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題名 Loan Market Competition and Bank Stability : a Re-examination of Banking Competition and Risk Taking
作者 張興華
Chang, Hsing-Hua
Lee, Li-Hsuan
Chiang, Yeong-Yuh
貢獻者 金融系
關鍵詞 Bank competition ; Financial stability ; Risk shifting ; Market structure
日期 2016-01
上傳時間 19-Dec-2019 14:39:17 (UTC+8)
摘要 The link between banking competition and stability is complex. In 2005, Boyd and De Nicóclo provide a competition-stability model by arguing that competition drives down loan rates and induces less risky investment. This paper introduces a deposit-cost-transmitting mechanism and argues that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between banking competition and the borrowers` risk-taking behaviors. When banks are equipped with capital-cost transmitting power, great profit margins drive banks to raise loan rates and cause entrepreneurs to choose riskier projects. The environment with higher banking bargaining power tends to be in favor of the competition-fragility view. When banks’ monopoly power is less robust, stiffer competition depresses demand for deposits and decreases both deposit rates and loan rates, inducing the choices of safer projects. Thus, the competition-stability view prevails over the concentration-stability view in a competitive banking system.
關聯 International Research Journal of Applied Finance, Vol.VII, No.10, pp.240-253
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 金融系
dc.creator (作者) 張興華
dc.creator (作者) Chang, Hsing-Hua
dc.creator (作者) Lee, Li-Hsuan
dc.creator (作者) Chiang, Yeong-Yuh
dc.date (日期) 2016-01
dc.date.accessioned 19-Dec-2019 14:39:17 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 19-Dec-2019 14:39:17 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 19-Dec-2019 14:39:17 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/127921-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The link between banking competition and stability is complex. In 2005, Boyd and De Nicóclo provide a competition-stability model by arguing that competition drives down loan rates and induces less risky investment. This paper introduces a deposit-cost-transmitting mechanism and argues that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between banking competition and the borrowers` risk-taking behaviors. When banks are equipped with capital-cost transmitting power, great profit margins drive banks to raise loan rates and cause entrepreneurs to choose riskier projects. The environment with higher banking bargaining power tends to be in favor of the competition-fragility view. When banks’ monopoly power is less robust, stiffer competition depresses demand for deposits and decreases both deposit rates and loan rates, inducing the choices of safer projects. Thus, the competition-stability view prevails over the concentration-stability view in a competitive banking system.
dc.format.extent 356710 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) International Research Journal of Applied Finance, Vol.VII, No.10, pp.240-253
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Bank competition ; Financial stability ; Risk shifting ; Market structure
dc.title (題名) Loan Market Competition and Bank Stability : a Re-examination of Banking Competition and Risk Taking
dc.type (資料類型) article