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題名 關稅與環境政策之政治經濟分析
Political economy analysis of tariff and environmental policy作者 魯宛憶 貢獻者 賴育邦
魯宛憶關鍵詞 利益團體
環境政策
貿易政策
關稅
利潤移轉
Interest Groups
Environmental Policy
Trade Policy
Tariffs
Rent-Shifting日期 2019 上傳時間 7-Aug-2019 16:50:14 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文以Xing (2006)的三階段賽局及Grossman and Helpman (1994)的利益團體模型為基礎，並採用Fredriksson (1999)的福利函數設定，探討當市場結構為雙占，兩國廠商的商品於本國進行數量競爭時，在兩個遊說立場相左的利益團體影響下，關稅政策與環境政策的關聯。我們發現政策主要受到外部性效果與利潤移轉效果的影響。當環保團體的力量佔上風，使外部性效果較大時，本國政府會訂定高於最適的汙染排放費；當產業利益團體的力量較強，本國政府則會訂定低於最適的汙染排放費。而不受利益團體影響的外國政府所訂定的汙染排放費則必然小於最適。考慮關稅政策後，本文發現若外部性效果大於利潤移轉效果，本國政府可能實施補貼進口財貨的政策，並調降原先高於最適的汙染排放費。如果利潤移轉效果較大，則本國政府則會對進口財貨課徵關稅，且汙染排放費較未考慮關稅時更高。至於汙染排放費與皮古稅的相對的大小，則視政府在乎環保團體的程度而定。另外，外國的汙染排放費原則上皆低於最適。
This thesis demonstrates a situation in which two interest groups provide political contributions to influence trade policy and environmental policy in their favor. The basic model is based on Xing (2006) and Grossman and Helpman (1994). To investigate how the tariff affects environmental policy in the presence of lobbying, I establish an international duopoly model containing three stages, in which firms competing in terms of quantity in the domestic market. Pollution arises in the process of production and does not travel across the border.I show that the equilibrium policies of the domestic country depend on the externality effect and the rent-shifting effect. I also find that under certain conditions, the externality effect can outweigh the profit-shifting effect. In this case, the domestic country’s emission fee will exceed the Pigouvian tax. Then by endogenizing the tariff, this thesis finds that a negative tariff will be given to the imported goods and the emission fee will decline. However, the emission fee will be set below the Pigouvian tax, if the rent-shifting effect is dominant. Under such circumstances, the domestic country will charge a positive tariff, and set a higher emission fee. As to the foreign environmental policy, which is not subject to the plague of the interest groups, the emission fee will be likely set below the Pigouvian tax.參考文獻 Barnett, A. H. (1980), “The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly,” American Economic Association, 70: 1037-1041.Barrett, S. (1994), “Strategic environmental policy and international trade,” Journal of Public Economics, 54: 325-338.Bernheim, B. D., Whinston, M. D. (1986), “Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101: 1-32.Conrad, K. (1993), “Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 25: 121-135.Coase, R. H. (1960), “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics, 3: 1-44.Fujiwara, K. (2010), “Environmental Policy and Trade Liberalization: The Case of Transboundary Pollution from Consumption,” Natural Resource Modeling, 23: 591-609.Fredriksson, P. G. (1999), “The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization and Environmental Policy,” Southern Economic Journal, 65: 513-525.Gawande, K., Bandyopadhyay, U. (2000), “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 82: 139-152.Grossman, G. M., Helpman, E. (1994), “Protection for Sale,” The American Economic Review, 84: 833-850.Hillman, A. L., Ursprung, H. W. (1992). The Greening of World Trade. 195-220.Lai, Y. B. (2007), “The political economy linkage between trade liberalization and domestic environmental regulations,” Public Choice, 133: 57-72.Mehra, M. K. (2010), “Interaction between Trade and Environment Policies with Special-Interest Politics,” Indian Growth and Development Review, 3, 138-165.Pigou, A. C. (1932), The Economics of Welfare, London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.Rauscher, M. (1994), “On Ecological Dumping,” Oxford Economic Papers, 46: 822-840.Weck-Hannemann, H. (2008), Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Boston: Springer.Xing, Y. (2006), “Strategic Environmental Policy and Environmental Tariffs,” Journal of Economic Integration, 21: 861-880. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
106255001資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255001 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 賴育邦 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 魯宛憶 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 魯宛憶 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2019 en_US dc.date.accessioned 7-Aug-2019 16:50:14 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 7-Aug-2019 16:50:14 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 7-Aug-2019 16:50:14 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106255001 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124947 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 106255001 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文以Xing (2006)的三階段賽局及Grossman and Helpman (1994)的利益團體模型為基礎，並採用Fredriksson (1999)的福利函數設定，探討當市場結構為雙占，兩國廠商的商品於本國進行數量競爭時，在兩個遊說立場相左的利益團體影響下，關稅政策與環境政策的關聯。