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題名 俄羅斯中央銀行獨立性之研究
作者 陳齊
貢獻者 魏艾
陳齊
關鍵詞 俄羅斯
中央銀行
政治獨立性
經濟獨立性
貨幣政策協調
Russia
central bnak
political independence
economical independence
monetary policy coordination
日期 2001
上傳時間 15-Apr-2016 15:59:16 (UTC+8)
摘要 本篇論文主要是分析俄羅斯中央銀行的獨立性。本文先由西方經濟理論與中央銀行獨立性文獻說明中央銀行為何必須要擁有一個高度的獨立性。對於俄羅斯的高通貨膨脹現象與中央銀行地位轉變之間的關係，本文也有詳細的說明。
This article’s main idea is the analysis of Russia central bank’s independence. From the aspects of the western economic theories and central bank independence literatures, the author interprets why central bank needs to have a high independent status. This article also provides a relationship description between the Russian hyperinflation phenomenon and the transformation of Russia central bank stance.
參考文獻 一、中文書目與期刊：
     謝登隆、徐繼達編，「總體經濟學；理論與政策」，（智勝，民83，四版）。
     趙何敏編，中央銀行學，（武漢：武漢大學出版社，2000年7月2刷）。
     畢英賢譯，「俄羅斯聯邦憲法」，俄羅斯，（台北：政大國研中心，民84）。
     張壽民，俄羅斯法律發達史，（北京：法律出版社，2000年），頁289-291。
     孫杰，貨幣與金融：金融制度的國際比較，（社會科學文獻出版社，北京，1998年，2刷）
     許瑜玟譯，俄羅斯聯邦憲法，1992年12月10日修正通過。見許瑜玟，「俄羅斯府會政爭之研析：1992-1993」，國立政治大學俄羅斯研究所碩士論文，民87年4月。
     馮紹雷，制度變遷與對外關係：1992年以來的俄羅斯，（上海人民出版社，1997年11月）。
     施建生，現代經濟思潮，（大中國：1996年6月）。
     葉自成，「俄羅斯政府與政治」，（台北：揚智，初版，1997）
     張穎，「中東歐國家的財政和貨幣政策理論與通貨膨脹」，《東歐中亞研究》，1998年第4期，頁43-50。
     熊家文，「俄羅斯惡性通貨膨脹的前因後果」，《世界經濟》，1998年第9期，頁53-56。
     林伏濤，各國銀行制度，（行健，初版，民45年5月），頁140-164。
     二、英文書目與期刊：
     Ahdieh, R. B., Russia’s Constitutional Revolution: 1985-1996, (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
     Andersen, T. M. and Schneider, F. “Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Different Institution arrangements,” European Journal of Political Economy, 2 (1986), pp. 169-191.
     Aslund, Anders, “Russia’s Financial Crisis: Causes and Possible Remedies,”Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, vol. 39, no. 6, 1998, pp. 309-328.
     Bagher, Fatholla M. & Habibi, Nader, “Political institutions and Central Bank indepedence: A cross-country analysis, ” Public Choice, vol. 96 (1998), pp. 187-204.
     Corda-Stanley, S. & Synnott Damien, Banking in Russia, (Financial Times publishing, London, 1996)
     Bernhard, William, “A political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence,” American Political Science Review, vol. 92, no. 2 (June 1998), pp.311-327.
     Boone, Peter, Breach, Alasdair, and Johnson, Simon, “Institutions and Prospects for a Currency Board in Russia: Perspectives on a Deepening Crisis,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, vol.39, no .7 (1998), pp. 371-378.
     Chadajo, Joshua, “The Independence of the Central Bank of Russia,” RFE/RL Research Report, vol.3, no. 27, 8 July 1994, pp. 26-32.
     Cukierman, A., Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence, (MIT press, Massachusetts, 1992).
     Debelle, Guy, and Stanley Fisher, “How Independent Should a Central Bank Be?” in Jeffery C. Fuhrer, ed., Goals, Guidelines and constraints facing Monetary Policymakers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series No. 38, 1995, pp. 195-221.
     Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W., and Haan, Jakob De., The Political Economy of Central –Bank Independence (Special Papers in international economics; no.19, Princeton University, 1996).
     Friedman, M., “Should There Be An Independent Monetary Authority?” in Central Banking in History III, excerpt from In Search of a Monetary Constitution, pp. 219-243.
     Gaddy, Clifford G., and Ickes, Barry W., “Russia’s Virtual Economy,”Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 5(September/October 1998), pp. 53-67.
     Gaidar, Y., Russian Reform/International Money, (The MIT Press, 1995).
     Gomulka, Stanislaw, “The IMF-Supported Programs of Poland and Russia, 1990-1994: Principles, Errors, and Results,” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 20, no. 3, 1995, pp.316-346.
