dc.contributor | 金融系 | |
dc.creator (作者) | Wu, Ming-Cheng;Liao, Szu-Lang;Huang, Yi-Ting | |
dc.creator (作者) | 廖四郎 | zh_TW |
dc.date (日期) | 2012 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2-Sep-2015 17:06:50 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.available | 2-Sep-2015 17:06:50 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 2-Sep-2015 17:06:50 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78213 | - |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This study examines the relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and hedging derivatives usage. We have three results. First, executives` risk-taking incentives are negatively related to the hedging derivatives holdings, a result consistent with equity-based compensation that promotes risk taking. Second, the indexed stock options appear to create stronger risk-taking incentives than the traditional stock options. Third, managerial risk-taking incentives are significantly related to executive stock options but not stock holdings. | |
dc.format.extent | 282530 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.relation (關聯) | International Review of Accounting, Banking & Finance, 4(2), 1-27 | |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | agency problems;executive compensation;hedging behavior;risk-taking incentives | |
dc.title (題名) | Executive Compensation and Hedging Behavior: Evidence from Taiwan | |
dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |