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題名 考慮下游異質產出競爭與降低成本研發下的內生垂直整合
Endogenous vertical integration in the presence of downstream product differentiation and cost-reducing R&D作者 李志允
Li, Zhi-Yun貢獻者 溫偉任
Wen, Wei-Jen
李志允
Li, Zhi-Yun關鍵詞 垂直整合
異質產出
降低成本研發
社會福利
過度研發
Vertical integration
Product differentiation
Cost-reducing R&D
Social welfare日期 2019 上傳時間 2-Mar-2020 10:58:30 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文考慮一個有兩家上游與兩家下游的垂直相關市場，並假設上游廠商生產同質中間財，下游生產異質產品。我們分析當下游廠商可以投入研發以降低生產成本時，垂直整合的福利效果。 研究結果顯示：當少許研發支出就可以大幅降低生產成本(研發效率高)，市場中存在兩家垂直整合廠商時的福利會低於僅有一家垂直整合廠商時的福利。反之，當研發效率低時，市場中存在兩家整合廠商時會有較高的福利。這是因為降低生產成本之研發投入的單位成本過小，使兩家整合市場之廠商投入的研發過多，造成過度研發進而減少社會福利，使市場中存在兩家垂直整合廠商時的福利會低於僅有一家垂直整合廠商時的福利。
This research examines the social welfare of vertical integration market with two upstream firms that produce same quality intermediate goods and two downstream firms that produce differentiation product and downstream firms can invest in cost-reducing R&D. We demonstrate that if firms costing small amount of R&D cost will substantially reducing their producing cost (high R&D efficiency), the social welfare of two vertical integrated firms market will lower than the social welfare of one vertical integrated firm market. In contrast, when R&D efficiency is low, the social welfare of two vertical integrated firms market will higher than the social welfare of one vertical integrated firm market. That’s because the unit cost of cost-reducing R&D is too small, the market of two vertical integrated firms will overinvest in R&D and reduce social welfare. So that the social welfare of two vertical integrated firms market will lower than the social welfare of one vertical integrated firm market.參考文獻 行政院公平交易委員會(1991)，公平交易法，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。[Fair Trade Commission(1991), “Free Trade Act” , Taipei, Fair Trade Commission.]行政院公平交易委員會(1992)，公平交易法施行細則，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。[Fair Trade Commission(1991), “Implementing Rules to the Fair Trade Act” , Taipei, Fair Trade Commission.]Banerjee and Lin, P. (2003), “Downstream R&D, raising rivals’ costs, and input price contracts” , International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.21, Iss1, 79-96.Buehler and Schmutzler (2008),“Intimidating competitors—Endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.26, Iss1, 247-265.Brocas (2003), “Vertical integration and incentives to innovate” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.21, Iss4, 457-488.Gaudet. G. and Long, N. (1996), “Vertical integration, foreclosure, and profits in the presence of double marginalization”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 5(3), 409-432.Ordover, J. A., Saloner, G., and Salop, S. C. (1990), “Equilibrium vertical foreclosure”, The American Economic Review,80, 127-142.Salinger, M.A. (1988), “Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(2), 345-356.Shy, O. (1995), Industrial organization: theory and applications, MIT press.Wang, K. C., Koo, H. W., and Chen, T. J.(2005), “Strategic buying or selling? : The behavior of vertically-integrated firms in the intermediate goods market”, Journal of Economic Integration, 20(2), 366-382.Wen, W. J., Lee, W. C., and Huang W. H., “Welfare-improving Vertical Mergers in the Presence of Downstream Product Differentiation” 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易學系
106351037資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106351037 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 溫偉任 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Wen, Wei-Jen en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 李志允 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Li, Zhi-Yun en_US dc.creator (作者) 李志允 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Li, Zhi-Yun en_US dc.date (日期) 2019 en_US dc.date.accessioned 2-Mar-2020 10:58:30 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 2-Mar-2020 10:58:30 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Mar-2020 10:58:30 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106351037 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/128774 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國際經營與貿易學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 106351037 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文考慮一個有兩家上游與兩家下游的垂直相關市場，並假設上游廠商生產同質中間財，下游生產異質產品。