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題名 Auditor Choice under Client Information Uncertainty
作者 周玲臺
Chou, Ling-Tai Lynette
貢獻者 會計系
關鍵詞 auditor choice;information uncertainty;auditor expertise
日期 2016-01
上傳時間 26-May-2021 10:29:56 (UTC+8)
摘要 This paper examines the auditors chosen by companies whose financial statements with information uncertainty and infers that these companies may choose specialist auditors to signal the credibility of the financial statements and improve market perception. We develop comprehensive measurements of information uncertainty from the auditor’s point of view and further disentangle the information uncertainty effects into fundamental volatility uncertainty and information quality uncertainty. We use an auditor switching sample of U.S. companies from 2001-2009 to examine whether the information uncertainty is an issue of auditor choice or not. Consistent with our conjecture, companies under information uncertainty prefer to hire specialist auditors. Evidence partially supports that, relative to companies under fundamental volatility uncertainty, companies suffering information quality uncertainty are more inclined to choose specialist auditors.
關聯 Review of Integrative Business and Economics Research, Vol.5, No.4, pp.329-370
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 會計系
dc.creator (作者) 周玲臺
dc.creator (作者) Chou, Ling-Tai Lynette
dc.date (日期) 2016-01
dc.date.accessioned 26-May-2021 10:29:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 26-May-2021 10:29:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 26-May-2021 10:29:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/135136-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper examines the auditors chosen by companies whose financial statements with information uncertainty and infers that these companies may choose specialist auditors to signal the credibility of the financial statements and improve market perception. We develop comprehensive measurements of information uncertainty from the auditor’s point of view and further disentangle the information uncertainty effects into fundamental volatility uncertainty and information quality uncertainty. We use an auditor switching sample of U.S. companies from 2001-2009 to examine whether the information uncertainty is an issue of auditor choice or not. Consistent with our conjecture, companies under information uncertainty prefer to hire specialist auditors. Evidence partially supports that, relative to companies under fundamental volatility uncertainty, companies suffering information quality uncertainty are more inclined to choose specialist auditors.
dc.format.extent 896470 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Review of Integrative Business and Economics Research, Vol.5, No.4, pp.329-370
dc.subject (關鍵詞) auditor choice;information uncertainty;auditor expertise
dc.title (題名) Auditor Choice under Client Information Uncertainty
dc.type (資料類型) article