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題名 企業超額現金持有與租稅規避
Corporate Excess Cash Holdings and Tax Avoidance
作者 蔡麗雯
Tsai, Lih Wen
貢獻者 陳明進
Chen, Ming Chin
蔡麗雯
Tsai, Lih Wen
關鍵詞 超額現金持有
租稅規避
有效稅率
財稅所得差異
Excess Cash Holdings
Tax Avoidance
Effective Tax Rates
Book Tax Differences
日期 2015
上傳時間 1-Mar-2016 10:26:05 (UTC+8)
摘要 　　本文以民國87年到103年我國上市櫃公司個別報表為樣本，實證研究發現租稅負擔愈重的公司，在「預防動機」下會傾向持有比較多的現金或超額現金，以作為日後稅款繳納的資金來源；此外，也發現愈有意圖以租稅規避節省稅款繳納的現金流出之企業，其留存的現金或超額現金持有部位也愈高。
　　再者，股票市場投資者認為企業租稅規避活動而節省的超額現金，受到債務契約中嵌入的限制性條款或加速條之約束，而無法用於發放股利或是股利發放金額低於股東預期值，因此會回應予負向的超額權益報酬。另外，本文也發現企業會傾向將租稅規避活動而節省的超額現金用於償還短期借款，或保留作為日後長期借款的還款資金來源，藉以減輕企業負債的資金成本。
　　最後，合併報表樣本同樣也發現集團企業租稅負擔愈重時，愈傾向持有更多的超額現金（或現金持有）作為日後稅款繳納的資金來源；而若以聯屬企業租稅負擔低於母公司租稅負擔作為租稅規避的代理變數時，則發現企業會將租稅規避所節省的現金流量用於投資或擴廠等用途，因此發現租稅規避與現金或超額現金持有具有負向關聯性；再者，企業為了避免補繳海外資金匯回的所得稅款，乃傾向將避稅節省的超額現金留滯於境外，故股票市場投資者仍然負面看待企業租稅規避之超額現金的邊際價值。
This study first examines the effects of tax avoidance on corporate excess cash holdings. The empirical result shows that, ceteris paribus, firms with higher effective tax rates tend to have greater excess cash holdings, which is consistent with the precautionary savings motive that financially-constrained firms proactively save more cash to pay future cash needs. In addition, firms which actively engaged in tax avoidance exhibit greater excess cash holdings.
This study then examines the relation between tax avoidance and the value of excess cash holdings. Following the Faulkender and Wang (2006) approach, this study uses excess equity returns to estimate the value of excess cash to equityholders. The result shows a negative relation between tax avoidance and the marginal value of excess cash holdings to equityholders, supporting the costly contracting hypothesis. Additional analysis reveals that firms engage in tax avoidance activities to minimize taxes and are likely to use excess cash holdings to retire debt, leading to a lower cost of debt.
Finally, based on the financial data of consolidated financial statements, the results also show that a positive relation between effective tax rates and the excess cash holdings, which is consistent with the transaction costs hypothesis that multinational corporations, to aviod repatriation taxes, retain cash holdings abroad and use that cash for overseas investments. Thus, tax avoidance is negatively related to excess cash holdings. In addition, based on the financial data of consolidated financial statements, the result also shows a negative relation between tax avoidance and the marginal value of excess cash holdings to equityholders. This result suggests that additional dollars of excess cash holdings arising from tax avoidance activities of multinational corporations are likely to be kept aborad to avoid the repatriation tax, rather than to be distributed to shareholders as an increase of cash dividend. Therefore, the stock market responds negatively to the excess cash holdings arising from tax avoidance.
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陳明進，2002，營利事業有效稅率決定因素之實證研究，會計評論，第34期（1月）：57-75。
陳明進與蔡麗雯，2006，財稅所得差異決定因素及課稅所得推估之研究，管理學報，第23期（6月）：739-763。
黃美祝，2010，財稅差異金額大小對國稅局選案查核之影響，會計評論，第50期（1月）：23-55。
黃曉雯，2011，遨睿收購國巨，為何破局收場？會計研究月刊，第308期（7月）：68-75。
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描述 博士
國立政治大學
會計學系
95353502
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095353502
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 陳明進zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Chen, Ming Chinen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 蔡麗雯zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Tsai, Lih Wenen_US
dc.creator (作者) 蔡麗雯zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Tsai, Lih Wenen_US
dc.date (日期) 2015en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Mar-2016 10:26:05 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Mar-2016 10:26:05 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Mar-2016 10:26:05 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0095353502en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/81457-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 95353502zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 　　本文以民國87年到103年我國上市櫃公司個別報表為樣本，實證研究發現租稅負擔愈重的公司，在「預防動機」下會傾向持有比較多的現金或超額現金，以作為日後稅款繳納的資金來源；此外，也發現愈有意圖以租稅規避節省稅款繳納的現金流出之企業，其留存的現金或超額現金持有部位也愈高。
　　再者，股票市場投資者認為企業租稅規避活動而節省的超額現金，受到債務契約中嵌入的限制性條款或加速條之約束，而無法用於發放股利或是股利發放金額低於股東預期值，因此會回應予負向的超額權益報酬。另外，本文也發現企業會傾向將租稅規避活動而節省的超額現金用於償還短期借款，或保留作為日後長期借款的還款資金來源，藉以減輕企業負債的資金成本。
　　最後，合併報表樣本同樣也發現集團企業租稅負擔愈重時，愈傾向持有更多的超額現金（或現金持有）作為日後稅款繳納的資金來源；而若以聯屬企業租稅負擔低於母公司租稅負擔作為租稅規避的代理變數時，則發現企業會將租稅規避所節省的現金流量用於投資或擴廠等用途，因此發現租稅規避與現金或超額現金持有具有負向關聯性；再者，企業為了避免補繳海外資金匯回的所得稅款，乃傾向將避稅節省的超額現金留滯於境外，故股票市場投資者仍然負面看待企業租稅規避之超額現金的邊際價值。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study first examines the effects of tax avoidance on corporate excess cash holdings. The empirical result shows that, ceteris paribus, firms with higher effective tax rates tend to have greater excess cash holdings, which is consistent with the precautionary savings motive that financially-constrained firms proactively save more cash to pay future cash needs. In addition, firms which actively engaged in tax avoidance exhibit greater excess cash holdings.
