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題名 Executive Compensation and Hedging Behavior: Evidence from Taiwan
作者 Wu, Ming-Cheng;Liao, Szu-Lang;Huang, Yi-Ting
廖四郎
貢獻者 金融系
關鍵詞 agency problems;executive compensation;hedging behavior;risk-taking incentives
日期 2012
上傳時間 2-Sep-2015 17:06:50 (UTC+8)
摘要 This study examines the relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and hedging derivatives usage. We have three results. First, executives` risk-taking incentives are negatively related to the hedging derivatives holdings, a result consistent with equity-based compensation that promotes risk taking. Second, the indexed stock options appear to create stronger risk-taking incentives than the traditional stock options. Third, managerial risk-taking incentives are significantly related to executive stock options but not stock holdings.
關聯 International Review of Accounting, Banking & Finance, 4(2), 1-27
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 金融系
dc.creator (作者) Wu, Ming-Cheng;Liao, Szu-Lang;Huang, Yi-Ting
dc.creator (作者) 廖四郎zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2012
dc.date.accessioned 2-Sep-2015 17:06:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-Sep-2015 17:06:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Sep-2015 17:06:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78213-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study examines the relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and hedging derivatives usage. We have three results. First, executives` risk-taking incentives are negatively related to the hedging derivatives holdings, a result consistent with equity-based compensation that promotes risk taking. Second, the indexed stock options appear to create stronger risk-taking incentives than the traditional stock options. Third, managerial risk-taking incentives are significantly related to executive stock options but not stock holdings.
dc.format.extent 282530 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) International Review of Accounting, Banking & Finance, 4(2), 1-27
dc.subject (關鍵詞) agency problems;executive compensation;hedging behavior;risk-taking incentives
dc.title (題名) Executive Compensation and Hedging Behavior: Evidence from Taiwan
dc.type (資料類型) articleen