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題名 The Impact of Controlling Shareholders on the Executive Compensation
控制股東對於高階管理當局薪酬的影響
作者 林卓民
鄭莉
陳嬿如
Lin, Cho-Min
Cheng, Li
Chen, Yenn-Ru
貢獻者 財管系
關鍵詞 薪酬績效敏感性;公司治理;控制股東
Pay-performance Sensitivity; Corporate Governance; Controlling Shareholders
日期 2017-06
上傳時間 23-Mar-2018 14:11:10 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文主要探討考慮控制股東對於薪酬績效敏感性的影響。本文延續Shaw and Zhang (2010)的研究,加入控制股東的影響,選取2006 年至2015 年台灣經濟新報資料,檢測控制股東對於薪酬績效敏感性的影響。結果發現: (1)在不考慮控制股東的影響時,擁有較佳的公司治理機制的公司能夠提高薪酬績效敏感性;(2)考慮控制股東的影響後,與董事會關聯程度低的控制股東存在正向的誘因效果,因此控制股東與董事會關聯程度低可視為公司有較佳的公司治理品質。本文結論認為探討公司治理機制對於薪酬績效敏感性時,必須考慮控制股東及其與董事會關聯性的影響,此研究結論同時也是本文主要研究貢獻。
This paper primarily investigates the effectiveness of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of firms with controlling shareholders. Examining Taiwanese firms public listed from 2006 to 2015, we find two main results. (1) Good corporate governance enhances the sensitivity of pay to performance in general case. (2) When there exist controlling shareholders, the controlling shareholders with lower affiliation with the board of directors can provide more incentive effect on PPS. In particular, the effect of controlling shareholders on PPS changes is subject to firm size and environmental shocks. The results suggest that ownership structure and its affiliation with the board are essential to the effect of compensation that however not yet documented in the related literature.
關聯 Review of Securities and Futures Markets, 29(2), pp.31-74
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.6529/RSFM.2017.29(2).2
dc.contributor 財管系zh_Tw
dc.creator (作者) 林卓民zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 鄭莉zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 陳嬿如zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lin, Cho-Minen_US
dc.creator (作者) Cheng, Lien_US
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Yenn-Ruen_US
dc.date (日期) 2017-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned 23-Mar-2018 14:11:10 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 23-Mar-2018 14:11:10 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 23-Mar-2018 14:11:10 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/116505-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文主要探討考慮控制股東對於薪酬績效敏感性的影響。本文延續Shaw and Zhang (2010)的研究,加入控制股東的影響,選取2006 年至2015 年台灣經濟新報資料,檢測控制股東對於薪酬績效敏感性的影響。結果發現: (1)在不考慮控制股東的影響時,擁有較佳的公司治理機制的公司能夠提高薪酬績效敏感性;(2)考慮控制股東的影響後,與董事會關聯程度低的控制股東存在正向的誘因效果,因此控制股東與董事會關聯程度低可視為公司有較佳的公司治理品質。本文結論認為探討公司治理機制對於薪酬績效敏感性時,必須考慮控制股東及其與董事會關聯性的影響,此研究結論同時也是本文主要研究貢獻。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper primarily investigates the effectiveness of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of firms with controlling shareholders. Examining Taiwanese firms public listed from 2006 to 2015, we find two main results. (1) Good corporate governance enhances the sensitivity of pay to performance in general case. (2) When there exist controlling shareholders, the controlling shareholders with lower affiliation with the board of directors can provide more incentive effect on PPS. In particular, the effect of controlling shareholders on PPS changes is subject to firm size and environmental shocks. The results suggest that ownership structure and its affiliation with the board are essential to the effect of compensation that however not yet documented in the related literature.en_US
dc.format.extent 193559 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Review of Securities and Futures Markets, 29(2), pp.31-74-
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬績效敏感性;公司治理;控制股東zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Pay-performance Sensitivity; Corporate Governance; Controlling Shareholdersen_US
dc.title (題名) The Impact of Controlling Shareholders on the Executive Compensationen_US
dc.title (題名) 控制股東對於高階管理當局薪酬的影響zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) article-
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6529/RSFM.2017.29(2).2-
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.6529/RSFM.2017.29(2).2-