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題名 不確定下的投票行為－以廉價溝通賽局分析
作者 張家瑜
貢獻者 何靜□
張家瑜
關鍵詞 廉價溝通賽局
投票
專家
cheap talk game
voting
expert
game
日期 2001
上傳時間 15-Apr-2016 16:05:14 (UTC+8)
摘要 近年來政府面對關於揭露環境污染物的危險的爭論日趨嚴重。我們特提出政治經濟學中的二重要議題。一是對於在環境政策資訊不完全的情況，選民在考慮其做錯決策之機會成本後，將如何影響其投票決策；追求社會福利極大的政策制定者會如何制定最適的投票通過比例；以及政策制定者如何藉由專家的宣告來改變選民對環境政策的預期報酬，進而達到三方的均衡。二是我們將進一步討論關於選民政策與意識形態的策略動機。當有關政黨效率的資訊不完全時，選民在收到專家對政黨效率的宣告後，如何調解其政策及意識形態，以達到均衡。採用廉價談判的賽局 (cheap talk game) 理論提供解決的思考方向，探討政策制定者、選民、專家間的關係，政府的策略性溝通是否會有效，提供一理論模型的解釋。藉探討種種均衡存在的條件，盼能為議題甚或更一般化的政府政策，提供一理論依據，其能給予政府、社會一些參考與貢獻。
參考文獻 Bank, J.S. (1993), Two-sided uncertainty in the monopoly agenda setter model, Journal of Public Economics , 50, 429-444.
     Bishop, J.A., Formby, J.P., and Smith, W. (1991), Incomplete information, income redistribution and risk averse median behavior, Public Choice, 68(1-3), 41-55.
     Blume, A. (1995), Communication-proof equilibria in cheap talk games, Journal Of Economic Theory, 65, 359-382.
     Calvert, R. (1985), The value of biased information: a rational choice model of political advice, Journal of Politics, 47, 530-555.
     Conlon, J. R. (1993), Can government talk cheap ? communication ,announcements and cheap talk, Southern Economic Journal, 60, 418-429.
     Crawford, V. and Sobel, J. (1982), Strategic information transmission, Econometrica, 50(6), 1431-1454.
     Eichenberger, R. and Serna, A. (1996), Random errors, dirty information, and politics, Public Choice, 86(1-2), 137-156.
     Farrel, J. and Gibbons, R. (1989), Cheap talk with two audiences, The American Economic Review, 79(5), 1214-1223.
     Feddersen, T. and Pesendorfer, W. (1998), Convicting the innocent: the inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting, American Political Science Review, 92(1), 23-35.
     Feddersen, T. and Pesendorfer, W. (1996), The swing voter’s curse, American Economic Review, 86, 408-424.
     Gilligan, T.W. and Krehbiel, K. (1989), Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee, American Journal of Political Science, 33, 459-490.
     Groothuis, P.A. and Miller, G. (1997), The role of social distrust in risk-benefit analysis : a study of the siting of a hazardous waste disposal facility, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 15, 241-257.
     Klevorick, A., Rothschild, M. and Winship, C. (1984), Information processing and jury decision making, Journal of Public Economics, 23, 245-278.
     Ladha, K. (1992), The condorcet jury theorem, free speech, and correlated votes, American Journal of Political Science,36(3), 617-634.
     Letterie, W. and Swank, O. (1997), Learning and signaling by advisor selection, public choice, 92, 353-367.
     Letterie, W. and Swank, O. (1998), Economic policy, model uncertainty and elections, Economics and Politics, 10(1), 85-103.
     Li,H., Sherwin,R. and Wing, S. (1999), Conflicts and common interest in committees, NBER working paper No.W7158.
     Lindbeck, A. and Weibull, J. (1993), A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy, Journal of Public Economics, 51, 195-209.
     Lohmann, S. (1994), Information through costly political action, American Economic Review, 84(3), 518-530.
     Mitchell, D.W. (1987), Candidate behavior under mixed motives, Social Choice and Welfare, 4, 153-160.
     Niskanen, W.A. (1971), Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine.
     Roemer, J. (1994), The strategic role of party ideology when voters are uncertain about how economy works, American Political Science Review, 88, 327-335.
     Schultz, C. (1995), The politics of persuasion when voters are rational, Scandinavian Journal of Economics , 97, 357-368.
     Spector, D. (2000), Pure communication between agent with close preferences, Economics Letters, 66, 171-178.
     Swank, O. (1993), Partisan view on the economy, Public Choice, 81, 137-150.
     Veendorp, E. and Majeed, A. (1995), Differentiation in a two-dimensional market, Regional Science & Urban Economics, 25, 75-83.
