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題名 Founding family ownership and innovation
作者 陳宇紳
Chen, Vincent Y.S.;Tsao, Shou-Min;Chen, Guang-Zheng
貢獻者 會計系
關鍵詞 family firms; innovation; risk diversification; voting–cash flow right divergence; G32; G34
日期 2015-01
上傳時間 8-Dec-2015 17:31:49 (UTC+8)
摘要 This study empirically examines the extent to which family ownership affects innovation. Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms, we find that family firms invest more in innovation than nonfamily firms, suggesting that family firms’ incentives to encourage innovation investment (e.g. long-run presence concern) outweigh families’ risk diversification concern in making innovation decisions. Our results are more pronounced in families that have voting–cash flow rights divergence and that operate in high-tech industries. Our study suggests that the family ownership structure is not necessarily detrimental to shareholder interests, although prior research indicates that the agency cost of large and small shareholders is high in East Asian countries where family ownership can exacerbate this type of agency conflict.
關聯 Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics,20(4),429-456
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2012.762971
dc.contributor 會計系
dc.creator (作者) 陳宇紳zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Vincent Y.S.;Tsao, Shou-Min;Chen, Guang-Zheng
dc.date (日期) 2015-01
dc.date.accessioned 8-Dec-2015 17:31:49 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 8-Dec-2015 17:31:49 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 8-Dec-2015 17:31:49 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/79605-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study empirically examines the extent to which family ownership affects innovation. Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms, we find that family firms invest more in innovation than nonfamily firms, suggesting that family firms’ incentives to encourage innovation investment (e.g. long-run presence concern) outweigh families’ risk diversification concern in making innovation decisions. Our results are more pronounced in families that have voting–cash flow rights divergence and that operate in high-tech industries. Our study suggests that the family ownership structure is not necessarily detrimental to shareholder interests, although prior research indicates that the agency cost of large and small shareholders is high in East Asian countries where family ownership can exacerbate this type of agency conflict.
dc.format.extent 146 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics,20(4),429-456
dc.subject (關鍵詞) family firms; innovation; risk diversification; voting–cash flow right divergence; G32; G34
dc.title (題名) Founding family ownership and innovation
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1080/16081625.2012.762971
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2012.762971