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題名 On Two Recent Arguments against Intellectualism
論最近兩個反對智性主義的論證
作者 李國揚
Lee, Kok Yong
貢獻者 政治大學哲學學報
關鍵詞 Intellectualism  ;  Epistemic Pragmatism  ;  Pragmatic Encroachment  ;  Pragmatic Penetration  ;  Interest-Relative Invariantism  ;  the Nature of Knowledge 
智性主義  ;  知性實用主義  ;  實用入侵主義  ;  實用穿透主義  ;  利益相對不變主義  ;  知識的本質
日期 2020-01
上傳時間 12-Nov-2020 15:59:15 (UTC+8)
摘要 Several authors have recently argued against intellectualism, the view that one`s epistemic position with respect to p depends exclusively on one`s truth-relevant factors with respect to p. In this paper, I first examine two prominent arguments for the anti-intellectualist position and find both of them wanting. More precisely, I argue that these arguments, by themselves, are underdetermined between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. I then manifest the intuitive plausibility of intellectualism by examining the ordinary conversational pattern of challenging a claim.
根據智性主義(intellectualism),影響S對p的認知地位(epistemic position)的因素,只能是與p是否為真相關的因素(truth-relevant factor)。近年來,有不少的哲學家對智性主義提出強而有力的反對論證。本文將探討其中兩個重要的反對論證。筆者主張,這兩個論證其實並沒有辦法證明,非智性主義比智性主義更合理。並且,通過檢視日常語言中,挑戰一個宣稱(challenging a claim)的語言資料(linguistic data),筆者將說明智性主義是非常符合一般人的直覺的。
關聯 政治大學哲學學報, 43, 35-67
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.30393/TNCUP.202001_(43).0002
dc.contributor 政治大學哲學學報
dc.creator (作者) 李國揚
dc.creator (作者) Lee, Kok Yong
dc.date (日期) 2020-01
dc.date.accessioned 12-Nov-2020 15:59:15 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 12-Nov-2020 15:59:15 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 12-Nov-2020 15:59:15 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/132531-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Several authors have recently argued against intellectualism, the view that one`s epistemic position with respect to p depends exclusively on one`s truth-relevant factors with respect to p. In this paper, I first examine two prominent arguments for the anti-intellectualist position and find both of them wanting. More precisely, I argue that these arguments, by themselves, are underdetermined between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. I then manifest the intuitive plausibility of intellectualism by examining the ordinary conversational pattern of challenging a claim.
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 根據智性主義(intellectualism),影響S對p的認知地位(epistemic position)的因素,只能是與p是否為真相關的因素(truth-relevant factor)。近年來,有不少的哲學家對智性主義提出強而有力的反對論證。本文將探討其中兩個重要的反對論證。筆者主張,這兩個論證其實並沒有辦法證明,非智性主義比智性主義更合理。並且,通過檢視日常語言中,挑戰一個宣稱(challenging a claim)的語言資料(linguistic data),筆者將說明智性主義是非常符合一般人的直覺的。
dc.format.extent 554848 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) 政治大學哲學學報, 43, 35-67
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Intellectualism  ;  Epistemic Pragmatism  ;  Pragmatic Encroachment  ;  Pragmatic Penetration  ;  Interest-Relative Invariantism  ;  the Nature of Knowledge 
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 智性主義  ;  知性實用主義  ;  實用入侵主義  ;  實用穿透主義  ;  利益相對不變主義  ;  知識的本質
dc.title (題名) On Two Recent Arguments against Intellectualism
dc.title (題名) 論最近兩個反對智性主義的論證
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.30393/TNCUP.202001_(43).0002
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.30393/TNCUP.202001_(43).0002