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題名 護法《成唯識寶生論》論知覺及其所緣：兼與當代理論之交涉
Dharmapāla on Perception and ālambana in the Cheng weishi baosheng lun: Engaging with Contemporary Philosophy of Perception作者 胡志強
Hu, Chih-chiang貢獻者 哲學系 關鍵詞 護法;所緣;成唯識寶生論;知覺因果論;非此即彼論
Dharmapāla;ālambana;Cheng weishi baosheng lun;the causal theory of perception;disjunctivism日期 2019-06 上傳時間 28-Mar-2022 14:42:31 (UTC+8) 摘要 護法《成唯識寶生論》是世親《唯識二十論》的重要註釋書。按照護法的詮釋，《二十論》的開頭先引經證、而後立量理證，其中瞖眼人的知覺是論證中的重要實例（喻依），瞖眼人的眼識有如同毛髮等物一樣的顯現，然其所見的毛髮等物是不存在的。對瞖眼人此例，《寶生論》中的論敵給出一實在論的因果說明，認為是透過白色網膜縫隙的光明分造成瞖眼人見髮的錯覺，瞖眼人的知覺並非沒有外境。對此質疑，護法訴諸陳那在《觀所緣論》中提到的所緣（ālambana）（認識對象）的二個條件來批評論敵。作為所緣的必要條件之一（C1），就是要在感官識中顯現，亦即感官識要有所緣的相（ākāra）。所緣的必要條件之二（C2），就是具有讓認識（對該所緣的知覺）生起的因果作用。護法認為，即便設許論敵的說明符合 C2 條件，但因缺乏 C1 條件，因此瞖眼人所緣並非外境。針對餓鬼們同見膿河的例子，雙方也有類似的交鋒。分析護法論證的合理性的策略之一，是與當代議題交涉或對話。大致上我們可以說，當代知覺因果論（the causal theory of perception）的基本要點類似於前述之所緣二條件 C1 與 C2，不僅如此，知覺因果論者均同意，在某人 X 面前沒有某事物 Y 時，對 X 而言看起來好像有某個 Y 仍是可能的，如同世親與護法所言，前面沒有髮、膿河，仍可能有髮、膿河的知覺經驗。也就是說，非正常知覺與正常知覺可具有共同要素（例如顯現），此點正是支持實在論的非此即彼論（disjunctivism）所極力反對的。本文對非此即彼論提出嘗試性的批評，以支持護法與知覺因果論。
The Cheng weishi baosheng lun is Dharmapāla’s commentary on Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā-vṛtti. According to Dharmapāla, in the beginning of the Viṃśikā, Vasubandhu cites the scripture and then presents his argument, in which the visual perception of taimirikas is an important example (dṛṣṭānta), i.e. there are appearances of hairs, etc. in the visual consciousness although those external objects of hairs, etc. are not existent. Regarding this example, the opponent in the Baosheng lun gives a realistic and causal explanation which suggests that the illusion of seeing hairs is caused by the split of light passing through the white-net membrane on the eye, and therefore it’s not the case that there are no external objects for that kind of illusion. In Dharmapāla’s response, the two criteria of ālambana (cognitive object) in Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣā-vṛtti are employed. The first (C1) is that the object must be that which appears in the cognition. In other words, a sensory cognition arises with the ākāra of the object. The second (C2) is that the object must be the cause of its cognition. Dharmapāla points out that even if he had accepted that in the opponent’s explanation C2 is met, the objects of the illusion of seeing hairs are not external objects because C1 is not met. Regarding another example of the pus river seen by hungry ghosts, the debate between Dharmapāla and his opponent is similar. This paper on Buddhist philosophy also tries to engage with contemporary philosophy of perception. Roughly speaking, the basic points of the causal theory of perception are similar to C1 and C2. Furthermore, the causal theory of perception suggests that it is possible that it seems as if there is Y for a person X even though there is not Y, like the examples of the illusions of seeing hairs, pus rivers used by Vasubandhu and Dharmapāla. That is to say, veridical perception and non-veridical perception have a common element, which is rejected by the disjunctivists in favor of realism. This paper provides some tentative arguments against the disjunctivism to support the causal theory of perception and the Baosheng lun. Hopefully it shows that the theory of consciousness-only is not so easily dismissed.關聯 正觀, No.89, pp.71-135 資料類型 article dc.contributor 哲學系 dc.creator (作者) 胡志強 dc.creator (作者) Hu, Chih-chiang dc.date (日期) 2019-06 dc.date.accessioned 28-Mar-2022 14:42:31 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 28-Mar-2022 14:42:31 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 28-Mar-2022 14:42:31 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/139452 - dc.description.abstract (摘要) 護法《成唯識寶生論》是世親《唯識二十論》的重要註釋書。