This study then examines the relation between tax avoidance and the value of excess cash holdings. Following the Faulkender and Wang (2006) approach, this study uses excess equity returns to estimate the value of excess cash to equityholders. The result shows a negative relation between tax avoidance and the marginal value of excess cash holdings to equityholders, supporting the costly contracting hypothesis. Additional analysis reveals that firms engage in tax avoidance activities to minimize taxes and are likely to use excess cash holdings to retire debt, leading to a lower cost of debt.
Finally, based on the financial data of consolidated financial statements, the results also show that a positive relation between effective tax rates and the excess cash holdings, which is consistent with the transaction costs hypothesis that multinational corporations, to aviod repatriation taxes, retain cash holdings abroad and use that cash for overseas investments. Thus, tax avoidance is negatively related to excess cash holdings. In addition, based on the financial data of consolidated financial statements, the result also shows a negative relation between tax avoidance and the marginal value of excess cash holdings to equityholders. This result suggests that additional dollars of excess cash holdings arising from tax avoidance activities of multinational corporations are likely to be kept aborad to avoid the repatriation tax, rather than to be distributed to shareholders as an increase of cash dividend. Therefore, the stock market responds negatively to the excess cash holdings arising from tax avoidance.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 謝　辭 i
摘　要 ii
目　次 iv
表　次 v
圖　次 vi
壹、緒論 1
貳、文獻回顧 11
一、資本結構理論 11
二、現金持有的理論依據 23
三、現金持有動機 27
四、租稅規避文獻 31
參、研究方法 34
一、現金持有與租稅規避 34
二、超額權益報酬與租稅規避所節省的超額現金持有 46
三、資料來源與樣本篩選 53
肆、實證結果 54
一、敘述統計分析 54
二、相關性分析 61
三、實證結果與分析 70
伍、結論 106
參考文獻 109		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1149371 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095353502en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 超額現金持有zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅規避zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 有效稅率zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 財稅所得差異zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Excess Cash Holdingsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax Avoidanceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Effective Tax Ratesen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Book Tax Differencesen_US
dc.title (題名) 企業超額現金持有與租稅規避zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Corporate Excess Cash Holdings and Tax Avoidanceen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 洪茂蔚，2015，財務管理，雙葉書廊。
洪貴參，1999，關係企業法理論與實務，元照出版社。
陳明進，2002，營利事業有效稅率決定因素之實證研究，會計評論，第34期（1月）：57-75。
陳明進與蔡麗雯，2006，財稅所得差異決定因素及課稅所得推估之研究，管理學報，第23期（6月）：739-763。
黃美祝，2010，財稅差異金額大小對國稅局選案查核之影響，會計評論，第50期（1月）：23-55。
黃曉雯，2011，遨睿收購國巨，為何破局收場？會計研究月刊，第308期（7月）：68-75。
蕭茜文，2013，遏止稅基侵蝕與利潤移轉國際發展近況，當代財政，第33期（9月）：99-103。
Acharya, V. V., H. Almeida, and M. Campello. 2007. Is cash negative debt? A hedging perspective on corporate financial policies. Journal of Financial Intermediation 16 (4): 515-554.
Almeida, H., M. Campellom, and M. S. Weisbach. 2004. The cash flow sensitivity of cash. Journal of Finance 59 (4): 1777-1804.
Armstrong C. S., J. L. Blouin, and D. F. Larcker. 2012. The incentives for tax planning. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53 (1-2): 391-411.
Bates, T. W., K. M. Kahle, and R. M. Stulz. 2009. Why do US firms hold so much more cash than they used to? Journal of Finance 64 (5): 1985-2021.
Baumol, W. J. 1952. The transactions demand for cash: An inventory theoretic approach. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 66 (4): 545-556.
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