我們分析當下游廠商可以投入研發以降低生產成本時，垂直整合的福利效果。 研究結果顯示：當少許研發支出就可以大幅降低生產成本(研發效率高)，市場中存在兩家垂直整合廠商時的福利會低於僅有一家垂直整合廠商時的福利。反之，當研發效率低時，市場中存在兩家整合廠商時會有較高的福利。這是因為降低生產成本之研發投入的單位成本過小，使兩家整合市場之廠商投入的研發過多，造成過度研發進而減少社會福利，使市場中存在兩家垂直整合廠商時的福利會低於僅有一家垂直整合廠商時的福利。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This research examines the social welfare of vertical integration market with two upstream firms that produce same quality intermediate goods and two downstream firms that produce differentiation product and downstream firms can invest in cost-reducing R&D. We demonstrate that if firms costing small amount of R&D cost will substantially reducing their producing cost (high R&D efficiency), the social welfare of two vertical integrated firms market will lower than the social welfare of one vertical integrated firm market. In contrast, when R&D efficiency is low, the social welfare of two vertical integrated firms market will higher than the social welfare of one vertical integrated firm market. That’s because the unit cost of cost-reducing R&D is too small, the market of two vertical integrated firms will overinvest in R&D and reduce social welfare. So that the social welfare of two vertical integrated firms market will lower than the social welfare of one vertical integrated firm market. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 1 緒論 62 文獻回顧 83 模型 103.1模型基本假設 103.2變數定義 113.3模型建立 113.3.1模型概述 113.3.2模型詳述 124 均衡結果分析 174.1定理一(產量與成本加價) 174.2定理二(研發誘因) 184.3命題一（研發決策） 194.4命題二（恫嚇效果） 205 延伸討論 225.1不對稱整合進入中間財交易市場之均衡結果 225.2.1定理一(產量與成本加價) 235.2.2定理二(研發誘因) 245.2.3命題一（研發決策） 255.2.4命題二（恫嚇效果） 276 數值分析 286.1觀察一(兩家整合市場與一家整合退出中間財市場之社會福利比較) 286.2觀察二(一家整合進入中間財市場與一家整合退出中間財市場之福利比較) 297 結論 318 附錄 324.3 (ii), (iii)證明 325.2.2 (ii), (iii)證明 339 參考文獻 35 zh_TW dc.format.extent 516765 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106351037 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 垂直整合 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 異質產出 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 降低成本研發 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 社會福利 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 過度研發 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Vertical integration en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Product differentiation en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Cost-reducing R&D en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Social welfare en_US dc.title (題名) 考慮下游異質產出競爭與降低成本研發下的內生垂直整合 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Endogenous vertical integration in the presence of downstream product differentiation and cost-reducing R&D en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 行政院公平交易委員會(1991)，公平交易法，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。[Fair Trade Commission(1991), “Free Trade Act” , Taipei, Fair Trade Commission.]行政院公平交易委員會(1992)，公平交易法施行細則，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。[Fair Trade Commission(1991), “Implementing Rules to the Fair Trade Act” , Taipei, Fair Trade Commission.]Banerjee and Lin, P. (2003), “Downstream R&D, raising rivals’ costs, and input price contracts” , International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.21, Iss1, 79-96.Buehler and Schmutzler (2008),“Intimidating competitors—Endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.26, Iss1, 247-265.Brocas (2003), “Vertical integration and incentives to innovate” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.21, Iss4, 457-488.Gaudet. G. and Long, N. (1996), “Vertical integration, foreclosure, and profits in the presence of double marginalization”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 5(3), 409-432.Ordover, J. A., Saloner, G., and Salop, S. C. (1990), “Equilibrium vertical foreclosure”, The American Economic Review,80, 127-142.Salinger, M.A. (1988), “Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(2), 345-356.Shy, O. (1995), Industrial organization: theory and applications, MIT press.Wang, K. C., Koo, H. W., and Chen, T. J.(2005), “Strategic buying or selling? : The behavior of vertically-integrated firms in the intermediate goods market”, Journal of Economic Integration, 20(2), 366-382.Wen, W. J., Lee, W. C., and Huang W. H., “Welfare-improving Vertical Mergers in the Presence of Downstream Product Differentiation” zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202000235 en_US
