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題名 董監事及經理人責任保險公開資訊不對稱問題分析
The Asymmetric Information Problem of Directors` and Officers` Liability Insurance作者 陳怡均
Chen, Yi Jun貢獻者 王儷玲<br>彭金隆
陳怡均
Chen, Yi Jun關鍵詞 董監事責任保險
公開資訊
資訊不對稱日期 2015 上傳時間 1-Oct-2015 14:13:47 (UTC+8) 摘要 近年來,公司治理問題受到重視,加上我國成立投資人保護中心,因此投資人求償意識提高,主導經營決策的董監事及重要經理人被求償頻率與金額上也有增加之趨勢,故董監事及經理人(下稱D&O)責任保險投保需求日益增加。 然而,保險市場中一直存在資訊不對稱的問題,過去研究多以車險、醫療險、傷害險為主,責任險部份較少提及。D&O責任保險承保範圍特色主要為董監事及重要經理人個人執行職務之錯誤、不當行為,因此對於保險公司能否辨別風險、收取相對應之費率存疑。實務上,保險公司仍比本研究能觀察的資料更多,因此本研究僅能以公開資訊探討D&O責任保險市場。 本研究使用2010至2014年之間上市櫃公司投保D&O責任保險資料進行分析,收集可觀察之承保事故紀錄,並以公司特性之資產規模、資產報酬率、負債資產比率、財報是否為四大會計事務所簽核、是否為高波動性產業等變數,觀察事故發生與否與高保額之間的相關性,以公開資訊探討我國D&O責任保險市場。實證結果發現,事故發生與否與高保額保單有正相關,表示相關公開資訊與D&O責任保險市場存在資訊不對稱問題。 參考文獻 一、中文文獻1.平兆民,2013,董監事暨重要職員責任保險需求之研究-以台灣金控公司為例,真理大學經濟學系財經碩士班碩士論文。2.何坤孟,2011,公司治理及財務風險與董監事責任保險需求之相關研究,樹德科技大學金融與風險管理系碩士論文。3.汪琪玲,2006,台灣車體損失險契約中存在之訊息不對稱問題,臺大管理論叢,16(2),161-185。4.林嬋娟、張哲嘉,2009,董監事異常變動、家族企業與企業舞弊之關聯性,會計評論,48,1-33。5.紀宛庭,2014,壽險公司銀行保險通路資訊不對稱問題之分析-以終身醫療險為例,國立政治大學風險管理與保險學系碩士論文。6.徐義凱,2014,董監事特性對企業舞弊與資訊揭露品質之影響,臺中科技大學會計資訊系碩士論文。7.張邦茹,曹亦寧,2012,替代或互補?董監事及經理人責任在公司治理的角色,2012臺灣財務金融學會年度學術研討會論文。8.陳可敏,2012,董監事及經理人責任保險核保因子之研究,實踐大學財務金融學系碩士論文。9.陳敏,2013,傷害保險訊息不對稱問題之實證,淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士班碩士論文。10.陳彩稚、龐嘉慧,2008,董監事暨重要職員責任保險之需求因素分析,臺大管理論叢,18(2),171-196。11.葉力旗,2005,董監事及重要職員責任保險承保範圍及相關問題之研究,國立政治大學風險管理與保險學系碩士論文。12.黃信博,2010,資訊揭露及時性、透明度與企業舞弊之關聯性研究,國立臺灣大學會計學系碩士論文。13.黃昱瑋,2013,資訊透明度與董監事暨重要職員責任保險關聯性,真理大學經濟系財經碩士班碩士論文。14.温哲嘉,2011,董監事責任險保險金額與會計盈餘品質之關聯性研究,國立臺灣大學國際企業學系碩士論文。15.廖婉婷,2010,台灣汽車竊盜損失險上的訊息不對稱問題之研究,淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士班碩士論文。16.廖淑惠,2005,落實公司治理,D&O責任險當後盾,財團法人保險事業發展中心保險專業研究專欄文章,https://fsr.tii.org.tw/iiroc/fcontent/research/research03_01.asp?A3b_sn=517.蔡英哲,2008,不對稱訊息在台灣車體保險市場之研究,國立臺灣大學財務金融學系博士論文。二、英文文獻1.Arrow, K. J., 1963, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, American Economic Review, 53, 941-969.2.Aunon-Nerin, D., and Ehling, P., 2008, Why Firms Purchase Property Insurance, Journal of Financial Economics, 90(3), 298-312.3.Boyer, M., 2004, Is the Demand for Corporate Insurance a Habit? Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, Working Paper, 2004s-33.4.Chalmers, J. M., Dann, L. Y., and Harford, J., 2002, Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Purchases, Journal of Finance, 57, 609-639.5.Chang, J. I., 2010, Essays on Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Firm Behavior, PhD Dissertation, National Cheng Chi University.6.Chen, T. J., and Li, S. H., 2010, Directors’ & Officers’ Insurance, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 7, 244-261.7.Chiappori, P. A., and Salanié, B., 2000, Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Market, Journal of Political Economy, 108(1), 56-78.8.Core, J. E., 1997, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64, 63-87.9.Crocker, K. J., and Snow, A., 1985, The Efficiency of Competitive Equilibria in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection, Journal of Public Economics, 26, 207-219.10.Crocker, K. J., and Snow, A., 1986, The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 321-344.11.DeFond, M., and