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題名 通路管理策略之探討
An exploration on channel policies : when taking promotion into consideration
作者 賴榮春
Lai, Jung-chun
貢獻者 溫偉任
賴榮春
日期 2002
上傳時間 28-Sep-2018 17:58:28 (UTC+8)
摘要 Abstract
Different industries have their preferred norms for arranging their distribution channels; one may sell products through exclusive channel partners, while another sells products through multiple channel partners. When addressing channel arrangement issues, is there any rule of thumb that we can employ in decision making? If so, can we justify our decisions based on this rule? Many researchers who are interested in the field of industrial rganization have explored similar topics from different points of view; based on their findings, I will further examine and illustrate the relative factors influencing the decision making of channel managers.
We will address the issue of optimal channel arrangement from a principal’s point of view. A principal is deemed as a brand owner and will be treated as a wholesaler in this study. He may also be a manufacturer and may need to decide on an optimal channel structure for maximizing its total profit return.
We assume that the principal initially knows little about the market; therefore, it needs to work with channel partners there. The selected partners in this study, besides being in charge of delivering goods to end users, will be the only firms that can carry out business promotion when needed. We will treat them as retailers throughout this study.
A principal will become acquainted with his market as his business grows, and he will review whether his current distribution channel works properly for him. This channel evolution issue is important for a channel manager, but we will not focus on it here.
We know that when retailers consider whether to establish business relationships with certain principals, their greatest concern is how much profit they can get by doing so. Some other issues, such as how strong the demand is for their products or services in the market, the competition among all the available products, and how long their business relationships can be sustained, are also important to our retailers, but here we will restrict our attention to the profit they can earn and the duration of their business relationship.
We will review the existing literatures on the commonly discussed channel issues first. After that, we will develop a model which takes into consideration the influence that promotion has on market demand in order to illustrate our thinking on the possible interactions among our channel members, which will be useful in determining appropriate channel structures. We will also briefly discuss some possible directions for further research.
參考文獻 References
Abel P. Jeuland and Steven M. Shugan (1983), “Managing Channel Profits,” Marketing Science, V. 2, No. 3, 239-272.
Abel P. Jeuland and Steven M. Shugan (1988), “Channel of Distribution Profits When Channel Members Form Conjectures” Marketing Science, V. 7, No. 2, 202-210.
Charles A. Ingene and Mark E. Parry (1995), “Channel Coordination When Retailers Compete,” Marketing Science, 14, 360-377.
Anne T. Coughlan and Birger Wernerfelt (1989), “On Credible Delegation by Oligopolists: A Discussion of Distribution Channel Management,” Management Science, V. 35, No. 226-239.
Lipczynski and Wilson, Industrial Organisation: An Analysis of Competitive Markets, 2001, Prentice Hall
Kenneth G. Hardy and Allan J. Magrath, Marketing Channel Management: Strategic Planning and Tactics, 1988, Scott, Foresman and Company.
Eunkyu Lee and Richard Staelin (1997), “Vertical Strategic Interaction: Implications for Channel Pricing Strategy,” Marketing Science, V. 16, No. 3, 185-207.
Rajeev K. Tyagi (March, 2001), “Why Do Suppliers Charge Larger Buyers Lower Prices?” The Journal of Industrial Economics, V. XLIX, No. 45-61
Timothy W. McGuire and Richard Staelin (1983), “An Industry Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream Vertical Integration,” Marketing Science, V. 2, No. 2, 161-191.
Research material (from Marketing Channel Management-Kenneth G Hardy)
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經營管理碩士學程
91
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G91NCCV5102012
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 溫偉任
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 賴榮春
dc.creator (作者) 賴榮春
dc.creator (作者) Lai, Jung-chun
dc.date (日期) 2002
dc.date.accessioned 28-Sep-2018 17:58:28 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 28-Sep-2018 17:58:28 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 28-Sep-2018 17:58:28 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120211-
dc.description (描述) 碩士
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學
dc.description (描述) 經營管理碩士學程
dc.description (描述) 91
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Abstract
Different industries have their preferred norms for arranging their distribution channels; one may sell products through exclusive channel partners, while another sells products through multiple channel partners. When addressing channel arrangement issues, is there any rule of thumb that we can employ in decision making? If so, can we justify our decisions based on this rule? Many researchers who are interested in the field of industrial rganization have explored similar topics from different points of view; based on their findings, I will further examine and illustrate the relative factors influencing the decision making of channel managers.
We will address the issue of optimal channel arrangement from a principal’s point of view. A principal is deemed as a brand owner and will be treated as a wholesaler in this study. He may also be a manufacturer and may need to decide on an optimal channel structure for maximizing its total profit return.
We assume that the principal initially knows little about the market; therefore, it needs to work with channel partners there. The selected partners in this study, besides being in charge of delivering goods to end users, will be the only firms that can carry out business promotion when needed. We will treat them as retailers throughout this study.