我們發現政策主要受到外部性效果與利潤移轉效果的影響。當環保團體的力量佔上風，使外部性效果較大時，本國政府會訂定高於最適的汙染排放費；當產業利益團體的力量較強，本國政府則會訂定低於最適的汙染排放費。而不受利益團體影響的外國政府所訂定的汙染排放費則必然小於最適。考慮關稅政策後，本文發現若外部性效果大於利潤移轉效果，本國政府可能實施補貼進口財貨的政策，並調降原先高於最適的汙染排放費。如果利潤移轉效果較大，則本國政府則會對進口財貨課徵關稅，且汙染排放費較未考慮關稅時更高。至於汙染排放費與皮古稅的相對的大小，則視政府在乎環保團體的程度而定。另外，外國的汙染排放費原則上皆低於最適。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This thesis demonstrates a situation in which two interest groups provide political contributions to influence trade policy and environmental policy in their favor. The basic model is based on Xing (2006) and Grossman and Helpman (1994). To investigate how the tariff affects environmental policy in the presence of lobbying, I establish an international duopoly model containing three stages, in which firms competing in terms of quantity in the domestic market. Pollution arises in the process of production and does not travel across the border.I show that the equilibrium policies of the domestic country depend on the externality effect and the rent-shifting effect. I also find that under certain conditions, the externality effect can outweigh the profit-shifting effect. In this case, the domestic country’s emission fee will exceed the Pigouvian tax. Then by endogenizing the tariff, this thesis finds that a negative tariff will be given to the imported goods and the emission fee will decline. However, the emission fee will be set below the Pigouvian tax, if the rent-shifting effect is dominant. Under such circumstances, the domestic country will charge a positive tariff, and set a higher emission fee. As to the foreign environmental policy, which is not subject to the plague of the interest groups, the emission fee will be likely set below the Pigouvian tax. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機與背景 1第二節 研究方法 2第三節 本文架構 2第二章 文獻回顧 4第一節 環境政策與貿易政策的關係 4第二節 利益團體於政策形成過程的角色 5第三章 模型設定 7第一節 經濟環境 7第二節 福利函數 8第三節 政治均衡 10第四章 均衡結果與比較 12第一節 不考慮關稅的均衡汙染排放費 12第二節 均衡關稅與均衡汙染排放費 15第三節 當本國政府同樣在乎兩個利益團體 20第五章 結論 22附錄 23附錄一、比較靜態分析 23附錄二、(∂e^H)⁄(∂e^F )之正負號 24附錄三、考慮關稅政策前後外國的環境稅率變化之計算 25參考文獻 26 zh_TW dc.format.extent 883258 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255001 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 利益團體 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 環境政策 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 貿易政策 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 關稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 利潤移轉 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Interest Groups en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Environmental Policy en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Trade Policy en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tariffs en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Rent-Shifting en_US dc.title (題名) 關稅與環境政策之政治經濟分析 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Political economy analysis of tariff and environmental policy en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Barnett, A. H. (1980), “The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly,” American Economic Association, 70: 1037-1041.Barrett, S. (1994), “Strategic environmental policy and international trade,” Journal of Public Economics, 54: 325-338.Bernheim, B. D., Whinston, M. D. (1986), “Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101: 1-32.Conrad, K. (1993), “Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 25: 121-135.Coase, R. H. (1960), “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics, 3: 1-44.Fujiwara, K. (2010), “Environmental Policy and Trade Liberalization: The Case of Transboundary Pollution from Consumption,” Natural Resource Modeling, 23: 591-609.Fredriksson, P. G. (1999), “The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization and Environmental Policy,” Southern Economic Journal, 65: 513-525.Gawande, K., Bandyopadhyay, U. (2000), “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 82: 139-152.Grossman, G. M., Helpman, E. (1994), “Protection for Sale,” The American Economic Review, 84: 833-850.Hillman, A. L., Ursprung, H. W. (1992). The Greening of World Trade. 195-220.Lai, Y. B. (2007), “The political economy linkage between trade liberalization and domestic environmental regulations,” Public Choice, 133: 57-72.Mehra, M. K. (2010), “Interaction between Trade and Environment Policies with Special-Interest Politics,” Indian Growth and Development Review, 3, 138-165.Pigou, A. C. (1932), The Economics of Welfare, London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.Rauscher, M. (1994), “On Ecological Dumping,” Oxford Economic Papers, 46: 822-840.Weck-Hannemann, H. (2008), Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Boston: Springer.Xing, Y. (2006), “Strategic Environmental Policy and Environmental Tariffs,” Journal of Economic Integration, 21: 861-880. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU201900269 en_US
