort level may be enhanced instead. | |
| dc.format.extent | 337354 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71(2), 473-485 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | D82 | |
| dc.title (題名) | Optimal supervision with moral hazard | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.010 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.010 | |
