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題名 On the complexity of the El Farol Bar Game: A sensitivity analysis
作者 陳樹衡
Chen, Shu-Heng
Gostoli, Umberto
貢獻者 經濟系
關鍵詞 Complex networks; Agent-based model; Economic efficiency; El Farol bar problem; Inequity aversion; Inherent complexity; Keeping-up-with-the-Joneses; Neighborhood size; Social preference; Sensitivity analysis
日期 2016-04
上傳時間 22-Aug-2017 16:35:21 (UTC+8)
摘要 In this paper, we carry out a sensitivity analysis for an agentbased model of the use of public resources as manifested by the El Farol Bar problem. An early study using the same model has shown that a good-society equilibrium, characterized by both economic efficiency and economic equality, can be achieved probabilistically by a von Neumann network, and can be achieved surely with the presence of some agents having social preferences, such as the inequity-averse preference or the `keeping-up-with-the-Joneses` preference. In this study, we examine this fundamental result by exploring the inherent complexity of the model; specifically, we address the effect of the three key parameters related to size, namely, the network size, the neighborhood size, and the memory size. We find that social preferences still play an important role over all the sizes considered. Nonetheless, it is also found that when network size becomes large, the parameter, the bar capacity (the attendance threshold), may also play a determining role.
關聯 Simulation Series, 48(1), 25-32
資料類型 conference
dc.contributor 經濟系
dc.creator (作者) 陳樹衡zh_tw
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Shu-Hengen_US
dc.creator (作者) Gostoli, Umbertoen_US
dc.date (日期) 2016-04
dc.date.accessioned 22-Aug-2017 16:35:21 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 22-Aug-2017 16:35:21 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 22-Aug-2017 16:35:21 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112083-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In this paper, we carry out a sensitivity analysis for an agentbased model of the use of public resources as manifested by the El Farol Bar problem. An early study using the same model has shown that a good-society equilibrium, characterized by both economic efficiency and economic equality, can be achieved probabilistically by a von Neumann network, and can be achieved surely with the presence of some agents having social preferences, such as the inequity-averse preference or the `keeping-up-with-the-Joneses` preference. In this study, we examine this fundamental result by exploring the inherent complexity of the model; specifically, we address the effect of the three key parameters related to size, namely, the network size, the neighborhood size, and the memory size. We find that social preferences still play an important role over all the sizes considered. Nonetheless, it is also found that when network size becomes large, the parameter, the bar capacity (the attendance threshold), may also play a determining role.
dc.format.extent 177 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) Simulation Series, 48(1), 25-32
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Complex networks; Agent-based model; Economic efficiency; El Farol bar problem; Inequity aversion; Inherent complexity; Keeping-up-with-the-Joneses; Neighborhood size; Social preference; Sensitivity analysis
dc.title (題名) On the complexity of the El Farol Bar Game: A sensitivity analysisen_US
dc.type (資料類型) conference