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題名 垂直整合廠商是否促成下游競爭廠商的聯合行為
Does Vertical Integration Facilitate Downstream Collusion?作者 歐宜芬
Ou, Yi Fen貢獻者 溫偉任
Wen, Wei Jen
歐宜芬
Ou, Yi Fen關鍵詞 垂直整合
連續Cournot寡占
聯合行為
卡特爾
折現因子
併購謬論
Vertical Merger
Successive Cournot Oligopolies
Collusion
Cartel
Discount Factor
Merger Paradox日期 2016 上傳時間 20-Jul-2016 16:36:43 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文運用連續Cournot寡占模型分析垂直相關市場中，垂直整合廠商的存在如何影響下游卡特爾組織出現的可能性。結果顯示，當廠商家數少時，由於下游市場將出現併購謬論而使下游廠商不願組成卡特爾組織；當廠商家數較多時，相較於「沒有垂直整合廠商」的情況，「存在一家垂直整合廠商」時，下游競爭廠商也較難形成穩定的卡特爾。因為此時任何一家卡特爾成員藉由背叛可以拿到的好處將遠高於背叛的機會成本。其原因為面對一家低成本的垂直整合廠商，高成本廠商所形成的卡特爾將生產較少的數量，且賺取較低的利潤。縱使卡特爾成員採用冷酷策略來處罰背叛的廠商，背叛廠商所遭受的利潤損失將是微乎其微。因此，本文指出垂直整合廠商的存在可降低下游市場形成卡特爾組織的可能性，進而維持市場競爭、提升社會福利。
This research investigates the emergence of downstream cartel in vertically-related industries by using successive Cournot oligopolies. The results show mergers’ paradox exists to circumvent the formation of downstream cartel with few firms in both upstream and downstream. Besides downstream firms would have less incentive to form a cartel organization when competing with an independent vertically-integrated firm in the industry relative to the industry without a vertically-integrated firm. The vertical integration would lessen the downstream cartel collusion as well as circumvent the double marginalization problem. The reason is that vertically-integrated firm would have huge gain from the ease of double marginalization and enjoys cost advantage to dominate the downstream market. The emergence of vertically-integration firm would in turn weaken the competitive advantage of those cartel firms in the downstream market. On the other hand, the firm betraying from the cartel would suffer much less punishment from the grim strategy conducted by the cartel facing vertically-integrated competitor in the downstream market. However, the gain from betraying the cartel would be much greater since every cartel firm would only produce less originally facing the vertically-integrated competitor. Therefore, the downstream cartel would be difficult to substantiate and the downstream market would maintain its competition. In this situation this paper contributes to a justification that the existence of vertically-integrated firm would be welfare-improving.參考文獻 Cunha, M. and Sarmento, P. (2014), “Does Vertical Integration Promote Downstream Incomplete Collusion? An Evaluation of Static and Dynamic Stability”, J Ind Compet Trade, 14:1–38.De Coninck, R. (2010), “Application of the Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines”, The Antitrust Bulletin, 55(4), 929–952.European Commission (2004), “Commission Notice: Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings.”Farrell, J. and Shapiro, C. (1990), “Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis”, Working paper.Gaudet, G. and Long, N. (1996), “Vertical integration, foreclosure, and profits in the presence of double marginalization”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 5(3), 409–432. Higgins, R. S. (1999), “Competitive Vertical Foreclosure”, Managerial And Decision Economics, 20, 299-237.Lee, W. C. and Wen, W. J. (2011), “Endogenous Vertical Industrial Structure in a Successive Oligopolistic Entry Game”, Working paper.Nocke, V. and White, Lucy (2007), “Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?”, The American Economic Review, 97(4), 1321–1339.Ordover, J. A., Saloner, G., and Salop, S. C. (1990), “Equilibrium vertical foreclosure”, The American Economic Review, 80, 127–142.Salinger, M. A. (1988), “Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(2), 345–356.Shaffer, S. (1995), “Stable Cartels With a Cournot Fringe”, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 744–754.Shy, O. (1995), Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications, MIT press.Wang, K. C., Koo, H. W., and Chen, T. J. (2005), “Strategic buying or selling? : The behavior of vertically-integrated firms in the intermediate goods market”, Journal of Economic Integration, 20(2), 366–382.行政院公平交易委員會（1991），公平交易法，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。行政院公平交易委員會（1992），公平交易法施行細則，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。行政院公平交易委員會（2006），公平交易委員會對於結合申報案件之處理原則，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。劉孔中（1998），「論結合管制之理論與實務」，公平交易季刊，第六卷第二期，1-38。 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易學系
102351006資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102351006 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 溫偉任 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Wen, Wei Jen en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 歐宜芬 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Ou, Yi Fen en_US dc.creator (作者) 歐宜芬 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Ou, Yi Fen en_US dc.date (日期) 2016 en_US dc.date.accessioned 20-Jul-2016 16:36:43 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 20-Jul-2016 16:36:43 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 20-Jul-2016 16:36:43 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0102351006 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/99282 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國際經營與貿易學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 102351006 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文運用連續Cournot寡占模型分析垂直相關市場中，垂直整合廠商的存在如何影響下游卡特爾組織出現的可能性。結果顯示，當廠商家數少時，由於下游市場將出現併購謬論而使下游廠商不願組成卡特爾組織；當廠商家數較多時，相較於「沒有垂直整合廠商」的情況，「存在一家垂直整合廠商」時，下游競爭廠商也較難形成穩定的卡特爾。因為此時任何一家卡特爾成員藉由背叛可以拿到的好處將遠高於背叛的機會成本。其原因為面對一家低成本的垂直整合廠商，高成本廠商所形成的卡特爾將生產較少的數量，且賺取較低的利潤。縱使卡特爾成員採用冷酷策略來處罰背叛的廠商，背叛廠商所遭受的利潤損失將是微乎其微。