A principal will become acquainted with his market as his business grows, and he will review whether his current distribution channel works properly for him. This channel evolution issue is important for a channel manager, but we will not focus on it here.
We know that when retailers consider whether to establish business relationships with certain principals, their greatest concern is how much profit they can get by doing so. Some other issues, such as how strong the demand is for their products or services in the market, the competition among all the available products, and how long their business relationships can be sustained, are also important to our retailers, but here we will restrict our attention to the profit they can earn and the duration of their business relationship.
We will review the existing literatures on the commonly discussed channel issues first. After that, we will develop a model which takes into consideration the influence that promotion has on market demand in order to illustrate our thinking on the possible interactions among our channel members, which will be useful in determining appropriate channel structures. We will also briefly discuss some possible directions for further research.
dc.description.tableofcontents An exploration on channel policies: when taking promotion into
Consideration
Acknowledgements 4
Abstract 5
1. Introduction 6
2. The Nature of a Distribution Channel 6
2.1 Different Objectives Among Channel Members 7
2.1 .1 Middlemen’s knowledge and power over their local markets 8
2.2 Channel Conflicts and Different Perspectives among Channel Members 9
2.3 Vertical Channel Relationship 10
2.3.1 Profit sharing and channel coordination 12
2.3.2 Will any conjecture bring channel members a better result? 13
2.3.3 Does a quantity discount schedule always work well for channel coordination? 15
3. Illustration of the Interactions among Channel Members 17
3.1 A Channel Structure of Dual Monopoly 17
3.1.1 The outcome of no coordination between channel members 18
3.1.2 Two approaches to maximizing the total channel profit under a dual monopoly structure 20
3.2 A Channel Consisting of One Monopoly Wholesaler and Two Retailers 21
3.2.1 Subgame perfect equilibrium 22
3.2.2 Can the monopolist further improve its profit under a subgame perfect equilibrium? 23
3.2.3 How can a monopoly wholesaler maximize its profit under this structure? 26
3.2.4 An adverse channel outcome may be generated when there are two retailers working in a distribution channel 27
3.3 Summary of the Channel Results under Steady Structures 28
4. Possible Channel Interactions When the Market Demand Is Influenced by Channel Members’ Promotion 30
4.1 Our Demand Model is Pt₊₁ = [1+α•X+β (Ut+Vt)−Qt₊₁ 30
4.1.1 A dual monopoly structure in a two period game 30
4.2 When α= 0, What Will Be the Behaviors of Our Channel Members? 31
4.2.1 How will channel members behave when the promotion effectiveness falls within ‘3.31 >β>2.21’?34
4.3 Two Strategies Channel Members Can Use to Maximize Profits 36
4.4 Is It Better for a Wholesaler to Have Two Retailers Than One Exclusive Retailer in a Two-Period Game? 40
4.4.1 Spontaneous promotion 41
4.4.2 Retailers’ collaboration when the principal devotes 1/6 of its profit to promotion 43
4.5 What Will Be Our Channel Result under a Dual Monopoly Structure in a Three-Period Game? 46
4.6 Numerical Examples of a Three-Period Game with β=4: A Comparison between Two Channel Structures While Taking the Discount Factor into Consideration 52
5. Conclusion 55
6. Further study 56
Appendix 58
References 65
dc.format.extent 115 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G91NCCV5102012
dc.title (題名) 通路管理策略之探討
dc.title (題名) An exploration on channel policies : when taking promotion into consideration
dc.type (資料類型) thesis
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) References
Abel P. Jeuland and Steven M. Shugan (1983), “Managing Channel Profits,” Marketing Science, V. 2, No. 3, 239-272.
Abel P. Jeuland and Steven M. Shugan (1988), “Channel of Distribution Profits When Channel Members Form Conjectures” Marketing Science, V. 7, No. 2, 202-210.
Charles A. Ingene and Mark E. Parry (1995), “Channel Coordination When Retailers Compete,” Marketing Science, 14, 360-377.
Anne T. Coughlan and Birger Wernerfelt (1989), “On Credible Delegation by Oligopolists: A Discussion of Distribution Channel Management,” Management Science, V. 35, No. 226-239.
Lipczynski and Wilson, Industrial Organisation: An Analysis of Competitive Markets, 2001, Prentice Hall
Kenneth G. Hardy and Allan J. Magrath, Marketing Channel Management: Strategic Planning and Tactics, 1988, Scott, Foresman and Company.
Eunkyu Lee and Richard Staelin (1997), “Vertical Strategic Interaction: Implications for Channel Pricing Strategy,” Marketing Science, V. 16, No. 3, 185-207.
Rajeev K. Tyagi (March, 2001), “Why Do Suppliers Charge Larger Buyers Lower Prices?” The Journal of Industrial Economics, V. XLIX, No. 45-61
Timothy W. McGuire and Richard Staelin (1983), “An Industry Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream Vertical Integration,” Marketing Science, V. 2, No. 2, 161-191.
Research material (from Marketing Channel Management-Kenneth G Hardy)