dc.contributor | 國家發展研究所 | |
dc.creator (作者) | 趙建民;張淳翔 | zh_TW |
dc.date (日期) | 2013 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 20-Apr-2016 15:42:23 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.available | 20-Apr-2016 15:42:23 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 20-Apr-2016 15:42:23 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/85704 | - |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 中國大陸對地方的權力下放,使得地方自主性提升,但也造成地方政治生 態的扭曲,形成「地方主義」。過去中共立法強調共同利益和全局利益,刻意忽 略個體與群體的利益需求,導致法律未能反映現實利益關係。改革開放後,利 益主體趨多元化,國家職能與權力逐漸分散到各主管部門與各級地方政府,中 央、地方、部門三者因利益不同形成新的博弈。1985 年全國人大通過「關於授 權國務院在經濟體制改革和對外開放方面可以制定暫行的規定或者條例的決 定」,為地方政府、部門參與立法提供法源,立法過程中地方與部門利益傾向的 問題逐漸凸顯,是否對地方政府權的合法性權威造成影響,乃本研究之主要探 討意旨。 地方立法過程中部門利益問題嚴重,使原存之法律衝突更為惡化。地方立法 利益化的傾向,基本上以兩種形式展現:一是地方主義,1990 年代地方政府參 予的不正當競爭多屬此類。此乃地方政府為了爭取利益,超出中央立法授權而發 生之越權行為,最常見的便是各種罰款的規定。此地方主義有時會延伸至垂直或 平行之利益競爭,形成地方與中央以及地方與地方之間的權利導向之權力競爭關 係。 另外一種形式是部門主義。地方主義的利益體現,經常透過部門進行。地方 立法的起草,除了人大專委或人大常委工作機構外,絕大多數由政府所屬之部門 擔任,地方政府內之個別部門,經常以立法的手段達到擴充權力或財政利益之目 的,在法規所要規範的問題涉及到全局利益或政府不同部門之重大議題時,常優 先考慮自身利益以致或怠忽職權,未盡協調之責。尤其是對部門審批、發證、收 費、處罰、年檢年審、培養等項目之立法,此傾向最為嚴重,不當地擴大了部門 之行政裁量權。 中國大陸的放權讓利政策,使得地方政權的自主性大為提高,本研究認為, 此一地方新增加之自主性,是造成地方立法過程出現部門利益化的主要來源,其 對地方政權的統治能力會造成何種程度的影響?此影響究係正面或負面?乃本 研究之主要目的。本研究認為,中國大陸地方利益出現於立法過程,固然有其歷 史傳統的因素,也是權力下放必然的結果,造成此種弊端的現象之一,便是地方 立法欠缺制度化的意見匯集管道,原有之意見匯集方式的效果並不理想。 | |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The decentralization of powers to the local governments was the main feature contributing to the success of China’s economic reform policies in the 1980’s. However, as powers are more decentralized interests have also become more divergent. As of now, the center, the local and government bureaucracy have engaged in a new three-way game to maximize their own interests. As a result, authorities of the local governments might have been compromised. The new localism is most vivid in two respects. First, local authorities have taken advantage of their unique position by making legislation to their own benefits. This is most evident when legislation is made to extract fees out of the people. Second, departmentalism is increasing unbearable seeing local bureaucratic agencies vying for their own benefits disregarding the overall interests of the government as a whole. Consequently, the authorities of the local governments have been unduly enlarged. Decentralization of powers to the local governments is attributable to this malfeasance. The practice might even damage the authorities of the local governments. How has this phenomenon been formed? How big its impact has been on the local governing body? How can China do in order to sway this problem? These are the issues that this research project intends to explore. | |
dc.format.extent | 1830712 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.relation (關聯) | 計畫編號 NSC 101-2410-H004-119-MY2 | |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 中國大陸地方立法過程;地方利益;地方主義;公共選擇理論;中央地方關係 | |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | China’s local people’s congress;local interests in legislation;localism;public choice;central/local relations | |
dc.title (題名) | 中國大陸地方立法過程中的部門利益問題 | zh_TW |
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | Departmental Interests in China`s Local Legislation | |
dc.type (資料類型) | report | |