1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. 學術產出
  3. Item

學術產出-Periodical Articles

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

政大圖書館

Citation Infomation

題名 Crisis and Contract Breach: The Domestic and International Determinants of Expropriation
作者 李佳怡
Lee, Chia-yi
Jonston, Noel P.
Jensen, Nathan M.
Sahin, Hadi
貢獻者 國際事務學院
關鍵詞 Expropriations ; Economic crisis ; Multilateral financial institutions ; Reputational costs ; Retaliation costs
日期 2019-07
上傳時間 26-May-2020 14:17:25 (UTC+8)
摘要 In this paper we address how external factors shape government decisions to break or uphold contracts, specifically focusing on how economic shocks and support from multilateral financial institutions shape leader decisions to expropriate from investors. Contrary to conventional wisdom and much of the existing scholarship, we argue that governments are less likely to expropriate from investors during periods of economic crisis since governments become more sensitive to the reputational costs of expropriating. We also argue that governments are sensitive to the levers other governments may use to punish for expropriation, such as withholding IMF and World Bank funding. We test these theories using a dataset of investment expropriations and case studies of thirty-four investment disputes that were resolved pre-claim. Our econometric analysis suggests that expropriations of foreign investment are less common during periods of crisis, and that countries under IMF agreements or borrowing from the World Bank are less likely to expropriate. Our thirty-four case studies, which substantiate the role of government reputation and multilateral pressure, support our statistical results.
關聯 Review of International Organizations, pp.00-00
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09363-z
dc.contributor 國際事務學院
dc.creator (作者) 李佳怡
dc.creator (作者) Lee, Chia-yi
dc.creator (作者) Jonston, Noel P.
dc.creator (作者) Jensen, Nathan M.
dc.creator (作者) Sahin, Hadi
dc.date (日期) 2019-07
dc.date.accessioned 26-May-2020 14:17:25 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 26-May-2020 14:17:25 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 26-May-2020 14:17:25 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/129877-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In this paper we address how external factors shape government decisions to break or uphold contracts, specifically focusing on how economic shocks and support from multilateral financial institutions shape leader decisions to expropriate from investors. Contrary to conventional wisdom and much of the existing scholarship, we argue that governments are less likely to expropriate from investors during periods of economic crisis since governments become more sensitive to the reputational costs of expropriating. We also argue that governments are sensitive to the levers other governments may use to punish for expropriation, such as withholding IMF and World Bank funding. We test these theories using a dataset of investment expropriations and case studies of thirty-four investment disputes that were resolved pre-claim. Our econometric analysis suggests that expropriations of foreign investment are less common during periods of crisis, and that countries under IMF agreements or borrowing from the World Bank are less likely to expropriate. Our thirty-four case studies, which substantiate the role of government reputation and multilateral pressure, support our statistical results.
dc.format.extent 514039 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Review of International Organizations, pp.00-00
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Expropriations ; Economic crisis ; Multilateral financial institutions ; Reputational costs ; Retaliation costs
dc.title (題名) Crisis and Contract Breach: The Domestic and International Determinants of Expropriation
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1007/s11558-019-09363-z
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09363-z