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題名 Privatization Neutrality with Quality and Subsidies 作者 翁堃嵐
Ueng , K. L. Glen
郭虹瑩
Horn-In Kuo
賴孚權
Lai , Fu-Chuan貢獻者 財政系 日期 2019-03 上傳時間 27-Apr-2020 16:00:02 (UTC+8) 摘要 This study revisits the privatization neutrality theorem that claims that social welfare is exactly the same before and after privatization when the government gives the optimal subsidy to both public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly. Unlike the existing literature that has assumed that a uniform subsidy is given to public and private firms, we demonstrate that if the discriminatory subsidy rates are adopted even when there is firm asymmetry between public and private firms, the privatization neutrality theorem continues to hold. First, we show that even if the cost of the public firm differs from those of private firms, the privatization neutrality theorem holds by appropriately subsidizing both public and private firms at the different levels. Second, even if the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader before and after privatization, the government can attain privatization neutrality by adopting the discriminatory subsidy and, as a result, can achieve social welfare maximization. Our result suggests that even when there exists firm asymmetry between public and private firms, it is not important for privatization authorities to determine whether to privatize the public firm. 關聯 The Japanese Economic Review 資料類型 article dc.contributor 財政系 dc.creator (作者) 翁堃嵐 dc.creator (作者) Ueng , K. L. Glen dc.creator (作者) 郭虹瑩 dc.creator (作者) Horn-In Kuo dc.creator (作者) 賴孚權 dc.creator (作者) Lai , Fu-Chuan dc.date (日期) 2019-03 dc.date.accessioned 27-Apr-2020 16:00:02 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 27-Apr-2020 16:00:02 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 27-Apr-2020 16:00:02 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/129507 - dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study revisits the privatization neutrality theorem that claims that social welfare is exactly the same before and after privatization when the government gives the optimal subsidy to both public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly. Unlike the existing literature that has assumed that a uniform subsidy is given to public and private firms, we demonstrate that if the discriminatory subsidy rates are adopted even when there is firm asymmetry between public and private firms, the privatization neutrality theorem continues to hold. First, we show that even if the cost of the public firm differs from those of private firms, the privatization neutrality theorem holds by appropriately subsidizing both public and private firms at the different levels. Second, even if the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader before and after privatization, the government can attain privatization neutrality by adopting the discriminatory subsidy and, as a result, can achieve social welfare maximization. Our result suggests that even when there exists firm asymmetry between public and private firms, it is not important for privatization authorities to determine whether to privatize the public firm. dc.format.extent 599181 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.relation (關聯) The Japanese Economic Review dc.title (題名) Privatization Neutrality with Quality and Subsidies dc.type (資料類型) article