     Grill, Vittorio, Donato Masciandaro, Guido Tabelini, “Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries,” Economic Policy, Vol.13, 1991, pp. 341-392.
     Ickes, Barry W., Murrell, Peter, and Ryterman, Randi, “End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 13, no. 2, 1997, pp. 105-133.
     Johnson, Juliet, “Russia’s Emerging Financial Industrial Groups,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 13, no. 4 (1997), pp. 333-365.
     Keesing’s Record of World Events
     Knight, Malcolm ed., Central Bank Reforms in the Baltics, Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union (Washington, IMF, 1997).
     Kolodko, G. W., Kozierkiewicz, D. G., and Paczek, E. S., Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Postsocialist Economies, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1992), pp. 1-4.
     Lewarne, S., “The Russian Central Bank and the Conduct of Monetary Policy,”in Willett, T. D., ect. ed., Establishing Monetary Stability in Emerging Market Economies, (Westview Press, 1995), pp.181-183.
     Lopez-Claros, Augusto, and Alexashenko, Sergei V., Fiscal policy issue during the transition in Russia (Washington, IMF, 1998).
     Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, “Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 29, no. 3 (August 1997), pp.381-399.
     Lushin, S., “The Fiscal and Payment Crisis,” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 40, no. 5, September 1997,pp. 36-48.
     Lybek, T., Leone, A. M., “Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation and Output Performance in the Baltic States, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1995-97,” IMF working paper, January 1999.
     Mau, V., “Stabilization, Elections, and Perspectives of Economic Growth: The Political Economy of Reform in Russia,” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 40, no. 4, August 1997, pp. 5-26.
     Miller, Geoffrey P., “An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence,” Journal of Legal Studies, vol. ⅩⅩⅦ (June 1998), pp. 433-453.
     Mishkin, F. S., The Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets, (Harper Collins, 1992, 3 edition).
     Panskov, V., “Financial Problems of Stabilization of the Russian Economy,” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 40, no. 3, July 1997, pp. 5-20.
     Papava, V., and Khaduri, N., “On the Shadow Political Economy of the Post-Communist Transformation,” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 40, no. 6, October 1997, pp. 15-34.
     Rogova, O., “A Strategy for Strengthening the National Currency,” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 40, no. 6, October 1997, pp. 35-48.
     Smopodinskaia, N., “Capital Flight as the Object of International Research,” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 40, no. 11, March 1998, pp. 67-82.
     The Current Digest
     Tompson, William, “The Politics of Central Bank Independence in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 50, no. 7 (1998), pp. 1157-1182.
     Treisman, Daniel S., “Fighting Inflation in a Transitional Regime: Russia’s Anomalous Stabilization,” World Politics, vol. 50 (January 1998), pp. 235-265.
     Willett, Thomas D., Burdekin, Richard C. K., Sweeney, Richard J., Wihlborg, Clas, ed., Establishing Monetary Stability in Emerging Market Economies (Westview Press, Boulder, 1995).
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
俄羅斯研究所
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#A2002001037
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 魏艾zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳齊zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 陳齊zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2001en_US
