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題名 家族所有權、經營權、控制權對集團企業經營績效與創新之影響
The Research of How Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firms’ Performance and Innovation
作者 莊皓鈞
Chuang, Hao Jun
貢獻者 溫肇東<br>沈榮欽
莊皓鈞
Chuang, Hao Jun
關鍵詞 家族企業
所有權結構
公司治理
企業績效
創新策略
Family business
ownership structures
corporate governance
firm performance
innovation strategies
日期 2015
上傳時間 1-Oct-2015 14:30:20 (UTC+8)
摘要 從企業績效來看，在需持續創新、風險與產業技術複雜性較高的電子業，家族企業若聘用專業經理人經營，企業績效較差，反之，在產業技術變化性與風險較低的傳統產業，家族企業聘用專業經理人經營，反而企業績效較佳，這顯示，在面臨高度風險的環境時，家族企業中經營權與所有權的分離才會導致代理問題。同樣地，在電子業中，家族企業的控制權與所有權分離程度越高，企業績效越差，反之，在傳統產業中，家族企業控制權與所有權分離程度越高，企業績效反而越佳。這個結果顯示，在需持續創新、風險與產業技術複雜性較高的產業中，家族企業必須同時面臨兩種代理問題。
從企業對創新這類風險性投資的策略來看，本論文的研究結果顯示，經營權與所有權合一，企業所有者有能力及意願監督經營者，這將有助於企業投入較多的創新。反之，在控制權與所有權分離的情況下，因為投資的大部分是其他人的錢，企業的最終控制者能將創新的風險分散給外部股東，而較有意願投入創新。而家族控制者本身，因其規避風險的特質，而對上述兩類對創新有正向影響的治理機制有負向的調節效果（moderate）。但對家族成員而言，創新有助於企業的長期競爭優勢為了家族的永續發展，在經營企業上應該會採取長遠觀點（long-term perspective），而有意願投入創新，為了解開這個難題，本研究進一步將創新分為利用型創新（exploitative innovation）及開創型創新（explorative innovation）兩類，分析結果發現，家族企業雖然投入創新的數目較少，但在比例上有較多是較開創的創新，這個結果顯示，家族企業雖然害怕風險，但相對於非家族企業仍較具有長期經營的觀點並較具開創性。
This dissertation concerns the effects of different governance structures on firms’ performance and innovativeness in business groups.
In the first study, the ambivalent needs of control and growth of family firms in business group are explored. This study finds that in general, the excess control rights and controlling shareholdings will increase firms’ performance. In addition, family firms with such control structures will perform better in non-electronic industry while worse in electronic industry. Lastly, active control, namely family members control management and chairman at the same time, will perform better in electronic industry while worse in non-electronic industry.
The second study focuses on comparing family and non-family group affiliated firms’ incentives to do innovations in different governance structures. Adopting behavior agent model, we propose that although family group affiliated firms are less innovativeness than non-family group affiliated firms in general, they have larger share of exploratory innovation than non-family firms. The empirical results support our hypotheses. However, in contrast to traditional agency perspective, the separations between ownership and control rights facilitate firms’ innovativeness. This finding may originate in pyramid ownership structure.
參考文獻 Admati, A. R., Pfleiderer, P., & Zechner, J. 1994. Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy, 102(6): 1097-1130.
Agrawal, A. & Knoeber, C. R. 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3): 377-397.
Almeida, H. V. & Wolfenzon, D. 2006. A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups. Journal of Finance, 61(6): 2637-2680.
Anderson, R. C. & Reeb, D. M. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58(3): 1301-1328.
Anderson, R. C., Duru, A., & Reeb, D. M. 2012. Investment policy in family controlled fims. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(6): 1744-1758.
Arregle, J. L., Hitt, M. A., Sirmon, D. G., & Very, P. 2007. The development of organizational social capital: Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management Studies, 44(1): 73-95.
Baltagi, B. H., Bresson, G., & Pirotte, A. 2003. Fixed effects, random effects or Hausman-Taylor? A pretest estimator. Economics Letters, 79(3): 361-369.
Battaggion, M. R. & L., T. 2001. Ownership Structure, Innovation Process and Competitive Performance: the Case of Italy. CESPRI Working Paper No. 120, Milano.
