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題名 Clawback 條款是否可以減輕 CEO 對審計委員會監督效率之影響？ 其他題名 Can Clawback Provisions Mitigate Ceos’ Power on Audit Committee Effectiveness? 作者 俞洪昭 貢獻者 會計學系 日期 2013 上傳時間 20-Apr-2016 16:54:02 (UTC+8) 摘要 一直以來，獨立性即被視為是審計委員會能否有效履行其法律所賦予責任的重要基 礎。最近的審計研究在探討會傷害審計委員會獨立性之因素時，發現若公司以認股權 做為審計委員會成員的報酬，公司較容易發生財務報表重編、內控缺失以及盈餘管理 行為。此外，公司若對財務報導的監督越不重視，越會傾向於採用股票或認股權做為 審計委員會成員的報酬。不同於這些以獎酬為基礎的研究，本研究試圖探討公司訂定 clawback 條款是否可以降低CEO 對審計委員會的影響，進而提高審計委員會對財務報 導監督的有效性。 本研究所欲探討的問題，其重要性有二：第一，雖然沙氏法案的第301 條規定，一 家公司的所有新任審計委員會成員均須完全獨立，但是該條文並未考量CEO 很有可能 利用其廣泛的人脈以及其影響力來介入審計委員會成員的選擇。近年的審計研究即發 現，在沙氏法案通過之前，唯有當CEO 沒有介入審計委員會成員的選擇時，審計委員 會的獨立性與其財務專業知識方可有效降低財務報表發生重編的機率。更值得注意的 是，CEO 介入審計委員會成員選擇的問題，在沙氏法案通過之後依然存在，導致財務 報表發生重編的機率，並未因沙氏法案要求審計委員會必須完全獨立且須具備財務的 專業知識，而有所下降。因此，探討何種法律或制度面的規範可以有效降低CEO 對審 計委員會的影響，是一個刻不容緩的議題。 第二，clawback 條款係公司在經營團隊成員的獎酬計畫中明定，若公司的財務報表 於以後年度被發現存在重大不實表達時，公司得向經營團隊成員追回其之前所領取的 所有紅利與不當利得。由於clawback 條款對經營團隊形成一個「事後」的貨幣性處罰， 導致經營團隊在「事前」可能較無誘因進行盈餘管理。因此，clawback 條款對於CEO 會產生誘因的威脅，促使CEO 減少其對審計委員會的影響，進而提高審計委員會的有 效性。由於最近的研究結論顯示，CEO 對於財務報導品質的責任會因為clawback 條款 的制定而提高，本研究的這個推論應屬適當。 本研究對於審計委員會以及 clawbacks 文獻，至少有下列兩個貢獻：第一，雖然 clawback 條款的訂定並不是一個新的規定，但是過去的研究並未對其效力、經濟後果 及限制進行深入的探討。本研究即試圖探討 clawback 條款是否可以有效降低CEO 對 審計委員會的影響，進而提高審計委員會的有效性。其次，本研究的實證結果或可提 供主管機關於政策制定時的參考。如果clawback 條款真的可以降低CEO 對審計委員 會的影響，進而提高審計委員會監督的效率性，主管機關應儘快推動強制公司訂定 clawback 條款。更重要的是，由於過去研究指出，完全移除CEO 介入董事會成員的選 擇並不一定是確保財務報導品質的有效手段，主管機關或應權衡「禁止CEO 介入董事 會成員選擇」與「強制公司訂定clawback 條款」兩種規定，何者較為恰當。
Audit committee (AC) independence is the cornerstone based on which ACs can effectively exercise their duty delegated by laws. Recent auditing studies examining what may impair AC independence find that option compensation paid to ACs is associated with higher likelihood of restatements, internal control weaknesses, and earnings management. In addition, firms demanding less monitoring over financial reporting pay more equity-based compensation to their ACs. Different from these compensation-based studies, I examine whether firms’ clawback provisions mitigate CEOs’ power on ACs, leading to more effective monitoring over financial reporting. My research question is important for two reasons. First, while Section 301 of SOX requires that all AC members be fully independent when they are newly-appointed to the boards, this rule does not consider the CEOs’ myriad personal connections in influencing the selection of AC members. Recent studies report that the monitoring benefits of reducing the incidence of pre-SOX restatements with independent and financial expert AC members are only maintained when the CEOs are not involved in selecting board members. Importantly, having financial experts on ACs does not necessarily lead to less likelihood of post-SOX restatements because CEOs’ power continues to have substantial adverse impacts on ACs` oversight effectiveness after the SOX. Therefore, a follow-up study that examines what regulatory arrangements may mitigate CEOs’ power on ACs’ effectiveness is warranted. Second, clawbacks are compensation contract provisions that allow companies to recover bonuses previously awarded to corporate executives in the event of subsequent erroneous financial reporting. Because clawbacks impose ex post monetary penalties on managers’ misreporting, managers