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題名 中國對漠南非洲對外援助的修辭與現實
Rhetoric and Reality of China’s Foreign Aid toward Sub-Saharan Africa
作者 楊一逵
Yang, I - Kwei
貢獻者 姜家雄
Chiang, Chia-Hsiung
楊一逵
Yang, I - Kwei
關鍵詞 中國的對外援助
修辭與現實
新殖民主義
債務陷阱
China’s Foreign Aid
Rhetoric and Realty
Neo-Colonialism
Debt Traps
日期 2019
摘要 近年來,中華人民共和國(以下簡稱「中國」)對漠南非洲(Sub-Saharan Africa)之對外援助已成各方批判焦點。某些學者與專家認為,中國為了奪取漠南非洲的自然資源,羅織債務陷阱 (debt traps),並運作帶有新殖民主義(Neo-colonialism)色彩之外援,以其不透明的金融援助,阻礙目標國對「良善治理」(Good Governance)的追求,進而威脅國際社會利益。此外,西方政治領導人論及中國之外援時,修辭上常以「掠奪性貸款之行為」(predatory loan practices)、「不透明協議」(opaque agreements)與「戰略性地利用債務」(strategic use of debt)標籤化中國的行為。 本文首要釐清,究竟上述觀點與針對現狀之描述是否真實且客觀?為檢驗中國漠南非洲外援行為相關文獻之批判修辭是否與現實間存在差距,作者試圖透過1950年代至2010年代中國外援之規範性指南(normative guidance),並爬梳中國外援制度與機構之變遷,進一步探析中國的對外援助是否即屬新殖民主義行為與債務陷阱。透過漠南非洲之區域案例進行研究,結合統計數據、資料彙整與過程演變之追蹤,區分批判中國外援觀點中的修辭與現實。研究發現,自1980年代以降,經濟利益便持續驅動著中國對外援助行為。隨著1994年援外優惠貸款政策之推行,中國的外援模式逐步轉型為援助、貿易及投資─三位一體的集成,成為中國企業在海外承攬援助項目之催化劑。鑒於中國與漠南非洲國家間存在著互補性,以及雙方合作過程中非方並未喪失國家自主權(country ownership),中國的外援係新殖民主義的說法並不符實。另外,中國以對外援助製造債務陷阱的觀點亦不符現實之判斷。
The People’s Republic of China’s (hereafter referred to as China) foreign aid has become a lightning rod for criticism in recent years. Scholars and commentators are claiming that China is threating the interests of international community by exploiting Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources, providing rogue aid, setting up debt traps, practicing neo-colonial agenda, and hindering the spread of good governance via China’s opaque finance of aid. Moreover, Western political leaders are keen to rhetorically tag labels of “predatory loan practices,” “opaque agreements,” and “strategic use of debt” on the patterns of Chinese aid behaviors. However, does the above claims provide a fair and authentic interpretation of reality? In order to figure out whether there is a gap between the rhetoric and reality of the scholarships concerning China’s foreign aid behaviors, this dissertation suggests to deconstruct the Chinese aid by engaging the ideational structure of normative guidance and the material structure of institutional mechanism of Chinese aid from the 1950s to the 2010s and to further ascertain whether China’s foreign aid is a form of Neo-Colonialism and a debt-trap. By incorporating data, statistics and process tracing, the Sub-Saharan Africa would be highlighted as a regional case study to separate the rhetoric from the reality. The author finds that China’s foreign aid has been driven by economic incentives since the 1980s. With the launch of China’s concessional loan policy in 1994, China’s foreign aid has turned into a trinity of aid, trade and investment, acting as a catalyst for Chinese enterprises’ contracting aid projects abroad. Given the existence of Sino-Africa complementarities and African governments’ country ownership, the claims of China’s neo-colonial aid projects are not reality. Moreover, the alleged Chinese debt traps of aid have also been misdiagnosed.
