Must We Know What We Mean? | Publication

題名	Must We Know What We Mean?
作者	鄭光明 Cheng, Kuang-Ming
貢獻者	哲學系
日期	2005-12
上傳時間	8-Jan-2016 17:14:05 (UTC+8)
摘要	In his 1987 article “Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person”, John Searle argues that we actually know what we mean; therefore, W. V. O. Quin ’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation must be wrong. In this paper, I will try to identify the mistakes in Searle’s criticism of Quine’s story. I will argue that Quine’s indeterminacy thesis can be construed as containing two theses— that is, the immanent indeterminacy and the transcendent indeterminacy. With these two indeterminacies in mind, Quine’s indeterminacy thesis will still remain tenable even if we actually know what we mean
關聯	Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy,19,21-33
資料類型	article

dc.contributor	哲學系
dc.creator (作者)	鄭光明	zh_TW
dc.creator (作者)	Cheng, Kuang-Ming
dc.date (日期)	2005-12
dc.date.accessioned	8-Jan-2016 17:14:05 (UTC+8)	-
dc.date.available	8-Jan-2016 17:14:05 (UTC+8)	-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間)	8-Jan-2016 17:14:05 (UTC+8)	-
dc.identifier.uri (URI)	http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/80476	-
dc.description.abstract (摘要)	In his 1987 article “Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person”, John Searle argues that we actually know what we mean; therefore, W. V. O. Quin ’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation must be wrong. In this paper, I will try to identify the mistakes in Searle’s criticism of Quine’s story. I will argue that Quine’s indeterminacy thesis can be construed as containing two theses— that is, the immanent indeterminacy and the transcendent indeterminacy. With these two indeterminacies in mind, Quine’s indeterminacy thesis will still remain tenable even if we actually know what we mean
dc.format.extent	96 bytes	-
dc.format.mimetype	text/html	-
dc.relation (關聯)	Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy,19,21-33
dc.title (題名)	Must We Know What We Mean?
dc.type (資料類型)	article