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題名 The Impact of Share Pledging Regulations on Stock Trading and Firm Valuation
作者 周冠男
Wang, Yu-Chun
Chou, Robin K.
貢獻者 財管系
關鍵詞 Institutional investment; Investor protection regulation; Ownership structure; Share pledges
日期 2018-04
上傳時間 9-Feb-2018 11:46:08 (UTC+8)
摘要 Previous research suggests that insiders’ shareholding pledges are associated with agency problems. However, the ways investors evaluate and react to such behaviors are less clear. By investigating stock market reactions to three regulatory changes related to share pledging in Taiwan, this study shows that firms whose directors make share pledges experience significantly higher stock returns around these events, compared with those without such directors. Institutional investors increase their shareholdings of pledging (i.e., less compliant) firms after the passage of the 2011 amendment to the Company Act, indicating that reduced agency problems increase institutions’ willingness to hold shares of less compliant firms. The results for stock trading and firm valuation also are more significant for firms with controlling shareholders, which are more likely to be expropriated. These results are consistent with the alignment hypothesis, in which firms that are less compliant with the rules benefit more from legislative changes. They also offer important implications, by showing how adjusting legal regulations can help improve investor protections.
關聯 Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 89, Pages 1-13
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.01.016
dc.contributor 財管系
dc.creator (作者) 周冠男zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Wang, Yu-Chunen_US
dc.creator (作者) Chou, Robin K.en_US
dc.date (日期) 2018-04
dc.date.accessioned 9-Feb-2018 11:46:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 9-Feb-2018 11:46:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 9-Feb-2018 11:46:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/115956-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Previous research suggests that insiders’ shareholding pledges are associated with agency problems. However, the ways investors evaluate and react to such behaviors are less clear. By investigating stock market reactions to three regulatory changes related to share pledging in Taiwan, this study shows that firms whose directors make share pledges experience significantly higher stock returns around these events, compared with those without such directors. Institutional investors increase their shareholdings of pledging (i.e., less compliant) firms after the passage of the 2011 amendment to the Company Act, indicating that reduced agency problems increase institutions’ willingness to hold shares of less compliant firms. The results for stock trading and firm valuation also are more significant for firms with controlling shareholders, which are more likely to be expropriated. These results are consistent with the alignment hypothesis, in which firms that are less compliant with the rules benefit more from legislative changes. They also offer important implications, by showing how adjusting legal regulations can help improve investor protections.en_US
dc.format.extent 555724 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 89, Pages 1-13
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Institutional investment; Investor protection regulation; Ownership structure; Share pledgesen_US
dc.title (題名) The Impact of Share Pledging Regulations on Stock Trading and Firm Valuationen_US
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.01.016
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.01.016