dc.contributor | 財政學系 | |
dc.creator (作者) | 郭虹瑩, 翁堃嵐; 林宛儀; | zh_TW |
dc.creator (作者) | Ueng, K. L. Glen ; Lin, Wan-Yi;Kuo, Horn-In | |
dc.date (日期) | 2014-12 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 23-Sep-2015 14:10:12 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.available | 23-Sep-2015 14:10:12 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 23-Sep-2015 14:10:12 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78683 | - |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 探討混合寡占市場的傳統文獻中,對於公營廠商民營化的議題,大多忽略租稅因素對釋股政策的影響。有鑑於此,本文在基本模型中引入利潤稅後發現:(1)對民營化廠商而言,利潤稅的課徵並不具租稅中立性,致使其生產決策受到扭曲,進而影響到市場均衡以及政府的最適釋股政策;(2)不論國內、外民營廠商的家數為何,最適的釋股比例與稅率成正向關係;(3)忽略利潤稅等租稅因素,將使得公營廠商民營化政策下的釋股比例偏低。 | |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The traditional literature regarding privatization of public enterprises under mixed oligopolies has neglected the impact of taxes. Therefore, this paper takes the effect of taxation into account and explores the optimal degree of privatization on public enterprises. It shows that, because profit taxes are non-neutral for the privatized firm, both the market equilibrium and the privatization policy will be affected by the imposition of profit taxes. Moreover, the optimal degree of privatization will increase (decrease) as tax rate increases (decreases), regardless of the number of domestic or foreign firms in the market. In other words, neglecting the impact of taxes will underestimate the optimal degree of privatization for public enterprises. | |
dc.format.extent | 1288220 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.relation (關聯) | 應用經濟論叢, 96, 105-126 | |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 利潤稅 ; 公營廠商 ; 民營化 ; 混合寡占市場 ; Profit Tax ; Public Enterprise ; Privatization ; Mixed Oligopoly | |
dc.title (題名) | 混合寡占市場下利潤稅的中立性與最適釋股比例 | zh_TW |
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | The Neutrality of Profit Tax and the Optimal Privatization Policy in the Mixed Oligopoly | |
dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.3966/054696002014120096004 | |
dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.3966%2f054696002014120096004 | |