dc.date.accessioned 15-Apr-2016 15:59:16 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 15-Apr-2016 15:59:16 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 15-Apr-2016 15:59:16 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) A2002001037en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/84849-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 俄羅斯研究所zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本篇論文主要是分析俄羅斯中央銀行的獨立性。本文先由西方經濟理論與中央銀行獨立性文獻說明中央銀行為何必須要擁有一個高度的獨立性。對於俄羅斯的高通貨膨脹現象與中央銀行地位轉變之間的關係，本文也有詳細的說明。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This article’s main idea is the analysis of Russia central bank’s independence. From the aspects of the western economic theories and central bank independence literatures, the author interprets why central bank needs to have a high independent status. This article also provides a relationship description between the Russian hyperinflation phenomenon and the transformation of Russia central bank stance.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 封面頁
     證明書
     致謝
     摘要
     目次
     圖目錄
     表目錄
     第一章 緒論
     第一節 研究動機與背景因素
     壹、蘇聯時期的金融改革
     貳、俄羅斯時期的金融改革
     第二節 文獻分析
     壹、討論通貨膨脹問題與中央銀行地位的文獻
     貳、西方已開發國家中央銀行獨立性之討論
     參、中央銀行獨立性對總體經濟的影響
     肆、俄羅斯與轉型經濟中央銀行政治經濟獨立性之討論
     第三節 研究目的與基本假設
     壹、研究目的
     貳、研究架構理論
     參、基本假設
     第四節 研究方法與章節安排
     壹、研究方法與限制
     貳、章節安排
     第二章 中央銀行與貨幣政策
     第一節 中央銀行的職能
     第二節 當代對貨幣理論的研究
     壹、古典學派
     貳、凱因斯學派
     參、貨幣學派
     肆、新古典學派
     伍、小結
     第三節 中央銀行貨幣政策的實踐
     壹、貨幣政策目標的制定
     貳、貨幣政策工具的選用
     參、貨幣政策的調控
     第四節 俄羅斯金融體系改革
     壹、蘇聯銀行制度遺緒
     貳、盧布區的影響
     參、俄羅斯價格自由化1992─1994
     肆、俄羅斯經改初成1995─1997
     第五節 小結
     第三章 俄羅斯央行獨立性評量
     第一節 中央銀行獨立性因素
     壹、俄羅斯聯邦中央銀行法
     貳、中央銀行獨立性因素
     參、評估範圍
     第二節 政治面獨立性
     壹、葛理力、馬斯強達羅、塔貝理尼1991
     貳、庫其爾曼1992
     第三節 經濟面獨立性
     壹、葛理力、馬斯強達羅、塔貝理尼1991
     貳、庫其爾曼1992
     第四節 小結
     第四章 俄羅斯央行政治獨立性
     第一節 俄羅斯憲法因素
     壹、俄羅斯聯邦憲政爭議
     貳、俄羅斯中央銀行政策目標與憲法規定
     參、俄羅斯聯邦憲法對於政策協調的規定
     第二節 府會政爭
     壹、俄羅斯政爭
     貳、央行政策獨立
     參、政府預算形成主動地位
     肆、政策協商機制
     第三節 中央銀行理事會的任命
     壹、俄羅斯中央銀行總裁
     貳、俄中央銀行理事會
     參、國家銀行會議
     肆、俄羅斯央行的行為獨立性
     第四節 央行其他目標與國際金融組織關係
     壹、央行的其他政策目標
     貳、國際金融組織關係
     第五節 小結
     第五章 俄羅斯中央銀行經濟獨立性
     第一節 實際的央行經濟獨立性
     壹、中央銀行的資產
     貳、中央銀行經濟獨立性的政治意義
     參、中央銀行與次級銀行體系的關係
     第二節 政府預算赤字融資
     壹、政府財政部門的收入支出
     貳、俄羅斯政府對於預算赤字的融資
     第三節 貨幣政策工具的使用
     壹、俄羅斯貨幣幣工具的演進
     貳、俄羅斯貨幣傳導機制
     參、俄羅斯的貨幣政策軌跡
     肆、金融體系的管理
     第四節 小結
     第六章 結論
     附錄
     附錄一：俄羅斯聯邦中央銀行法
     附錄二：現任央行理事會成員
     附錄三：中央銀行獨立性法規評量
     附錄四：大事年表
     參考書目		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#A2002001037en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 俄羅斯zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 中央銀行zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政治獨立性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經濟獨立性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 貨幣政策協調zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Russiaen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) central bnaken_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) political independenceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) economical independenceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) monetary policy coordinationen_US
dc.title (題名) 俄羅斯中央銀行獨立性之研究zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文書目與期刊：
     謝登隆、徐繼達編，「總體經濟學；理論與政策」，（智勝，民83，四版）。
     趙何敏編，中央銀行學，（武漢：武漢大學出版社，2000年7月2刷）。
     畢英賢譯，「俄羅斯聯邦憲法」，俄羅斯，（台北：政大國研中心，民84）。
     張壽民，俄羅斯法律發達史，（北京：法律出版社，2000年），頁289-291。
     孫杰，貨幣與金融：金融制度的國際比較，（社會科學文獻出版社，北京，1998年，2刷）
     許瑜玟譯，俄羅斯聯邦憲法，1992年12月10日修正通過。見許瑜玟，「俄羅斯府會政爭之研析：1992-1993」，國立政治大學俄羅斯研究所碩士論文，民87年4月。
     馮紹雷，制度變遷與對外關係：1992年以來的俄羅斯，（上海人民出版社，1997年11月）。
     施建生，現代經濟思潮，（大中國：1996年6月）。
     葉自成，「俄羅斯政府與政治」，（台北：揚智，初版，1997）
     張穎，「中東歐國家的財政和貨幣政策理論與通貨膨脹」，《東歐中亞研究》，1998年第4期，頁43-50。
     熊家文，「俄羅斯惡性通貨膨脹的前因後果」，《世界經濟》，1998年第9期，頁53-56。
     林伏濤，各國銀行制度，（行健，初版，民45年5月），頁140-164。
     二、英文書目與期刊：
     Ahdieh, R. B., Russia’s Constitutional Revolution: 1985-1996, (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
     Andersen, T. M. and Schneider, F. “Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Different Institution arrangements,” European Journal of Political Economy, 2 (1986), pp. 169-191.
     Aslund, Anders, “Russia’s Financial Crisis: Causes and Possible Remedies,”Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, vol. 39, no. 6, 1998, pp. 309-328.