Jiambalvo. J., 1994, Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, 145-176.12.Farber, D. B., 2005, Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter? The Accounting Review, 80(2), 539-561.13.Gupta, M. and Prakash, P., 2012, Information Embedded in Directors and Officers Insurance Purchases, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, 37, 429-451.14.Gutierrez, M., 2003, An Economic Analysis of Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duties, RAND Journal of Economics, 10(2), 115-129.15.Hoy, M., 1982, Categorizing Risks in the Insurance Industry, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, 321-336.16.Lin, C., Officer, M. S., Wang, R., Zou, H., 2013, Directors` and officers` liability insurance and loan spreads, Journal of Financial Economics, 110(1), 37-60.17.Mayers, D. and Smith, C. W. Jr., 1982, On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, Journal of Business, 55(2), 281-296.18.O’Sullivan, N., 2002, The Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance by Large UK Companies, European Management Journal, 20(5), 574-583.19.Peng, J. L., and Wang, K. C., 2015, Information Problems in Bancassurance: Empirical Evidence Based on a Comparison Between Over-the-Counter and Telephone Marketing Customers, The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2015, 1-31.20.Puelz, R., and Snow, A., 1994, Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Empirical Investigation in the Insurance Market, Journal of Political Economy, 102(2), 236-257.21.Rasmusen, E., 1989, Game and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, B. Blackwell, New York.22.Rothschild, M., and Stiglitz, J. E., 1976, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4), 629-649. 23.Shavell, S., 1979, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93(4), 541-562.24.Singhvi, S. S., and Desai, H. B., 1971, An Empirical Analysis of the Quality of Corporate Financial Disclosure, The Accounting Review, 46(1), 129-138.25.Zou, H., Wong, S., Shum, C., Xiong, J., and Yan, J., 2008, Controlling-minority Shareholder Incentive Conflicts and Director’s and officers’ Liability Insurance: Evidence from China, Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(12), 2636-2645. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
風險管理與保險研究所
98358004資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098358004 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 王儷玲<br>彭金隆 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳怡均 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chen, Yi Jun en_US dc.creator (作者) 陳怡均 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chen, Yi Jun en_US dc.date (日期) 2015 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Oct-2015 14:13:47 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Oct-2015 14:13:47 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Oct-2015 14:13:47 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0098358004 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78733 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 風險管理與保險研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 98358004 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 近年來,公司治理問題受到重視,加上我國成立投資人保護中心,因此投資人求償意識提高,主導經營決策的董監事及重要經理人被求償頻率與金額上也有增加之趨勢,故董監事及經理人(下稱D&O)責任保險投保需求日益增加。 