     Warnery, K. (1994), Partisanship as information, Public Choice, 80(3-4), 371-380.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
88258002
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#A2002001219
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 何靜□zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 張家瑜zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 張家瑜zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2001en_US
dc.date.accessioned 15-Apr-2016 16:05:14 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 15-Apr-2016 16:05:14 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 15-Apr-2016 16:05:14 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) A2002001219en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/85011-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 88258002zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 近年來政府面對關於揭露環境污染物的危險的爭論日趨嚴重。我們特提出政治經濟學中的二重要議題。一是對於在環境政策資訊不完全的情況，選民在考慮其做錯決策之機會成本後，將如何影響其投票決策；追求社會福利極大的政策制定者會如何制定最適的投票通過比例；以及政策制定者如何藉由專家的宣告來改變選民對環境政策的預期報酬，進而達到三方的均衡。二是我們將進一步討論關於選民政策與意識形態的策略動機。當有關政黨效率的資訊不完全時，選民在收到專家對政黨效率的宣告後，如何調解其政策及意識形態，以達到均衡。採用廉價談判的賽局 (cheap talk game) 理論提供解決的思考方向，探討政策制定者、選民、專家間的關係，政府的策略性溝通是否會有效，提供一理論模型的解釋。藉探討種種均衡存在的條件，盼能為議題甚或更一般化的政府政策，提供一理論依據，其能給予政府、社會一些參考與貢獻。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 封面頁
     證明書
     致謝詞
     論文摘要
     目錄
     第一章 緒論
     第一節 研究動機與目的
     第二節 研究方法
     第三節 文獻回顧
     第二章 環境政策不確定下的廉價溝通
     第一節 選民與專家的決策行為
     第二節 政策制定者的決策行為
     第三節 廉價溝通的均衡
     附錄2-1 社會最適的臨界值
     第三章 政黨執政效率不確定下的廉價溝通賽局
     第一節 基本模型
     第二節 不對稱資訊下的投票
     第3.1節 專家傳送的情況
     第3.2節 專家傳送的情況
     第3.3節 專家傳送的情況
     第3.4節 專家傳送的情況
     第3.5節 專家傳送的情況
     附錄3-1 Lemma 3-1之證明
     第四章 結論
     參考文獻		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#A2002001219en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 廉價溝通賽局zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 投票zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 專家zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) cheap talk gameen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) votingen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) experten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) gameen_US
dc.title (題名) 不確定下的投票行為－以廉價溝通賽局分析zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bank, J.S. (1993), Two-sided uncertainty in the monopoly agenda setter model, Journal of Public Economics , 50, 429-444.
     Bishop, J.A., Formby, J.P., and Smith, W. (1991), Incomplete information, income redistribution and risk averse median behavior, Public Choice, 68(1-3), 41-55.
     Blume, A. (1995), Communication-proof equilibria in cheap talk games, Journal Of Economic Theory, 65, 359-382.
     Calvert, R. (1985), The value of biased information: a rational choice model of political advice, Journal of Politics, 47, 530-555.
     Conlon, J. R. (1993), Can government talk cheap ? communication ,announcements and cheap talk, Southern Economic Journal, 60, 418-429.
     Crawford, V. and Sobel, J. (1982), Strategic information transmission, Econometrica, 50(6), 1431-1454.
     Eichenberger, R. and Serna, A. (1996), Random errors, dirty information, and politics, Public Choice, 86(1-2), 137-156.
     Farrel, J. and Gibbons, R. (1989), Cheap talk with two audiences, The American Economic Review, 79(5), 1214-1223.
     Feddersen, T. and Pesendorfer, W. (1998), Convicting the innocent: the inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting, American Political Science Review, 92(1), 23-35.
     Feddersen, T. and Pesendorfer, W. (1996), The swing voter’s curse, American Economic Review, 86, 408-424.
     Gilligan, T.W. and Krehbiel, K. (1989), Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee, American Journal of Political Science, 33, 459-490.
     Groothuis, P.A. and Miller, G. (1997), The role of social distrust in risk-benefit analysis : a study of the siting of a hazardous waste disposal facility, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 15, 241-257.
     Klevorick, A., Rothschild, M. and Winship, C. (1984), Information processing and jury decision making, Journal of Public Economics, 23, 245-278.
     Ladha, K. (1992), The condorcet jury theorem, free speech, and correlated votes, American Journal of Political Science,36(3), 617-634.
     Letterie, W. and Swank, O. (1997), Learning and signaling by advisor selection, public choice, 92, 353-367.
     Letterie, W. and Swank, O. (1998), Economic policy, model uncertainty and elections, Economics and Politics, 10(1), 85-103.
     Li,H., Sherwin,R. and Wing, S. (1999), Conflicts and common interest in committees, NBER working paper No.W7158.
     Lindbeck, A. and Weibull, J. (1993), A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy, Journal of Public Economics, 51, 195-209.
     Lohmann, S. (1994), Information through costly political action, American Economic Review, 84(3), 518-530.
     Mitchell, D.W. (1987), Candidate behavior under mixed motives, Social Choice and Welfare, 4, 153-160.
     Niskanen, W.A. (1971), Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine.
     Roemer, J. (1994), The strategic role of party ideology when voters are uncertain about how economy works, American Political Science Review, 88, 327-335.
     Schultz, C. (1995), The politics of persuasion when voters are rational, Scandinavian Journal of Economics , 97, 357-368.
     Spector, D. (2000), Pure communication between agent with close preferences, Economics Letters, 66, 171-178.
     Swank, O. (1993), Partisan view on the economy, Public Choice, 81, 137-150.
     Veendorp, E. and Majeed, A. (1995), Differentiation in a two-dimensional market, Regional Science & Urban Economics, 25, 75-83.
     Warnery, K. (1994), Partisanship as information, Public Choice, 80(3-4), 371-380.		zh_TW