     Bagher, Fatholla M. & Habibi, Nader, “Political institutions and Central Bank indepedence: A cross-country analysis, ” Public Choice, vol. 96 (1998), pp. 187-204.
     Corda-Stanley, S. & Synnott Damien, Banking in Russia, (Financial Times publishing, London, 1996)
     Bernhard, William, “A political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence,” American Political Science Review, vol. 92, no. 2 (June 1998), pp.311-327.
     Boone, Peter, Breach, Alasdair, and Johnson, Simon, “Institutions and Prospects for a Currency Board in Russia: Perspectives on a Deepening Crisis,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, vol.39, no .7 (1998), pp. 371-378.
     Chadajo, Joshua, “The Independence of the Central Bank of Russia,” RFE/RL Research Report, vol.3, no. 27, 8 July 1994, pp. 26-32.
     Cukierman, A., Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence, (MIT press, Massachusetts, 1992).
     Debelle, Guy, and Stanley Fisher, “How Independent Should a Central Bank Be?” in Jeffery C. Fuhrer, ed., Goals, Guidelines and constraints facing Monetary Policymakers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series No. 38, 1995, pp. 195-221.
     Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W., and Haan, Jakob De., The Political Economy of Central –Bank Independence (Special Papers in international economics; no.19, Princeton University, 1996).
     Friedman, M., “Should There Be An Independent Monetary Authority?” in Central Banking in History III, excerpt from In Search of a Monetary Constitution, pp. 219-243.
     Gaddy, Clifford G., and Ickes, Barry W., “Russia’s Virtual Economy,”Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 5(September/October 1998), pp. 53-67.
     Gaidar, Y., Russian Reform/International Money, (The MIT Press, 1995).
     Gomulka, Stanislaw, “The IMF-Supported Programs of Poland and Russia, 1990-1994: Principles, Errors, and Results,” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 20, no. 3, 1995, pp.316-346.
     Grill, Vittorio, Donato Masciandaro, Guido Tabelini, “Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries,” Economic Policy, Vol.13, 1991, pp. 341-392.
     Ickes, Barry W., Murrell, Peter, and Ryterman, Randi, “End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 13, no. 2, 1997, pp. 105-133.
     Johnson, Juliet, “Russia’s Emerging Financial Industrial Groups,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 13, no. 4 (1997), pp. 333-365.
     Keesing’s Record of World Events
     Knight, Malcolm ed., Central Bank Reforms in the Baltics, Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union (Washington, IMF, 1997).
     Kolodko, G. W., Kozierkiewicz, D. G., and Paczek, E. S., Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Postsocialist Economies, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1992), pp. 1-4.
     Lewarne, S., “The Russian Central Bank and the Conduct of Monetary Policy,”in Willett, T. D., ect. ed., Establishing Monetary Stability in Emerging Market Economies, (Westview Press, 1995), pp.181-183.
     Lopez-Claros, Augusto, and Alexashenko, Sergei V., Fiscal policy issue during the transition in Russia (Washington, IMF, 1998).
     Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, “Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 29, no. 3 (August 1997), pp.381-399.
     Lushin, S., “The Fiscal and Payment Crisis,” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 40, no. 5, September 1997,pp. 36-48.
     Lybek, T., Leone, A. M., “Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation and Output Performance in the Baltic States, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1995-97,” IMF working paper, January 1999.
     Mau, V., “Stabilization, Elections, and Perspectives of Economic Growth: The Political Economy of Reform in Russia,” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 40, no. 4, August 1997, pp. 5-26.
     Miller, Geoffrey P., “An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence,” Journal of Legal Studies, vol. ⅩⅩⅦ (June 1998), pp. 433-453.
     Mishkin, F. S., The Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets, (Harper Collins, 1992, 3 edition).
     Panskov, V., “Financial Problems of Stabilization of the Russian Economy,” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 40, no. 3, July 1997, pp. 5-20.
     Papava, V., and Khaduri, N., “On the Shadow Political Economy of the Post-Communist Transformation,” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 40, no. 6, October 1997, pp. 15-34.
     Rogova, O., “A Strategy for Strengthening the National Currency,” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 40, no. 6, October 1997, pp. 35-48.
     Smopodinskaia, N., “Capital Flight as the Object of International Research,” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 40, no. 11, March 1998, pp. 67-82.
     The Current Digest
     Tompson, William, “The Politics of Central Bank Independence in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 50, no. 7 (1998), pp. 1157-1182.
     Treisman, Daniel S., “Fighting Inflation in a Transitional Regime: Russia’s Anomalous Stabilization,” World Politics, vol. 50 (January 1998), pp. 235-265.
     Willett, Thomas D., Burdekin, Richard C. K., Sweeney, Richard J., Wihlborg, Clas, ed., Establishing Monetary Stability in Emerging Market Economies (Westview Press, Boulder, 1995).		zh_TW