are less likely to do ex ante earnings management. Therefore, firms’ clawback provisions constitute an “incentive threat” that may discourage the CEOs to take advantage of their powerful influence on ACs’ monitoring over financial reporting, leading to enhanced AC effectiveness. My argument is consistent with recent research’s conclusion that CEOs will be more accountable for financial reporting quality due to the clawbacks. My study makes at least two contributions to the audit committee and clawback literature. First, while the clawback requirement is not new, there is a lack of research that explores its efficacy, economic consequences, and limitations. My study provides a first step to examine whether clawbacks are effective in mitigating CEOs’ power, therefore increasing ACs’ independence. Second, my empirical results may bear policy implication in that, if clawbacks can effectively mitigate the adverse impacts of CEOs’ involvement in director selection, regulators may need to accelerate the mandatory adoption of clawbacks in the near future. Importantly, regulators may also consider the tradeoff between prohibiting CEOs’ involvement in director selection and adopting clawback provisions in executives’ compensation contracts, given removing CEOs from this selection process may not be effective in reducing misstated financial reporting.關聯 計畫編號 NSC 102-2410-H004-023 資料類型 report dc.contributor 會計學系 dc.creator (作者) 俞洪昭 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2013 dc.date.accessioned 20-Apr-2016 16:54:02 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 20-Apr-2016 16:54:02 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 20-Apr-2016 16:54:02 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/85790 - dc.description.abstract (摘要) 一直以來，獨立性即被視為是審計委員會能否有效履行其法律所賦予責任的重要基 礎。最近的審計研究在探討會傷害審計委員會獨立性之因素時，發現若公司以認股權 做為審計委員會成員的報酬，公司較容易發生財務報表重編、內控缺失以及盈餘管理 行為。此外，公司若對財務報導的監督越不重視，越會傾向於採用股票或認股權做為 審計委員會成員的報酬。不同於這些以獎酬為基礎的研究，本研究試圖探討公司訂定 clawback 條款是否可以降低CEO 對審計委員會的影響，進而提高審計委員會對財務報 導監督的有效性。 本研究所欲探討的問題，其重要性有二：第一，雖然沙氏法案的第301 條規定，一 家公司的所有新任審計委員會成員均須完全獨立，但是該條文並未考量CEO 很有可能 利用其廣泛的人脈以及其影響力來介入審計委員會成員的選擇。近年的審計研究即發 現，在沙氏法案通過之前，唯有當CEO 沒有介入審計委員會成員的選擇時，審計委員 會的獨立性與其財務專業知識方可有效降低財務報表發生重編的機率。更值得注意的 是，CEO 介入審計委員會成員選擇的問題，在沙氏法案通過之後依然存在，導致財務 報表發生重編的機率，並未因沙氏法案要求審計委員會必須完全獨立且須具備財務的 專業知識，而有所下降。因此，探討何種法律或制度面的規範可以有效降低CEO 對審 計委員會的影響，是一個刻不容緩的議題。 第二，clawback 條款係公司在經營團隊成員的獎酬計畫中明定，若公司的財務報表 於以後年度被發現存在重大不實表達時，公司得向經營團隊成員追回其之前所領取的 所有紅利與不當利得。由於clawback 條款對經營團隊形成一個「事後」的貨幣性處罰， 導致經營團隊在「事前」可能較無誘因進行盈餘管理。因此，clawback 條款對於CEO 會產生誘因的威脅，促使CEO 減少其對審計委員會的影響，進而提高審計委員會的有 效性。由於最近的研究結論顯示，CEO 對於財務報導品質的責任會因為clawback 條款 的制定而提高，本研究的這個推論應屬適當。 本研究對於審計委員會以及 clawbacks 文獻，至少有下列兩個貢獻：第一，雖然 clawback 條款的訂定並不是一個新的規定，但是過去的研究並未對其效力、經濟後果 及限制進行深入的探討。本研究即試圖探討 clawback 條款是否可以有效降低CEO 對 審計委員會的影響，進而提高審計委員會的有效性。其次，本研究的實證結果或可提 供主管機關於政策制定時的參考。如果clawback 條款真的可以降低CEO 對審計委員 會的影響，進而提高審計委員會監督的效率性，主管機關應儘快推動強制公司訂定 clawback 條款。更重要的是，由於過去研究指出，完全移除CEO 介入董事會成員的選 擇並不一定是確保財務報導品質的有效手段，主管機關或應權衡「禁止CEO 介入董事 會成員選擇」與「強制公司訂定clawback 條款」兩種規定，何者較為恰當。 