描述 博士
國立政治大學
外交學系
100253502
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100253502
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 姜家雄zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Chiang, Chia-Hsiungen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 楊一逵zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Yang, I - Kweien_US
dc.creator (作者) 楊一逵zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Yang, I - Kweien_US
dc.date (日期) 2019en_US
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0100253502en_US
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 外交學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 100253502zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 近年來,中華人民共和國(以下簡稱「中國」)對漠南非洲(Sub-Saharan Africa)之對外援助已成各方批判焦點。某些學者與專家認為,中國為了奪取漠南非洲的自然資源,羅織債務陷阱 (debt traps),並運作帶有新殖民主義(Neo-colonialism)色彩之外援,以其不透明的金融援助,阻礙目標國對「良善治理」(Good Governance)的追求,進而威脅國際社會利益。此外,西方政治領導人論及中國之外援時,修辭上常以「掠奪性貸款之行為」(predatory loan practices)、「不透明協議」(opaque agreements)與「戰略性地利用債務」(strategic use of debt)標籤化中國的行為。 本文首要釐清,究竟上述觀點與針對現狀之描述是否真實且客觀?為檢驗中國漠南非洲外援行為相關文獻之批判修辭是否與現實間存在差距,作者試圖透過1950年代至2010年代中國外援之規範性指南(normative guidance),並爬梳中國外援制度與機構之變遷,進一步探析中國的對外援助是否即屬新殖民主義行為與債務陷阱。透過漠南非洲之區域案例進行研究,結合統計數據、資料彙整與過程演變之追蹤,區分批判中國外援觀點中的修辭與現實。研究發現,自1980年代以降,經濟利益便持續驅動著中國對外援助行為。隨著1994年援外優惠貸款政策之推行,中國的外援模式逐步轉型為援助、貿易及投資─三位一體的集成,成為中國企業在海外承攬援助項目之催化劑。鑒於中國與漠南非洲國家間存在著互補性,以及雙方合作過程中非方並未喪失國家自主權(country ownership),中國的外援係新殖民主義的說法並不符實。另外,中國以對外援助製造債務陷阱的觀點亦不符現實之判斷。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The People’s Republic of China’s (hereafter referred to as China) foreign aid has become a lightning rod for criticism in recent years. Scholars and commentators are claiming that China is threating the interests of international community by exploiting Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources, providing rogue aid, setting up debt traps, practicing neo-colonial agenda, and hindering the spread of good governance via China’s opaque finance of aid. Moreover, Western political leaders are keen to rhetorically tag labels of “predatory loan practices,” “opaque agreements,” and “strategic use of debt” on the patterns of Chinese aid behaviors. However, does the above claims provide a fair and authentic interpretation of reality? In order to figure out whether there is a gap between the rhetoric and reality of the scholarships concerning China’s foreign aid behaviors, this dissertation suggests to deconstruct the Chinese aid by engaging the ideational structure of normative guidance and the material structure of institutional mechanism of Chinese aid from the 1950s to the 2010s and to further ascertain whether China’s foreign aid is a form of Neo-Colonialism and a debt-trap. By incorporating data, statistics and process tracing, the Sub-Saharan Africa would be highlighted as a regional case study to separate the rhetoric from the reality. The author finds that China’s foreign aid has been driven by economic incentives since the 1980s. With the launch of China’s concessional loan policy in 1994, China’s foreign aid has turned into a trinity of aid, trade and investment, acting as a catalyst for Chinese enterprises’ contracting aid projects abroad. Given the existence of Sino-Africa complementarities and African governments’ country ownership, the claims of China’s neo-colonial aid projects are not reality. Moreover, the alleged Chinese debt traps of aid have also been misdiagnosed.