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題名 Are Independent Directors Effective Monitors in Taiwan? A Theoretical Analysis
作者 周振鋒
Chou, Cheng-Fong
貢獻者 法律系
關鍵詞 Independent Directors ; Corporate Governance ; Supervisors ; Company Act ; Controlling Shareholders
日期 2013-03
上傳時間 4-Dec-2019 14:48:38 (UTC+8)
摘要 About a decade ago, Taiwan introduced the institution of independent directors, which has long been advocated as a good corporate governance practice in the United States of America (“U.S.”). At the time, the concept of independent directors then was a whole new legal idea in Taiwan that fundamentally changed the original intention behind the internal corporate governance system in the Taiwan Company Act in which supervisors were supposed to address oversight and to take action against the board of directors and managers. Traditionally, the U.S. corporate conventional wisdom argues that independent directors benefit companies in some aspects, but it is also believed that they could face some inherent limitations while carrying out their monitoring tasks. The most serious issue is how to ensure an independent director has true independence from management. In addition to the limitations that U.S. independent directors normally face, Taiwanese independent directors also encounter other constraints arising from characteristics of Taiwan’s business environment. This article argues that independent directors in Taiwan have few chances to rid themselves of the controlling shareholders’ influence. Even in the absence of such powerful shareholders, they would still encounter other difficulties in carrying out the monitoring tasks such as insufficient information. This article concludes that as a result, Taiwanese independent directors will function in a very limited way, and can hardly be effective monitors for Taiwanese companies under the current business and legal environment in Taiwan.
關聯 National Taiwan University Law Review, Vol.8, No.1, pp.49-95
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.3966/181263242013030801002
dc.contributor 法律系
dc.creator (作者) 周振鋒
dc.creator (作者) Chou, Cheng-Fong
dc.date (日期) 2013-03
dc.date.accessioned 4-Dec-2019 14:48:38 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 4-Dec-2019 14:48:38 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Dec-2019 14:48:38 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/127696-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) About a decade ago, Taiwan introduced the institution of independent directors, which has long been advocated as a good corporate governance practice in the United States of America (“U.S.”). At the time, the concept of independent directors then was a whole new legal idea in Taiwan that fundamentally changed the original intention behind the internal corporate governance system in the Taiwan Company Act in which supervisors were supposed to address oversight and to take action against the board of directors and managers. Traditionally, the U.S. corporate conventional wisdom argues that independent directors benefit companies in some aspects, but it is also believed that they could face some inherent limitations while carrying out their monitoring tasks. The most serious issue is how to ensure an independent director has true independence from management. In addition to the limitations that U.S. independent directors normally face, Taiwanese independent directors also encounter other constraints arising from characteristics of Taiwan’s business environment. This article argues that independent directors in Taiwan have few chances to rid themselves of the controlling shareholders’ influence. Even in the absence of such powerful shareholders, they would still encounter other difficulties in carrying out the monitoring tasks such as insufficient information. This article concludes that as a result, Taiwanese independent directors will function in a very limited way, and can hardly be effective monitors for Taiwanese companies under the current business and legal environment in Taiwan.
dc.format.extent 526671 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) National Taiwan University Law Review, Vol.8, No.1, pp.49-95
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Independent Directors ; Corporate Governance ; Supervisors ; Company Act ; Controlling Shareholders
dc.title (題名) Are Independent Directors Effective Monitors in Taiwan? A Theoretical Analysis
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.3966/181263242013030801002
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.3966/181263242013030801002