dc.description.abstract (摘要) Audit committee (AC) independence is the cornerstone based on which ACs can effectively exercise their duty delegated by laws. Recent auditing studies examining what may impair AC independence find that option compensation paid to ACs is associated with higher likelihood of restatements, internal control weaknesses, and earnings management. In addition, firms demanding less monitoring over financial reporting pay more equity-based compensation to their ACs. Different from these compensation-based studies, I examine whether firms’ clawback provisions mitigate CEOs’ power on ACs, leading to more effective monitoring over financial reporting. My research question is important for two reasons. First, while Section 301 of SOX requires that all AC members be fully independent when they are newly-appointed to the boards, this rule does not consider the CEOs’ myriad personal connections in influencing the selection of AC members. Recent studies report that the monitoring benefits of reducing the incidence of pre-SOX restatements with independent and financial expert AC members are only maintained when the CEOs are not involved in selecting board members. Importantly, having financial experts on ACs does not necessarily lead to less likelihood of post-SOX restatements because CEOs’ power continues to have substantial adverse impacts on ACs` oversight effectiveness after the SOX. Therefore, a follow-up study that examines what regulatory arrangements may mitigate CEOs’ power on ACs’ effectiveness is warranted. Second, clawbacks are compensation contract provisions that allow companies to recover bonuses previously awarded to corporate executives in the event of subsequent erroneous financial reporting. Because clawbacks impose ex post monetary penalties on managers’ misreporting, managers are less likely to do ex ante earnings management. Therefore, firms’ clawback provisions constitute an “incentive threat” that may discourage the CEOs to take advantage of their powerful influence on ACs’ monitoring over financial reporting, leading to enhanced AC effectiveness. My argument is consistent with recent research’s conclusion that CEOs will be more accountable for financial reporting quality due to the clawbacks. My study makes at least two contributions to the audit committee and clawback literature. First, while the clawback requirement is not new, there is a lack of research that explores its efficacy, economic consequences, and limitations. My study provides a first step to examine whether clawbacks are effective in mitigating CEOs’ power, therefore increasing ACs’ independence. Second, my empirical results may bear policy implication in that, if clawbacks can effectively mitigate the adverse impacts of CEOs’ involvement in director selection, regulators may need to accelerate the mandatory adoption of clawbacks in the near future. Importantly, regulators may also consider the tradeoff between prohibiting CEOs’ involvement in director selection and adopting clawback provisions in executives’ compensation contracts, given removing CEOs from this selection process may not be effective in reducing misstated financial reporting. dc.format.extent 630557 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.relation (關聯) 計畫編號 NSC 102-2410-H004-023 dc.title (題名) Clawback 條款是否可以減輕 CEO 對審計委員會監督效率之影響？ dc.title.alternative (其他題名) Can Clawback Provisions Mitigate Ceos’ Power on Audit Committee Effectiveness? dc.type (資料類型) report
