Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/125104
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dc.contributor.advisor陳樹衡zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorChen, Shu-Hengen_US
dc.contributor.author吳立思zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorUde, Felixen_US
dc.creator吳立思zh_TW
dc.creatorUde, Felixen_US
dc.date2019en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-07T09:20:11Z-
dc.date.available2019-08-07T09:20:11Z-
dc.date.issued2019-08-07T09:20:11Z-
dc.identifierG0106266012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/125104-
dc.description碩士zh_TW
dc.description國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description應用經濟與社會發展英語碩士學位學程(IMES)zh_TW
dc.description106266012zh_TW
dc.description.abstractCryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, witnessed a surge in popularity during recent years. With the rise of attention, the discussion about a better design of these cryptocurrencies also increased, to solve issues like security problems and network congestion. Many suggested solutions require a total redesign of the cryptocurrency. This thesis looks into ways to redesign the cryptocurrency Bitcoin in a more subtle way, by only optimizing its current parameters.\nFor that reason an agent-based computation model is used to simulate the Bitcoin market and its transaction system. Its parameters are optimized and compared to the real Bitcoin parameters. The results suggest a trade-off between security and economic efficiency, and that the real parameter values of Bitcoin are sub-optimal.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsList of Figures II\nList of Tables III\n\n1 Introduction 1\n1.1 Research Motivation ........................... 1\n1.2 Contribution ................................ 2\n1.3 Organization ................................ 2\n\n2 Literature Review 4\n2.1 Cryptocurrencies ............................. 4\n2.1.1 Blockchain ............................ 4\n2.1.2 Signature of Transactions ..................... 5\n2.1.3 Bitcoin Mining .......................... 6\n2.1.4 Development of Bitcoin ..................... 9\n2.2 Economic Literature ........................... 10\n2.2.1 Economic Analysis of Bitcoin .................. 10\n2.2.2 Agent-Based Computational Economics in Blockchains . . . . 14\n2.3 Summary ................................. 15\n\n3 Methodology 17\n3.1 Model Overview ............................. 17\n3.2 Types of Agents .............................. 18\n3.2.1 Chartist .............................. 18\n3.2.2 User ................................ 19\n3.2.3 Miner ............................... 19\n3.3 The Model ................................. 22\n3.3.1 The Bitcoin Market ........................ 22\n3.3.2 The Transaction System ..................... 26\n3.4 Initialization ................................ 28\n3.4.1 Number of Agents and their Type Distribution .........\n3.4.2 Agent’s Wealth .......................... 29\n3.5 Calibration ................................ 31\n3.5.1 Realistic Parameters ....................... 31\n3.5.2 Optimization for Economic Efficiency .............. 32\n3.5.3 Optimization for Economic Efficiency and Hashing Power . . . 34\n3.6 Summary ................................. 35\n\n4 Findings 36\n4.1 Real Parameters .............................. 36\n4.1.1 Price Development ........................ 36\n4.1.2 Hashing Power Development ................... 37\n4.1.3 Transaction Fee Development .................. 39\n4.1.4 Wealth Development ....................... 40\n4.2 Optimized Wealth ............................. 42\n4.3 Optimized Wealth and Hashing Power .................. 43\n4.3.1 Parameters ............................ 44\n4.3.2 Outcomes ............................. 48\n4.4 Summary ................................. 5 1\n\n5 Conclusion 52\n5.1 Review of Findings ............................ 52\n5.2 Application of Findings .......................... 52\n5.3 Limitations ................................ 53\n5.4 Future Work ................................ 54\n\nBibliography 55\n\nA Table of Variables 62zh_TW
dc.format.extent3273957 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.source.urihttp://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106266012en_US
dc.subject加密貨幣zh_TW
dc.subject比特幣zh_TW
dc.subject代理人基計算模型zh_TW
dc.subjectCryptocurrencyen_US
dc.subjectBitcoinen_US
dc.subjectAgent-Based Computationen_US
dc.title加密貨幣設計之代理人基計算模型zh_TW
dc.titleAgent-Based Computational Modeling of Cryptocurrency Designen_US
dc.typethesisen_US
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dc.identifier.doi10.6814/NCCU201900519en_US
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