Baysinger, B. D., Kosnik, R. D., & Turk, T. A. 1991. Effects of Board and Ownership Structure on Corporate Research-and-Development Strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 34(1): 205-214.
Bebchuk, L., Kraakman, R., & Triantis, G. 2000. Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash-Flow Rights. In R. Morck (Ed.), Concentrated Corporate Ownership: 445-460.
Bebchuk, L. A. & Cohen, A. 2005. The costs of entrenched boards. Journal of Financial Economics, 78(2): 409-433.
Belenzon, S. & Berkovitz, T. 2010. Innovation in Business Groups. Management Science, 56(3): 519-535.
Belloc, F. 2012. Corporate Governance and Innovation: A Survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, 26(5): 835-864.
Benner, M. J. & Tushman, M. 2002. Process management and technological innovation: A longitudinal study of the photography and paint industries. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(4): 676-706.
Berger, P. G., Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. L. 1997. Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. Journal of Finance, 52(4): 1411-1438.
Berle, A. A. & Means, G. C. 1932. The modern corporation and private property. New York: Macmillan.
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Larraza-Kintana, M. 2010. Socioemotional Wealth and Corporate Responses to Institutional Pressures: Do Family-Controlled Firms Pollute Less? Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(1): 82-113.
Bertrand, M. & Schoar, A. 2006. The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(2): 73-96.
Bourgeois, L. J. & Eisenhardt, K. M. 1988. Strategic Decision-Processes in High-Velocity Environments - 4 Cases in the Microcomputer Industry. Management Science, 34(7): 816-835.
Boyd, B. 1990. Corporate Linkages and Organizational Environment - a Test of the Resource Dependence Model. Strategic Management Journal, 11(6): 419-430.
Boyd, B. K. 1995. Ceo Duality and Firm Performance - a Contingency-Model. Strategic Management Journal, 16(4): 301-312.
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Jarrell, G. 1997. Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3(3): 189-220.
Chandler, A. D. 1977. The visible hand : the managerial revolution in American business. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press.
Chandler, A. D. & Hikino, T. 1990. Scale and scope : the dynamics of industrial capitalism. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Belknap Press.
Chang, S. J. & Hong, J. 2000. Economic performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea: Intragroup resource sharing and internal business transactions. Academy of Management Journal, 43(3): 429-448.
Chang, S. J. 2003. Ownership structure, expropriation, and performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea. Academy of Management Journal, 46(2): 238-253.
Chang, S. J., Chung, C. N., & Mahmood, I. P. 2006. When and how does business group affiliation promote firm innovation? A tale of two emerging economies. Organization Science, 17(5): 637-656.
Chen, S., Chen, X., & Cheng, Q. 2008. Do family firms provide more or less voluntary disclosure? Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3): 499-536.
Chrisman, J. J. & Patel, P. C. 2011. Variations in R&D Investments of Family and Non-family Firms: Behavioral Agency and Myopic Loss Aversion Perspectives. Academy of Management Journal, In Press.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2): 81-112.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. R. H., & Lang, L. H. P. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57(6): 2741-2771.
Claessens, S., Fan, J. R. H., & Lang, L. H. P. 2006. The benefits and costs of group affiliation: Evidence from East Asia. Emerging Markets Review, 7(1): 1-26.
Corstjens, M., Peyer, U. C., & Van der Heyden, L. 2006. Performance of family firms : evidence from US and European firms and investors. INSEAD Working Paper.
Cubbin, J. & Leech, D. 1983. The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of Control in British-Companies - Theory and Measurement. Economic Journal, 93(370): 351-369.
Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. 2007. The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control. Academy of Management Annals, 1: 1-64.
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Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I. 2001. The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal, 44(1): 81-95.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Haynes, K. T., Nunez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J. L., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. 2007. Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(1): 106-137.
