| dc.contributor | 金融系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Shen, Chung-Hua | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 沈中華 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2006 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 1-Oct-2015 18:36:46 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 1-Oct-2015 18:36:46 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 1-Oct-2015 18:36:46 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78837 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Not until the present study has there been an attempt to investigate the determinants of a country`s choice vis-a-vis the type of financial supervisory system: sectoral, partial and unified. Sectoral supervision is in place when a country`s banking, securities and insurance sectors are supervised by three different supervisors, while unified supervision prevails when all three sectors are supervised by one entity. Partial supervision falls between these two systems. From a sample of 101 countries, it is found that a "reverse central bank effect" exists, where countries whose central bank also supervises their banks tend to adopt sectoral supervision. Also, there is evidence for a "scale effect": where countries with a higher population prefer sectoral to partial supervision. The "poor country effect" is rejected since poor countries tend to adopt sectoral supervision. Developed countries seemingly opt for unified supervision, whereas less developed countries generally take on partial but not unified supervision. With their preference for sectoral rather than unified supervision, central and eastern European countries experience the "CEE effect". Of particular interest, it is determined that the "reverse blurring of distinction effect" holds true as countries whose banks cannot engage in securities and insurance activities tend to adopt partial or unified supervisions. Finally, "the good governance effect" is confirmed in that countries with good governance evidently opt for unified supervision. On the weight of the evidence here, this research lays the groundwork for further systematic studies of the determinants of financial supervisory systems. | |
| dc.format.extent | 203434 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Banks and Bank Systems, 1(2), 36-57 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | financial supervision;unified supervision;sectoral supervision | |
| dc.title (題名) | Determinants of the Financial Supervision System: Global Evidence | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