因此，本文指出垂直整合廠商的存在可降低下游市場形成卡特爾組織的可能性，進而維持市場競爭、提升社會福利。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This research investigates the emergence of downstream cartel in vertically-related industries by using successive Cournot oligopolies. The results show mergers’ paradox exists to circumvent the formation of downstream cartel with few firms in both upstream and downstream. Besides downstream firms would have less incentive to form a cartel organization when competing with an independent vertically-integrated firm in the industry relative to the industry without a vertically-integrated firm. The vertical integration would lessen the downstream cartel collusion as well as circumvent the double marginalization problem. The reason is that vertically-integrated firm would have huge gain from the ease of double marginalization and enjoys cost advantage to dominate the downstream market. The emergence of vertically-integration firm would in turn weaken the competitive advantage of those cartel firms in the downstream market. On the other hand, the firm betraying from the cartel would suffer much less punishment from the grim strategy conducted by the cartel facing vertically-integrated competitor in the downstream market. However, the gain from betraying the cartel would be much greater since every cartel firm would only produce less originally facing the vertically-integrated competitor. Therefore, the downstream cartel would be difficult to substantiate and the downstream market would maintain its competition. In this situation this paper contributes to a justification that the existence of vertically-integrated firm would be welfare-improving. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 1 緒論12 文獻回顧與探討43 理論基礎63.1 簡單卡特爾模型設定63.1.1 模型參數設定73.1.2 賽局決策順序83.2 簡單卡特爾模型均衡分析93.2.1 策略(i)：獨立下游廠商進行卡特爾聯合103.2.2 策略(ii)：獨立下游廠商進行卡特爾聯合，但有一家廠商背叛123.2.3 策略(iii)：背叛後卡特爾聯合破裂143.3 簡單卡特爾模型研究結果164 加入垂直整合廠商的延伸卡特爾模型194.1 延伸卡特爾模型設定194.1.1 賽局決策順序204.2 延伸卡特爾模型均衡分析之情況一：存在一家垂直整合廠商214.2.1 策略(i)：獨立下游廠商進行卡特爾聯合224.2.2 策略(ii)：獨立下游廠商進行卡特爾聯合，但有一家廠商背叛254.2.3 策略(iii)：背叛後卡特爾聯合破裂284.3 延伸卡特爾模型均衡分析之情況二：沒有垂直整合廠商304.3.1 策略(i)：獨立下游廠商進行卡特爾聯合314.3.2 策略(ii)：獨立下游廠商進行卡特爾聯合，但有一家廠商背叛324.3.3 策略(iii)：背叛後卡特爾聯合破裂334.4 延伸卡特爾模型研究結果344.4.1 併購謬論與其他獨立下游廠商形成卡特爾的可能性354.4.2 其他獨立下游廠商在何種市場結構下能形成穩定卡特爾385 總結論455.1 折現因子455.2 社會福利485.2 結論49附錄A 卡特爾組織為市場領導者之模型50A.1 情況一：存在一家垂直整合廠商的市場結構50A.2 情況二：沒有垂直整合廠商的市場結構52A.3 情況一與二的折現因子結論54B 數學推導55B.1 推論一數學推導55B.2 推論二數學推導55C 英文參考文獻56D 中文參考文獻57 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1069358 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102351006 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 垂直整合 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 連續Cournot寡占 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 聯合行為 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 卡特爾 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 折現因子 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 併購謬論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Vertical Merger en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Successive Cournot Oligopolies en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Collusion en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Cartel en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Discount Factor en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Merger Paradox en_US dc.title (題名) 垂直整合廠商是否促成下游競爭廠商的聯合行為 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Does Vertical Integration Facilitate Downstream Collusion? en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Cunha, M. and Sarmento, P. (2014), “Does Vertical Integration Promote Downstream Incomplete Collusion? An Evaluation of Static and Dynamic Stability”, J Ind Compet Trade, 14:1–38.De Coninck, R. (2010), “Application of the Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines”, The Antitrust Bulletin, 55(4), 929–952.European Commission (2004), “Commission Notice: Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings.”Farrell, J. and Shapiro, C. (1990), “Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis”, Working paper.Gaudet, G. and Long, N. (1996), “Vertical integration, foreclosure, and profits in the presence of double marginalization”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 5(3), 409–432. Higgins, R. S. (1999), “Competitive Vertical Foreclosure”, Managerial And Decision Economics, 20, 299-237.Lee, W. C. and Wen, W. J. (2011), “Endogenous Vertical Industrial Structure in a Successive Oligopolistic Entry Game”, Working paper.Nocke, V. and White, Lucy (2007), “Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?”, The American Economic Review, 97(4), 1321–1339.Ordover, J. A., Saloner, G., and Salop, S. C. (1990), “Equilibrium vertical foreclosure”, The American Economic Review, 80, 127–142.Salinger, M. A. (1988), “Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(2), 345–356.Shaffer, S. (1995), “Stable Cartels With a Cournot Fringe”, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 744–754.Shy, O. (1995), Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications, MIT press.Wang, K. C., Koo, H. W., and Chen, T. J. (2005), “Strategic buying or selling? : The behavior of vertically-integrated firms in the intermediate goods market”, Journal of Economic Integration, 20(2), 366–382.行政院公平交易委員會（1991），公平交易法，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。行政院公平交易委員會（1992），公平交易法施行細則，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。行政院公平交易委員會（2006），公平交易委員會對於結合申報案件之處理原則，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。劉孔中（1998），「論結合管制之理論與實務」，公平交易季刊，第六卷第二期，1-38。 zh_TW