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描述 博士
國立政治大學
科技管理與智慧財產研究所
95359504
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0953595041
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 溫肇東<br>沈榮欽zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 莊皓鈞zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chuang, Hao Junen_US
dc.creator (作者) 莊皓鈞zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chuang, Hao Junen_US
dc.date (日期) 2015en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Oct-2015 14:30:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Oct-2015 14:30:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Oct-2015 14:30:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0953595041en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78815-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 科技管理與智慧財產研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 95359504zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 從企業績效來看，在需持續創新、風險與產業技術複雜性較高的電子業，家族企業若聘用專業經理人經營，企業績效較差，反之，在產業技術變化性與風險較低的傳統產業，家族企業聘用專業經理人經營，反而企業績效較佳，這顯示，在面臨高度風險的環境時，家族企業中經營權與所有權的分離才會導致代理問題。同樣地，在電子業中，家族企業的控制權與所有權分離程度越高，企業績效越差，反之，在傳統產業中，家族企業控制權與所有權分離程度越高，企業績效反而越佳。這個結果顯示，在需持續創新、風險與產業技術複雜性較高的產業中，家族企業必須同時面臨兩種代理問題。
從企業對創新這類風險性投資的策略來看，本論文的研究結果顯示，經營權與所有權合一，企業所有者有能力及意願監督經營者，這將有助於企業投入較多的創新。反之，在控制權與所有權分離的情況下，因為投資的大部分是其他人的錢，企業的最終控制者能將創新的風險分散給外部股東，而較有意願投入創新。而家族控制者本身，因其規避風險的特質，而對上述兩類對創新有正向影響的治理機制有負向的調節效果（moderate）。但對家族成員而言，創新有助於企業的長期競爭優勢為了家族的永續發展，在經營企業上應該會採取長遠觀點（long-term perspective），而有意願投入創新，為了解開這個難題，本研究進一步將創新分為利用型創新（exploitative innovation）及開創型創新（explorative innovation）兩類，分析結果發現，家族企業雖然投入創新的數目較少，但在比例上有較多是較開創的創新，這個結果顯示，家族企業雖然害怕風險，但相對於非家族企業仍較具有長期經營的觀點並較具開創性。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This dissertation concerns the effects of different governance structures on firms’ performance and innovativeness in business groups.
In the first study, the ambivalent needs of control and growth of family firms in business group are explored. This study finds that in general, the excess control rights and controlling shareholdings will increase firms’ performance. In addition, family firms with such control structures will perform better in non-electronic industry while worse in electronic industry. Lastly, active control, namely family members control management and chairman at the same time, will perform better in electronic industry while worse in non-electronic industry.
The second study focuses on comparing family and non-family group affiliated firms’ incentives to do innovations in different governance structures. Adopting behavior agent model, we propose that although family group affiliated firms are less innovativeness than non-family group affiliated firms in general, they have larger share of exploratory innovation than non-family firms. The empirical results support our hypotheses. However, in contrast to traditional agency perspective, the separations between ownership and control rights facilitate firms’ innovativeness. This finding may originate in pyramid ownership structure.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents Preface I
1. Introduction: Family control, Performance and Innovation 1
1.1 Family-controlled firm and performance 2
1.2 Family-controlled firm and Innovation 5
2. How Do Family and Control Structures Affect Group Affiliated Firms’ Performance 8
2.1 Introduction 8
2.2 Theory And Hypotheses 10
2.3 Data And Methods 20
2.4 Results 29
2.5 Conclusion And Implication 30
3. How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Group-affiliated Firms’ Innovativeness? 40
3.1 Introduction 40
3.2 Theory And Hypotheses 43
3.3 Data And Methods 50
3.4 Results 58
3.5 Discussion And Conclusion 61
4. The Pros and Cons of Professional Managers and Other People’s Money: Final Thoughts 65
Tables 33
Table 1 研究架構 IV
Table 2-1 Variations in three control mechanisms 33
Table 2-2 Descriptive statistics Correlations 34
Table 2-2 Descriptive statistics Correlations (Cont’d) 35
Table 2-3 the effects of different control-enhancing mechanisms on firm value of group-affiliated firms (Hausman and Taylor model) 36
Table 2-4 the effects of different control-enhancing mechanisms on firm value of group-affiliated firms in high-tech industries (Hausman and Taylor model) 37
Table 2-5 the effects of different control-enhancing mechanisms on firm value of group-affiliated firms in low-tech industries (Hausman and Taylor model) 38
Table 2-6 the summary of the effect of different control-enhancing mechanisms on firm performance 39
Table 3-1 Time invariant test for control rights 68
Table 3-2 Descriptive statistics Correlations 69
Table 3-2 Descriptive statistics Correlations (Cont’d) 70
Table 3-3 ZINB models for the effects of family, business group structures, and governance structures on group-affiliated firm innovation 71
Table 3-4 Hausman-Taylor model for the effects of family on share of exploration and exploitation in innovation 72
Table 3-4 Hausman-Taylor model for the effects of family on exploratory and exploitive innovations (Cont’d) 73
Table 3-5 Hausman-Taylor model for the effect of governance structures on exploratory and exploitative innovations in non-family group affiliated firms 74		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 6274822 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0953595041en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 家族企業zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 所有權結構zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 企業績效zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 創新策略zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Family businessen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) ownership structuresen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) corporate governanceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) firm performanceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) innovation strategiesen_US
dc.title (題名) 家族所有權、經營權、控制權對集團企業經營績效與創新之影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Research of How Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firms’ Performance and Innovationen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Admati, A. R., Pfleiderer, P., & Zechner, J. 1994. Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy, 102(6): 1097-1130.
