| dc.contributor | 財政系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Wang, Jue-Shyan;Hung, Hsiao-Yin | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 王智賢;洪曉吟 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2008-07 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 6-Oct-2015 16:33:42 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 6-Oct-2015 16:33:42 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 6-Oct-2015 16:33:42 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78875 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Because the interests of the manager and the organization are not necessarily coincident, the principal-agent problem arises in the process of recruitment. The standard of employment and the motive in the manager`s mind may influence the result of recruitment. The present paper analyzes a game in which the recruit may lobby the manager. We discuss the equilibrium when the manager has a prejudice against some applicant or has a consideration about his own future promotion prospects. | |
| dc.format.extent | 159 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Economics and Management, 4(2), 125-143 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Asymmetric Information;Employment;Equilibrium;Information;Principal Agent;Promotion | |
| dc.title (題名) | The Lobbying Game for Recruitment in Asymmetric Information | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