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents Table of Contents Chapter One: Introduction 1 1.1 Research Background 2 1.1.1 The Theories of Foreign Aid 4 1.1.2 The Question of ODA’s Effectiveness 8 1.1.3 China is a Rising Heavyweight Provider of Foreign Aid 10 1.1.4 China is a Different Aid Provider 11 1.1.5 China is a Controversial Aid Provider 14 1.2 Literature Review 17 1.2.1 The Incentives of Chinese Aid 17 1.2.2 The Impact of Chinese Aid in the SSA 23 1.2.3 The Positive Literature of Chinese Aid 26 1.2.4 Evaluation and Research Questions 30 1.3 Methodology 32 1.3.1 Document Analysis 32 1.3.2 Historical Analysis 32 1.3.3 Comparative Analysis 33 1.3.4 Case Study 33 1.3.5 Data Sources 35 1.3.6 Scope of Research 37 1.4 Chapter Outlining 37 Chapter Two: Contextualizing the Normative Guidance of Chinese Aid 41 2.1 Introduction 41 2.2 Normative Guidance of Chinese Aid, 1950-1977 43 2.2.1 Socialist Internationalism 44 2.2.2 The Third Word Ideology 47 2.2.3 The Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance in 1964 49 2.2.4 Revolutionary Pragmatism 54 2.2.5 Evaluation: Foreign Aid Served for Diplomacy from 1950 to 1977 56 2.3 Normative Guidance of Chinese Aid, 1978-2000 60 2.3.1 Prioritizing the Economic Development 60 2.3.2 Zhao Ziyang’s Four Principles in 1982 63 2.3.3. Wu Yi’s Grand Strategy of Economy and Trade in 1994 66 2.3.4 The Going Global Strategy 69 2.3.5 Evaluation: Foreign Aid Served for Economic Development from 1978 to 2000 71 2.4 Normative Guidance of Chinese Aid, 2000-2017 78 2.4.1 Peaceful Development and Aid Relations 79 2.4.2 Selected FOCAC Guidance of Chinese Aid 82 2.4.3 Evaluation: China’s Other Official Flow (OOF) was on a Surge from 2000 to 2017 88 2.5 Summary 93 Chapter Three: Investigating China’s Institutional Mechanism of Foreign Aid 97 3.1 Introduction 97 3.2 China’s Institutional Mechanism of Foreign Aid, 1950-1977 99 3.2.1 State Planning Committee and Ministry of Foreign Trade in the 1950s 99 3.2.2 The General Bureau for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, 1961 100 3.2.3 Commission for Foreign Economic Relations, 1964 101 3.2.4 The Chinese Aid Delivery Mechanism, 1950-1970 102 3.2.5 Evaluation: State Planning Commission’s Top-Down Command on Aid Projects 104 3.2.6 Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, 1970 105 3.2.7 The Chinese Aid Delivery Mechanism in the 1970s 107 3.2.8 Evaluation: The gradual retreat of the State Planning Commission 109 3.3 China’s Institutional Mechanism of Foreign Aid, 1978-2000 111 3.3.1 The Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation and Trade in 1982 112 3.3.2 The Chinese Aid Delivery Mechanism in the 1980s 113 3.3.3 Evaluation: Separating the Government from the Functions of Undertaking Agencies of Foreign Aid 117 3.3.4 Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation in 1993 119 3.3.5 The Chinese Aid Delivery Mechanism in the 1990s 121 3.3.6 Evaluation: Chinese Enterprises become the Chief Contracting Actors of Foreign Aid Implementation 124 3.4 China’s Institutional Mechanism of Foreign Aid, 2000-2018 128 3.4.1 The Leading Role of MOFCOM and Its Five Key Agencies 129 3.4.2 The Multi-Level Institution of FOCAC 133 3.4.3 Establishing a Top-Level Coordinating Committee for Efficiency 135 3.4.4 First Ministry-Level Regulation of Foreign Aid 136 3.4.5 Establishing the CIDCA in 2018 137 3.4.6 Evaluation: Who’s in the Driver’s Seat of Aid Implementation? 138 3.5 Summary 139 3.5.1 The Ministry of Commerce and Its Predecessors Have Taken the Lead in Aid Implementation 140 3.5.2 To Delegate an Aid Project is not a Political Command, but a Contract 141 3.5.3 Legal Person Enterprises are Rational Actors Aiming at Profits 142 3.5.4 Economic Development still Prevails 142 Chapter Four: Is China’s Foreign Aid a Form of Neo-Colonialism? Rhetoric and Reality 145 4.1 Introduction 145 4.2 Defining Neo-Colonialism 147 4.3 The Workflow of Chinese Aid Project 149 4.3.1 Contemporary Workflow of Chinese Aid is embedded in Concessional Loan Policy 150 4.3.2 The Workflow of Chinese Aid 157 4.3.3 Evaluation: Unveiling the Country Ownership 160 4.4 Exploitation or Complementation? 