按照護法的詮釋，《二十論》的開頭先引經證、而後立量理證，其中瞖眼人的知覺是論證中的重要實例（喻依），瞖眼人的眼識有如同毛髮等物一樣的顯現，然其所見的毛髮等物是不存在的。對瞖眼人此例，《寶生論》中的論敵給出一實在論的因果說明，認為是透過白色網膜縫隙的光明分造成瞖眼人見髮的錯覺，瞖眼人的知覺並非沒有外境。對此質疑，護法訴諸陳那在《觀所緣論》中提到的所緣（ālambana）（認識對象）的二個條件來批評論敵。作為所緣的必要條件之一（C1），就是要在感官識中顯現，亦即感官識要有所緣的相（ākāra）。所緣的必要條件之二（C2），就是具有讓認識（對該所緣的知覺）生起的因果作用。護法認為，即便設許論敵的說明符合 C2 條件，但因缺乏 C1 條件，因此瞖眼人所緣並非外境。針對餓鬼們同見膿河的例子，雙方也有類似的交鋒。分析護法論證的合理性的策略之一，是與當代議題交涉或對話。大致上我們可以說，當代知覺因果論（the causal theory of perception）的基本要點類似於前述之所緣二條件 C1 與 C2，不僅如此，知覺因果論者均同意，在某人 X 面前沒有某事物 Y 時，對 X 而言看起來好像有某個 Y 仍是可能的，如同世親與護法所言，前面沒有髮、膿河，仍可能有髮、膿河的知覺經驗。也就是說，非正常知覺與正常知覺可具有共同要素（例如顯現），此點正是支持實在論的非此即彼論（disjunctivism）所極力反對的。本文對非此即彼論提出嘗試性的批評，以支持護法與知覺因果論。 dc.description.abstract (摘要) The Cheng weishi baosheng lun is Dharmapāla’s commentary on Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā-vṛtti. According to Dharmapāla, in the beginning of the Viṃśikā, Vasubandhu cites the scripture and then presents his argument, in which the visual perception of taimirikas is an important example (dṛṣṭānta), i.e. there are appearances of hairs, etc. in the visual consciousness although those external objects of hairs, etc. are not existent. Regarding this example, the opponent in the Baosheng lun gives a realistic and causal explanation which suggests that the illusion of seeing hairs is caused by the split of light passing through the white-net membrane on the eye, and therefore it’s not the case that there are no external objects for that kind of illusion. In Dharmapāla’s response, the two criteria of ālambana (cognitive object) in Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣā-vṛtti are employed. The first (C1) is that the object must be that which appears in the cognition. In other words, a sensory cognition arises with the ākāra of the object. The second (C2) is that the object must be the cause of its cognition. Dharmapāla points out that even if he had accepted that in the opponent’s explanation C2 is met, the objects of the illusion of seeing hairs are not external objects because C1 is not met. Regarding another example of the pus river seen by hungry ghosts, the debate between Dharmapāla and his opponent is similar. This paper on Buddhist philosophy also tries to engage with contemporary philosophy of perception. Roughly speaking, the basic points of the causal theory of perception are similar to C1 and C2. Furthermore, the causal theory of perception suggests that it is possible that it seems as if there is Y for a person X even though there is not Y, like the examples of the illusions of seeing hairs, pus rivers used by Vasubandhu and Dharmapāla. That is to say, veridical perception and non-veridical perception have a common element, which is rejected by the disjunctivists in favor of realism. This paper provides some tentative arguments against the disjunctivism to support the causal theory of perception and the Baosheng lun. Hopefully it shows that the theory of consciousness-only is not so easily dismissed. dc.format.extent 872286 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.relation (關聯) 正觀, No.89, pp.71-135 dc.subject (關鍵詞) 護法;所緣;成唯識寶生論;知覺因果論;非此即彼論 dc.subject (關鍵詞) Dharmapāla;ālambana;Cheng weishi baosheng lun;the causal theory of perception;disjunctivism dc.title (題名) 護法《成唯識寶生論》論知覺及其所緣：兼與當代理論之交涉 dc.title (題名) Dharmapāla on Perception and ālambana in the Cheng weishi baosheng lun: Engaging with Contemporary Philosophy of Perception dc.type (資料類型) article