然而,保險市場中一直存在資訊不對稱的問題,過去研究多以車險、醫療險、傷害險為主,責任險部份較少提及。D&O責任保險承保範圍特色主要為董監事及重要經理人個人執行職務之錯誤、不當行為,因此對於保險公司能否辨別風險、收取相對應之費率存疑。實務上,保險公司仍比本研究能觀察的資料更多,因此本研究僅能以公開資訊探討D&O責任保險市場。 本研究使用2010至2014年之間上市櫃公司投保D&O責任保險資料進行分析,收集可觀察之承保事故紀錄,並以公司特性之資產規模、資產報酬率、負債資產比率、財報是否為四大會計事務所簽核、是否為高波動性產業等變數,觀察事故發生與否與高保額之間的相關性,以公開資訊探討我國D&O責任保險市場。實證結果發現,事故發生與否與高保額保單有正相關,表示相關公開資訊與D&O責任保險市場存在資訊不對稱問題。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 謝詞………………………………………………………………………I摘要………………………………………………………………………II目錄………………………………………………………………………III圖目錄……………………………………………………………………IV表目錄……………………………………………………………………V第一章、緒論……………………………………………………………1第一節、研究動機與背景………………………………………………1第二節、研究目的………………………………………………………7第三節、研究架構………………………………………………………8第二章、文獻探討………………………………………………………9第一節、資訊不對稱……………………………………………………9第二節、董監事及經理人責任保險文獻………………………………11第三章、研究設計………………………………………………………14第一節、研究模型………………………………………………………14第二節、變數說明………………………………………………………16第三節、資料……………………………………………………………20第四章、實證結果………………………………………………………22第一節、敘述統計分析…………………………………………………22第二節、實證結果………………………………………………………24第五章、結論……………………………………………………………27參考文獻…………………………………………………………………28 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098358004 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董監事責任保險 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公開資訊 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊不對稱 zh_TW dc.title (題名) 董監事及經理人責任保險公開資訊不對稱問題分析 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Asymmetric Information Problem of Directors` and Officers` Liability Insurance en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文文獻1.平兆民,2013,董監事暨重要職員責任保險需求之研究-以台灣金控公司為例,真理大學經濟學系財經碩士班碩士論文。2.何坤孟,2011,公司治理及財務風險與董監事責任保險需求之相關研究,樹德科技大學金融與風險管理系碩士論文。3.汪琪玲,2006,台灣車體損失險契約中存在之訊息不對稱問題,臺大管理論叢,16(2),161-185。4.林嬋娟、張哲嘉,2009,董監事異常變動、家族企業與企業舞弊之關聯性,會計評論,48,1-33。5.紀宛庭,2014,壽險公司銀行保險通路資訊不對稱問題之分析-以終身醫療險為例,國立政治大學風險管理與保險學系碩士論文。6.徐義凱,2014,董監事特性對企業舞弊與資訊揭露品質之影響,臺中科技大學會計資訊系碩士論文。7.張邦茹,曹亦寧,2012,替代或互補?董監事及經理人責任在公司治理的角色,2012臺灣財務金融學會年度學術研討會論文。8.陳可敏,2012,董監事及經理人責任保險核保因子之研究,實踐大學財務金融學系碩士論文。9.陳敏,2013,傷害保險訊息不對稱問題之實證,淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士班碩士論文。10.陳彩稚、龐嘉慧,2008,董監事暨重要職員責任保險之需求因素分析,臺大管理論叢,18(2),171-196。11.葉力旗,2005,董監事及重要職員責任保險承保範圍及相關問題之研究,國立政治大學風險管理與保險學系碩士論文。12.黃信博,2010,資訊揭露及時性、透明度與企業舞弊之關聯性研究,國立臺灣大學會計學系碩士論文。13.黃昱瑋,2013,資訊透明度與董監事暨重要職員責任保險關聯性,真理大學經濟系財經碩士班碩士論文。14.温哲嘉,2011,董監事責任險保險金額與會計盈餘品質之關聯性研究,國立臺灣大學國際企業學系碩士論文。15.廖婉婷,2010,台灣汽車竊盜損失險上的訊息不對稱問題之研究,淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士班碩士論文。16.廖淑惠,2005,落實公司治理,D&O責任險當後盾,財團法人保險事業發展中心保險專業研究專欄文章,https://fsr.tii.org.tw/iiroc/fcontent/research/research03_01.asp?A3b_sn=517.蔡英哲,2008,不對稱訊息在台灣車體保險市場之研究,國立臺灣大學財務金融學系博士論文。二、英文文獻1.Arrow, K. J., 1963, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, American Economic Review, 53, 941-969.2.Aunon-Nerin, D., and Ehling, P., 2008, Why Firms Purchase Property Insurance, Journal of Financial Economics, 90(3), 298-312.3.Boyer, M., 2004, Is the Demand for Corporate Insurance a Habit? Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, Working Paper, 2004s-33.4.Chalmers, J. M., Dann, L. Y., and Harford, J., 2002, Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Purchases, Journal of Finance, 57, 609-639.5.Chang, J. I., 2010, Essays on Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Firm Behavior, PhD Dissertation, National Cheng Chi University.6.Chen, T. J., and Li, S. H., 2010, Directors’ & Officers’ Insurance, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 7, 244-261.7.Chiappori, P. A., and Salanié, B., 2000, Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Market, Journal of Political Economy, 108(1), 56-78.8.Core, J. E., 1997, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64, 63-87.9.Crocker, K. J., and Snow, A., 1985, The Efficiency of Competitive Equilibria in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection, Journal of Public Economics, 26, 207-219.10.Crocker, K. J., and Snow, A., 1986, The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 321-344.11.DeFond, M., and Jiambalvo. J., 1994, Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, 145-176.12.Farber, D. B., 2005, Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter? The Accounting Review, 80(2), 539-561.13.Gupta, M. and Prakash, P., 2012, Information Embedded in Directors and Officers Insurance Purchases, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, 37, 429-451.14.Gutierrez, M., 2003, An Economic Analysis of Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duties, RAND Journal of Economics, 10(2), 115-129.15.Hoy, M., 1982, Categorizing Risks in the Insurance Industry, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, 321-336.16.Lin, C., Officer, M. S., Wang, R., Zou, H., 2013, Directors` and officers` liability insurance and loan spreads, Journal of Financial Economics, 110(1), 37-60.17.Mayers, D. and Smith, C. W. Jr., 1982, On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, Journal of Business, 55(2), 281-296.18.O’Sullivan, N., 2002, The Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance by Large UK Companies, European Management Journal, 20(5), 574-583.19.Peng, J. L., and Wang, K. C., 2015, Information Problems in Bancassurance: Empirical Evidence Based on a Comparison Between Over-the-Counter and Telephone Marketing Customers, The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2015, 1-31.20.Puelz, R., and Snow, A., 1994, Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Empirical Investigation in the Insurance Market, Journal of Political Economy, 102(2), 236-257.21.Rasmusen, E., 1989, Game and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, B. Blackwell, New York.22.Rothschild, M., and Stiglitz, J. E., 1976, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4), 629-649. 23.Shavell, S., 1979, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93(4), 541-562.24.Singhvi, S. S., and Desai, H. B., 1971, An Empirical Analysis of the Quality of Corporate Financial Disclosure, The Accounting Review, 46(1), 129-138.25.Zou, H., Wong, S., Shum, C., Xiong, J., and Yan, J., 2008, Controlling-minority Shareholder Incentive Conflicts and Director’s and officers’ Liability Insurance: Evidence from China, Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(12), 2636-2645. zh_TW