Agrawal, A. & Knoeber, C. R. 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3): 377-397.
Almeida, H. V. & Wolfenzon, D. 2006. A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups. Journal of Finance, 61(6): 2637-2680.
Anderson, R. C. & Reeb, D. M. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58(3): 1301-1328.
Anderson, R. C., Duru, A., & Reeb, D. M. 2012. Investment policy in family controlled fims. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(6): 1744-1758.
Arregle, J. L., Hitt, M. A., Sirmon, D. G., & Very, P. 2007. The development of organizational social capital: Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management Studies, 44(1): 73-95.
Baltagi, B. H., Bresson, G., & Pirotte, A. 2003. Fixed effects, random effects or Hausman-Taylor? A pretest estimator. Economics Letters, 79(3): 361-369.
Battaggion, M. R. & L., T. 2001. Ownership Structure, Innovation Process and Competitive Performance: the Case of Italy. CESPRI Working Paper No. 120, Milano.
Baysinger, B. D., Kosnik, R. D., & Turk, T. A. 1991. Effects of Board and Ownership Structure on Corporate Research-and-Development Strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 34(1): 205-214.
Bebchuk, L., Kraakman, R., & Triantis, G. 2000. Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash-Flow Rights. In R. Morck (Ed.), Concentrated Corporate Ownership: 445-460.
Bebchuk, L. A. & Cohen, A. 2005. The costs of entrenched boards. Journal of Financial Economics, 78(2): 409-433.
Belenzon, S. & Berkovitz, T. 2010. Innovation in Business Groups. Management Science, 56(3): 519-535.
Belloc, F. 2012. Corporate Governance and Innovation: A Survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, 26(5): 835-864.
Benner, M. J. & Tushman, M. 2002. Process management and technological innovation: A longitudinal study of the photography and paint industries. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(4): 676-706.
Berger, P. G., Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. L. 1997. Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. Journal of Finance, 52(4): 1411-1438.
Berle, A. A. & Means, G. C. 1932. The modern corporation and private property. New York: Macmillan.
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Larraza-Kintana, M. 2010. Socioemotional Wealth and Corporate Responses to Institutional Pressures: Do Family-Controlled Firms Pollute Less? Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(1): 82-113.
Bertrand, M. & Schoar, A. 2006. The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(2): 73-96.
Bourgeois, L. J. & Eisenhardt, K. M. 1988. Strategic Decision-Processes in High-Velocity Environments - 4 Cases in the Microcomputer Industry. Management Science, 34(7): 816-835.
Boyd, B. 1990. Corporate Linkages and Organizational Environment - a Test of the Resource Dependence Model. Strategic Management Journal, 11(6): 419-430.
Boyd, B. K. 1995. Ceo Duality and Firm Performance - a Contingency-Model. Strategic Management Journal, 16(4): 301-312.
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Jarrell, G. 1997. Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3(3): 189-220.
Chandler, A. D. 1977. The visible hand : the managerial revolution in American business. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press.
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