| dc.contributor | 財管系 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | 張元晨 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lu, Chien-Lin;Chang, Yuanchen | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2015 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 10-Nov-2015 16:38:54 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 10-Nov-2015 16:38:54 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 10-Nov-2015 16:38:54 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/79391 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper explores the role of creditors in firm’s cash holding policy. We test whether creditors affect firm’s cash reserves and the value of cash via covenants of bank loan contracts. The results show that the tightness of cash-related covenant limits firm’s attempt to accumulate cash, causing firms use their cash more efficiently. Borrowers tend to hold more cash reserves for precautionary motive since they might not be able to borrow from banks when they violate covenants. By separating the sources of cash, we show that firms liquidate net working-capital and reduce payout ratio to retain more cash after violating covenants. Finally, we find that the effects of covenant violations on cash are significant for high M/B firms, and the violation help low M/B firms increase the value of cash since firms save cash mainly for precautionary motive after covenant violations. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 1098082 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Financial Studies, | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Bank loan; Cash holdings; Covenants; Value of cash | - |
| dc.title (題名) | The Effects of Bank Monitoring on Firm’s Cash Holding Policy and Value of Cash | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