166 4.4.1 The Complementarities 166 4.4.2 Evaluation: Aid for Complementarities 174 4.5 Multilateral Cooperation of Chinese Aid is on the Rise 175 4.5.1 A Multilateral Turn of Chinese Aid to SSA 176 4.5.2 Trilateral Cooperation is on the Rise 180 4.5.3 Evaluation: A Multilateral Turn of Chinese Aid 182 4.6 Summary 184 Chapter Five: Is China’s Foreign Aid a Debt Trap? Rhetoric and Reality 187 5.1 Introduction 187 5.2 Deconstructing the Chinese Loan 191 5.2.1 The Inauguration of China’s Loan Policy in 1995 192 5.2.2 China’s Loan Provision Aimed at Promoting Overseas Chinese Contracts, not Debt Traps 192 5.2.3 China’s Economically Driven Loan Policy is appropriated from the Developed Countries 194 5.2.4 Indebted Aid Recipients Do Not Serve the Interests of the Contracting Chinese Enterprises 198 5.2.5 Using Commodity-Backed Loan to Alleviate the Debt Stress 199 5.3 Assessing China’s Grants, Debt Cancellation and Loans 204 5.3.1 The Visible Volume of China’s Aid Finance from FOCAC 2000 to 2018 205 5.3.2 The Overestimated Chinese Loan: A Case of the Kiel Institute’s Assessment 214 5.3.3 How Much Overseas Loan does China Provide? 219 5.4 Who Owns Africa’s Debt? 224 5.4.1 The Sub-Saharan Africa’s Debt Burden 224 5.4.2 The Creditors’ Share 226 5.5 Accessing Top African Borrowers of Chinese Loans and Their Indebted Conditions 228 5.5.1 The Top 10 African Borrowers of Chinese Loans 228 5.5.2 Analyzing the Indebted Situation of the Top 10 African Borrowers 229 5.6 Reconsidering the Alleged Chinese Debt Trap in the SSA 233 5.6.1 Who are the Victims of Chinese Debt Traps in the SSA? 233 5.6.2 Is China Setting up a Debt Trap in the SSA? 235 5.7 If Not Debt Trap, What Else? 241 5.7.1 Commerce is More Important than Resources 242 5.7.2 The Enlarging Sino-Africa Exports and Imports 243 5.7.3 A Stable Growth of China’s Investment to the SSA 246 5.8 Summary 249 Chapter Six: Conclusion 253 6.1 Major Findings 253 6.1.1 Difference between China’s ODA and OOF 253 6.1.2 China’s Foreign Aid Pattern is not an Chinese Invention 254 6.1.3 Wu Yi’s Concessional Loan Policy was the Turning Point 256 6.1.4 ODA aimed at Diplomatic Interests while OOF aimed at Economic Benefits 257 6.1.5 The Significance of the Ministry of Commerce in China’s Foreign Aid 258 6.1.6 China’s Foreign Aid is Not a Form of Neo-Colonialism 259 6.1.7 The Chinese Debt-Trap Narrative is Not a Reality 260 6.2 Significance of Research 262 6.3 Limitations 265 6.4 Future Research 266 6.4.1 The Sino-African Cooperation of ICTs 266 6.4.2 BRI and the SSA 267 6.4.3 The Chinese Founded Special Economic Zones in SSA 268 6.4.4 The Sino-Africa Human Resource Cooperation 270 Bibliography 273 English Language 273 Chinese Language 309zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100253502en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 中國的對外援助zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 修辭與現實zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 新殖民主義zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 債務陷阱zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) China’s Foreign Aiden_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Rhetoric and Realtyen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Neo-Colonialismen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Debt Trapsen_US
dc.title (題名) 中國對漠南非洲對外援助的修辭與現實zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Rhetoric and Reality of China’s Foreign Aid toward Sub-Saharan Africaen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesis-